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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Kuwait does not only depend on oil as a sole source of revenue, but has also 
nullified all taxes since the discovery of oil in 1938. Under the request of foreign 
oil companies extracting and exporting Kuwaiti oil, the Kuwaiti government 
founded a primitive tax law which imposes a tax instead of a royalty on foreign 
oil companies in order to enable them to credit taxes paid to the Kuwaiti 
government against taxes they owe to their home states. This poorly drafted piece 
of legislation which is criticised for being ambiguous and lacking the adequate 
provisions to regulate crucial tax related issues is Income Tax Decree 3/1955, the 
Decree continued to govern taxation in Kuwait even after the full nationalization 
of the oil company in 1979, imposing income tax upon the profits of foreign 
enterprises carrying out trade and business in Kuwait.  
 
Depending on a sole source of wealth and a highly unstable one such as oil means 
that the Kuwaiti economy fluctuates considerably; from the oil boom in the 1970s 
to the sharp economic stagnation in the 1980s this economic instability coupled 
with the fast depletion of oil reserves, the government’s over spending, the poor 
social responsibility due to the absence of individual tax and finally the 
extravagant welfare system, have all contributed to the current deficit in the 
Kuwaiti budget and have stimulated the government to rethink the possibility of 
introducing taxes back into the state.  
 
With taxation being an infinite source of revenue, this thesis argues that there is 
an imminent need for Kuwait to advance its fiscal system in an attempt to possibly 
turn taxation into a secondary source of revenue in the state. Kuwait has the 
potential to attract foreign direct investment which in turn can yield more tax 
revenues to the state; however, much improvement needs to be made to Kuwait’s 
fiscal law. The government’s attempt to reform the Income Tax Decree of 3/1955 
through the 2008 Amendments did not eliminate much of the Decree’s shortfalls. 
This thesis studies the Kuwaiti tax system closely from a legal economic point of 
view and provides realistic recommendations on how to reform the current system 
in order to make Kuwait a more attractive jurisdiction for foreign investment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 An Overview of the Thesis 
 
The need to find a second source of income for an oil dependant Kuwait has 
become a fundamental one. The discovery of oil in 1938 replaced a relatively 
adequate tax system that had existed in the country from 1752 until the beginning 
of oil exportation in 1946.  Kuwait’s dependency on a single source of revenue 
(oil) has resulted in numerous social, economic and political disparities. First, 
socially; by pumping enormous oil revenues into the state, oil allowed Kuwait to 
create an increasingly growing government bureaucracy that plays the role of the 
main provider for the people, employing 88% of the population, and offering a 
lavish subsidising policy that has caused unequal wealth distribution, where the 
more an individual consumes, the larger his share of the public funding will be. 
Second, economically; Kuwait extracts oil and does not produce it, thus the 
country lives off its capital and not income, the instability of oil prices (fluctuating 
according to economic ups and downs), and oil being a non-renewable source of 
income makes relying on it an even more acute problem. Third, politically; oil 
provides large financial assets in the hands of political leaders opening 
opportunities for theft and to maintain themselves in power, also oil wealth can 
produce weak state structures that make corrupt practices considerably easier for 
government officials especially when the country is associated with concentrated 
bureaucratic powers which increases the difficulty of securing transparency.   
 2 
 
Chapter 2 provides the philosophical background for this thesis, by exploring the 
Islamic and Western theory on the concept of redistribution of wealth. Kuwait 
being an Islamic country where many believe that there needn’t be tax reform due 
to the existence of the Islamic duty of almsgiving (Zakat), has raised the need to 
carry an assessment of Zakat in Islamic philosophy and an assessment of taxation 
in Western theory, with an emphasis on the advantages and disadvantages of both, 
and setting both Zakat and taxation against Adam Smith’s four requirements for 
an efficient tax system, namely: equity, certainty, convenience, and efficiency.  
Chapter 3 describes Kuwait before and after oil, how oil has changed the dynamic 
of social, political and economic life in Kuwait, with reference to the economic 
term “Rentier State” an economic political phenomenon that results from total oil 
dependency. This chapter also touches on other domestic and international 
economic downturns of oil dependency and stresses on the need to diversify 
economic resources. 
Chapter 4 provides an outline of the Kuwaiti tax system with a close assessment 
of the previous Income Tax Decree No. 3/1955 and the new Tax Law 
Amendments of 2/2008 by highlighting the shortfalls of each of the legislations 
with a special emphasis on the problem of the agency and distribution relationship 
between nationals and foreign enterprises carrying on business in Kuwait. 
This thesis argues in favour of tax reform that can assist in attracting more foreign 
investment into Kuwait’s jurisdiction and thus raise the tax revenues. However, 
since Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the 
Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) which call on the harmonization of some 
fiscal regulations between Member States of the Agreements, an important 
 3 
 
question arises on whether or not Kuwait has the discretion to reform its domestic 
fiscal system unilaterally or do such agreements pose a restriction upon Kuwait’s 
fiscal freedom? Chapter 5 answers this question. 
Chapter 6 of this thesis examines Kuwait’s Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs), as 
International taxation plays the most crucial role in Foreign Direct Investment, 
this chapter looks closely at how Kuwait’s DTTs tackle key issues such as: 
Permanent Establishment, profits and other types of income, the Elimination of 
Double Taxation, and the concept of Non-discrimination, it also proposes possible 
amendments to Kuwait’s DTTs that may assist in yielding more international tax 
revenue. 
Chapter 7 provides an empirical study, with questionnaires and interviews 
conducted with three survey samples who work closely with Kuwait’s Tax Law, 
i.e. the Tax Auditors, the Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) and finally the Tax 
Department employees. The survey conducted reveals the samples attitudes 
towards Kuwait’s fiscal laws and proposes possible amendments to help make 
Kuwait more attractive for FDI. 
The final Chapter, Chapter 8, revisits what this thesis is seeking to establish and 
takes an overall look at each of the areas of inquiry in earlier chapters. Chapter 8 
also proposes tax reform and possible effective recommendations to improve 
Kuwait’s tax legislation and the services of the Kuwaiti Tax Department. In 
addition to this, Chapter 8 discusses what might be achievable in Kuwait in the 
short and longer term and sheds light on possible future research on relative 
questions outside the scope of this thesis and concludes with overall 
recommendations. 
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1.2 Research Questions and Methodology 
 
The fact that Kuwait depends entirely on one source of income; that being oil, has 
provoked the question of what other resources a country such as Kuwait with no 
industry or agriculture can rely on after oil has become insufficient to satisfy the 
countries growing economic, and financial demands. This has led to the main 
research question of this thesis i.e. how to enhance Kuwait’s tax system in order 
to transform the Kuwaiti market into a more attractive and inviting jurisdiction for 
foreign enterprises? This question has led to many other questions, such as, 
whether or not Zakat, an Islamic method of redistribution of wealth could replace 
taxation in Kuwait? This is addressed in chapter 2. What were the damaging 
effects of the current situation of total oil dependency? This is explored in 
chapters 3. What are the shortcomings of the current fiscal system in Kuwait? 
This has been explored extensively in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines the 
restraints which economic agreements Kuwait is a member of may have on 
Kuwait’s ability to reform its tax legislation unilaterally. Chapter 6 answers the 
question; what is Kuwait’s international tax policy, and how does Kuwait 
construct its DTTs with other states. Empirical work and findings on what foreign 
enterprises think of the Kuwaiti tax law and how it can be improved is provided in 
Chapter 7 in addition to the opinions of Tax Auditors and the Tax Department 
employees. The last chapter of this thesis concludes with recommendations on 
how to improve Kuwait’s fiscal system. 
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In the process of writing this thesis both qualitative and quantitative methods were 
used; qualitative methods such as interviews with foreign enterprises doing 
business in Kuwait, Tax auditors in Kuwait and tax inspectors from the Kuwaiti 
Tax Department, in addition to a number of case studies were used to answer 
many questions regarding the agency problem in Kuwait’s tax law. Quantitative 
methods were also used in questionnaires that were distributed to the same 
samples mentioned above.  
 
1.3 Existing Literature and Scope for Future Research  
 
Although some insignificant research has been done on the assessment of the 
Kuwaiti Tax Policies, the literature found was either outdated or does not answer 
all of the questions mentioned above. Baker (1986) touches very briefly on the 
aspects of international taxation in Kuwait; however this is was conducted under 
the rules of the previous Kuwait Income Tax Decree No. 3/1955. Al Rashed 
(1992, 2000, and 2006) asses the Kuwaiti tax system from an economist 
perspective, and provides a comparison between Zakat and tax from an 
accountancy point of view, these publications however are earlier than the 
amendments of 2008 and thus include nothing about the changes and amendments 
made to the law. Al Muzaini (1984) provides a historical development of the 
Kuwaiti tax system, and argues that Zakat can serve as an adequate instrument of 
redistribution of wealth; this publication is again outdated and concentrates more 
on Zakat than taxation. The annual tax brochures which are produced by Auditing 
Firms in Kuwait such as Ernst and Young, and AlBazie& Co. are informative but 
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too brief and target potential clients (foreign enterprise looking to invest in 
Kuwait) thus they tend to leave question un-answered to attract more potential 
clients. Although the latest editions do touch on the amendments of 2008, they do 
so very briefly without any analysis, and there is no mention of DTTs.  
There is tremendous scope for future research on the topic of Kuwait’s taxation: 
VAT and Individual Income Tax are definitely worth revisiting. However the 
reformation of the Kuwaiti Tax Department, and other departments linked to 
intensifying FDI in the country such as the Foreign Direct Invest Bureau and the 
Free Trade Zone are entities that suffer from poor management and are in 
desperate need of improvement. Taxing National Companies can also be a useful 
future project.    
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Chapter 2: Finding an Alternative Source of Income for Oil 
Dependent Kuwait: Redistribution of Wealth in Islamic 
Philosophy and Western Theory with Themes drawn from Zakat 
and Taxation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Kuwait’s complete dependency on oil revenues 1 has resulted in the need to find a 
new source of revenue, a renewable and stable source that helps eliminate the 
downsides of oil dependency. Taxation is of course a consistent method to raise 
revenue for government expenditure2. However, before suggesting tax reform in 
Kuwait there are some important social, religious and economic elements to 
consider: first, Kuwait as a Muslim country3 exercises the Islamic alms duty of 
Zakat4. Although paying Zakat is now voluntary in Kuwait, some Muslim 
scholars call for the implementation of Zakat rather than taxation and argue that 
Zakat has many advantages over taxation, these arguments are discussed in more 
detail below5. Second, in the past (1752 – 1946) Kuwait had a fairly adequate tax 
system where duties on imports were collected. Today Zakat is voluntary and 
although duties on imports are still collected, no taxes are imposed other than a 
                                                 
1 See pp.76 - 95 in Chapter 3 for a discussion on the economic downsides of oil dependency. 
2 Governments direct tax revenues towards services which private enterprise cannot provide, such 
as defence and law and order. Tax revenues are also spent on services thought better provided on a 
universal basis, such as social security benefits and education. Other important purposes for 
taxation include the redistribution of wealth and income, controlling the economy by imposing 
high custom duties on rival imported goods to protect domestic industries, and social control.  
3 With 85% of the Kuwaiti population being Muslims, UN data, Country profile, 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=KUWAIT, [8/3/2010]. 
4 A system of redistributing wealth in Islam, one of the pillars of Islam, Zakat is the obligatory 
transfer of a prescribed proportion of property by a Muslim who owns more wealth than the limit 
dictated under Islamic Law (shari’a), Richardson, G. (2004), Islamic Law and Zakat: Waqf 
Resources in Pakistan, in Islam and Social Policy, Vanderbilt University Press, p.156. 
5 See pp. 20-23. 
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flat rate 15% corporate income tax on foreign enterprises carrying out business in 
Kuwait6. Thus the idea of imposing a new system of taxation after more than sixty 
years of non taxation will not be an easy task, with such little fiscal awareness the 
Kuwaiti people will most probably reject a tax on their income. Third, there is a 
strong opposition from the Kuwaiti people towards the implementation of a 
western income tax7, Kuwaiti domestic enterprises are also opposed to paying 
taxes and claim they are entitled to a more favourable fiscal treatment than foreign 
enterprises working in Kuwait8. In addition to this domestic hostility towards 
taxes, Kuwait’s objective of attracting more FDI creates a restriction when taxing 
foreign enterprises, as a competitive tax rate is vital to materialize Kuwait’s 
objective of attracting more FDI and maximising tax revenues9.   
This chapter attempts to provide a close look at Zakat, what it is from the 
viewpoint of Islamic philosophy, and its advantages and limitations as a method 
of redistribution of wealth. Also, due to the religious nature of Zakat, this chapter 
attempts to underline what positive and negative affects religion has on economic 
development. Finally, this chapter discusses the theoretical foundation of western 
taxation, looking at different western theories which attempt to justify why the 
state has a right over the personal property of individuals, with special emphasis 
on John Rawls’s social primary goods approach in which he focuses on 
individuals’ resources and explains why the better off must always use their 
endowments to relieve the suffering of the worse off in society, otherwise known 
                                                 
6 See p. 143. 
7 The Kuwaiti people argue that their payment of voluntary Zakat represents redistribution of 
wealth and thus they should not be liable to pay tax.   
8 See p.101 and p.113. 
9 The issues of treating Kuwaiti domestic enterprise more favourably tax wise and attracting 
foreign investment through a more competitive corporate income tax rate is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 4, p. 113. 
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as the difference principle, with reference to the opposite opinion of his rival 
Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach, in which he does not put as much 
weight on ones resources as on ones capability for turning such resources into 
functionings.  
 
The claim by the Kuwaiti people that their voluntary payment of Zakat substitutes 
a western tax, and the argument by Muslim scholars10 that Zakat is an efficient 
system of redistribution of wealth opens up the opportunity to explore what Zakat 
is, and whether Zakat suffices as a system for redistribution of wealth.   
 
2.2 Zakat in Islam 
  
Although the word “Zakat” holds numerous meanings in the literary sense11, in 
Islamic terminology, Zakat is the process where a certain amount of property or 
money is collected from those who are sufficiently endowed to be given to the 
needy, with donors, recipients, and the proportion of required donations being 
clearly specified in both the Qur’an and Sunna12. Zakat with its specific isab 
(required minimum wealth) and conditions was decreed compulsory as the third 
pillar of Islam13. There are verses in the Qur’an which provide evidence for the 
obligation of Zakat: 
“Establish Salat14 and pay Zakat15...” 
                                                 
10 Including the jurists of the four main schools of thought in Islam: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, and 
Hanbali. Other scholars such as Al Qardawi, Al Ghazalli, Siddiqi, Jehle, Abdul Rahman, Qutb, 
Turtushi, Khadduri and many others. 
11 To profit, to purify, to increase, to be worthy, mercy, truth, and blessing.  
12 Senturk, O. (2007), A comprehensive Guide to Zakat: charity in Islam, The Light, pp. 3-4. 
13 Following salat (prayer) and fasting. 
14 Prayer. 
15 The Qur’an, Surat Al Ahzab 33:33. 
 10 
 
“If you establish Salat, disburse Zakat and believe in my messengers16...” 
 
In the Sunna17 the prophet Mohammed provides the following when asked by his 
followers “what is Islam?”; 
“Islam is for you to worship God alone, to establish Salat, to give the obligatory 
Zakat and to fast Ramadan18.” 
 
Kuwait as a Muslim country recognizes the religious duty of almsgiving ‘Zakat’ 
as a method to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor; although Zakat used 
to be obligatory19, with time it gradually became voluntary20 in some countries 
such as Kuwait, However in countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and 
Malaysia Zakat is to this day mandatory.  
The reasons Zakat plays an important role in Islamic faith are the benefits Zakat 
can bring to society. A quick glance at the categories of Zakat recipients who are 
specifically numbered in the Qur’an reveals the important social aspect of Zakat: 
“Collected Zakat is for: the poor, the destitute, those who collect it, reconciling 
people’s hearts, freeing slaves, those in debt, spending in the way of Allah, and 
travellers. An obligation imposed by Allah
21
” 
 
2.2.1 The Benefits of Zakat   
 
1. A Social Insurance System 
 
                                                 
16 The Qur’an, Surat Al Maida 5:12. 
17 Sayings and actions by Prophet Mohammed followed by Muslims. 
18 Bukhari, Muslim. 
19 It was enforced by Abu Bakr the first Khalifa (successor of the Prophet Mohammed) who 
justified using force in collecting Zakat from those refusing to pay it, implying that those who 
refuse to pay Zakat are not true Muslims: “I will fight those who differentiate between prayer and 
Zakat”.  
20
Over time Zakat slowly began to be interpreted as a voluntary offering of charity, this 
misconception stemmed especially from confusing Zakat with another voluntary form of charity in 
Islam named “Sadaqa”.  Sadaqa is used in the Qur’an as a synonym for Zakat; however, it often 
refers to the broader concept of charitable offerings. 
21 AL Qur’an, Surat Al Tawbah, The Qur’an 9:60. 
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Zakat is the cornerstone of Islam’s social insurance system; it provides relief to 
those in need and collects funds from those who have access to money. Zakat 
does not depend on individual voluntary charity, but on a governmental institution 
that collects regular contributions and distributes organized relief to all those who 
are in need22. 
 
2. Reducing Social Disparities 
 
According to Jehle23 on the effects of Zakat in Pakistan – where Zakat is 
obligatory24 Zakat has led to a reduction in income inequality and to an 
unambiguous increase in the social welfare in every province of Pakistan. Others 
also agree that Zakat helps achieve economic justice by reducing the gap between 
the rich and the poor25. In addition, Abdul Rahman 26 argues that Zakat increases 
the purchasing power of the poor, so eventually this would lead to “economic 
growth through an increase in consumption expenditure and aggregate demand”27. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Theoretical Basis for Zakat 
 
                                                 
22 Qardawi, Y. (1999), Fiqh Az.Zakat: A Comparative Study, Dar Al Taqwa, pp. 550-551.  
23 Jehle, G. A. (1994), Zakat and Inequality: Some Evidence from Pakistan, 1994, Review of 
Income and Wealth, Series 40, Number 2, June, pp. 205-216. 
24 Only five Islamic countries today enforce an obligatory Zakat system: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, and Brunei. 
25 Molla, R.I., Moten R.A, Gusau, S.A., Gwandu A.A. (1988), Frontiers and Mechanics of Islamic 
Economics, University of Sokoto, Nigeria, pp. 73. 
26 Abdul Rahman, A. (2002), Zakat Accounting: Creating Business Wealth, Akauntan Nasional, 
pp. 11-16. 
27 Azharuddin, M. (1998), Role of Zakat in a Modern Economy with Reference to Bangladesh, 
(cited in) Molla, R. (et al) (1988), Frontiers and Mechanics of Islamic Economics, University of 
Sokoto, Nigeria 68 – 155. 
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There are also several theories that attempt to explain the theoretical basis for 
Zakat. The first of these theories is the theory of obligation. The supporters of this 
theory explain Zakat the same way that other Islamic religious duties are 
explained, i.e. God who is the creator and provides has the right to charge his 
servants with an obligation in thankfulness to him. Another theory is the theory of 
vicegerency (the position of authority). The basic element of this theory is that all 
goods, in fact, belong to God, and that human beings are only vicergents, while 
God is the owner of everything28.  Also through the theory of solidarity, human 
beings are social creatures, thus even in the procuring of wealth and income by an 
individual, society plays an important role. Consequently, private wealth must 
have a facet that is, at the same time, part of the wealth of society as a whole. 
Allah addresses the Muslim community, 
“Do not hand over to the simple minded any property in your hands for which 
Allah has made you responsible.” (4:5)29 
 
The passage from the Qur’an indicates that property and wealth belong to society 
as much as to individuals, to the extent that Muslim jurists deduce that abusers of 
their private wealth must be prevented from practising control over their assets 
since wealth belongs to the whole society as well as the individual owners. 
Finally, the theory of brotherhood among Muslims, which is rooted deeper than 
the idea of solidarity, and is considered more influential, since solidarity is a 
mutual exchange while brotherhood implies selfless giving and sacrifice30. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Mahjub, R. (2004), Al Iqtisad Al Siyasi, Vol. 1, pp. 191-192. Arabic Reference. 
29 The Qur’an, Surat Al Nisa (4:5). 
30 Al Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
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2.2.3 Assets Subject to Zakat  
 
The Qur’an does not give the definition of the kinds of wealth on which Zakat 
should be paid. It is left to the Sunna to give, by example or by directives, details 
of the general Qur’anic command and to convert the theoretical axioms of the 
Qur’an into a living reality in human life. The Qur’an does mention, however, a 
few zakatable assets, these are: (1) gold and silver, according to the Qur’anic 
verse: 
 “As for those who hoard up gold and silver and do not spend it in the way of 
Allah, give them the news of their punishment” (9:34)31. 
 
(2) Crops and fruits, referred to in the Qur’an:  
“Eat of their fruit when they bear fruit and pay their due on the day of their 
harvest” (6:141)32; 
 
(3) What is extracted from the earth: the above Qur’anic verse continues: 
 
“and some of what the earth produces for you”(6:141)33; 
 
(4) Earning from trade and other business ventures, referred to in the verse: 
 
“O you who believe, give away some of the good things you have earned” 
(2:267)34. 
 
Except for the examples above, the Qur’an mentions Zakat in general and the 
word amwal (assets or wealth) in its plural form such as in the Qur’anic verse: 
“Take sadaqa
35
 from their wealth to purify and cleanse them” (9:103)36 and “and 
the beggars and destitute received a due share of their wealth” (51:19)37. 
                                                 
31 The Qur’an, Surat Al Tawba (9:34) 
32 The Qur’an, Surat Al An’am (6:141).  
33 Id. 
34 The Qur’an, Surat Al Baqara (2:267). 
35 Another form of alms giving in Islam, however, Sadaqa has always been voluntary as opposed 
to Zakat which is obligatory. 
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2.2.4 Conditions Required in Amwal (wealth) for Zakat Collection 
 
Three conditions must exist in the wealth in order for it to be liable for Zakat: 
ownership, growth, and reaching a minimum threshold isab38.  
 
1. Ownership:  meaning the Muslim who owns the wealth subject to Zakat must 
have control and authority over this wealth and have exclusive right of 
disposition over it. From this first condition the exceptions to the wealth which is 
not liable to Zakat can be defined: 
a. Property in public trust, this includes public trusts for the poor, for mosques, 
orphans, schools etc., is not subject to Zakat. 
b. Unlawful wealth, this excludes any wealth acquired through unlawful means such 
as theft, counterfeiting, bribery, interest, monopoly or cheating. 
c. Debt: Zakat on debt is disputable, there are three views. The first, is that the 
creditor must pay Zakat for all the past years upon repayment of the debt
39
. The 
second is the creditor should pay Zakat for the past year only upon repayment of 
the debt
40
. And the third, is that the creditor does not owe any Zakat 
whatsoever
41
. 
 
2. Growth: the second condition for Zakat is that the wealth concerned must either 
be actually growing or have the potential for growth. Growth means something 
that provides the owner with profit and benefit. The rational for this condition is 
that Zakat has been legislated to help and relieve the poor without impoverishing 
the rich, by having the rich pay from their surplus, taking a little from the plenty. 
Imposing Zakat on wealth that does not by definition grow reverses this 
purpose
42
. 
3. Reaching Nisab: Zakat is not imposed on all amounts of growing wealth, there is 
a minimum required for Zakat which is called Nisab. A saying by the prophet 
Mohamed exempts anything that is less than five camels, forty sheep, two 
hundred silver dirhams
43
, or five wasqs
44
 of grain, fruits or agricultural crops. 
The equivalent of Nisab today is 2.5% (or 1/40) of one’s eligible growing wealth. 
                                                                                                                                     
36 The Qur’an, Surat Al Tawbah, (9:103). 
37 The Qur’an, Surat Al Zariyat, (51:19). 
38 Al Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
39 The view of Muslim scholars Ali and Ibn Abbas.  
40 The view of Muslim scholars Al Hasan, Umar Ibn AbdulAziz and Malik. 
41 The view of Muslim scholar Abu Hanifa. 
42 Al Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
43 A silver coin used as currency. 
44 A measure of volume used in agriculture. 
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The condition of Nisab as a minimum for paying Zakat is agreed upon among all 
scholars, except in the case of crops, fruit, and minerals. Abu Hanifa
45
 considers 
anything that comes out of the earth to be subject to Zakat, while other Muslim 
scholars see Nisab as a necessary condition for Zakat on all kinds of wealth 
whether it comes from the earth or not.  
There are three conditions which must be satisfied in the Nisab:  
 
a. Excess above essential need: this means that Nisab must be in excess of the 
basic need of the owner, i.e. Zakat is imposed only on the surplus of wealth, 
the surplus understood and defined as the excess after satisfying needs. 
b. Freedom of debt: if the owner of the wealth is burdened by debts that exceed 
the Nisab or reduce the assets worth to below the Nisab Zakat is not obliged. 
c. The passage of a year: twelve full lunar months should pass from the 
beginning of the ownership or past the due date of Zakat for Zakat to accrue 
again
46
.    
The above are the requirements outlining the wealth liable to Zakat, but who are 
the Zakat payers? 
 
2.2.5 Persons Liable to Pay Zakat 
 
There is an agreement amongst most Muslim jurists that Zakat is an obligation for 
any Muslim who has reached puberty, who is sane, who is free47, and who owns 
the minimum Nisab. Thus Zakat is only obligatory upon Muslims and is not 
required upon non-Mulims because it is part of the religion and could not be 
expected from those who do not believe in Islam. The fact that Zakat is only 
obligatory upon Muslims has raised the question of whether it is possible in an 
Islamic State for an equivalent of Zakat to be taken from non-Muslims as tax. 
During the reign of prophet Mohamed and the two Khalifat who succeeded him, 
Abu Baker and Umar Ibn Al Khatab non-Muslims living in Muslim countries did 
                                                 
45 The leader of one of the four main schools of jurisprudence in Islamic Fiqh, the others are Ibin 
Malik, Al Shafi, and Al Hanbali. 
46 Al Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
47 The issue of slavery is not discussed any more as it is not relevant to our time anymore. 
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pay a financial duty to the Islamic State they resided in called by the Qur’an 
‘Jizya’
48
 as a contribution towards the public expenditure of the State that covers 
disability, old age and poverty insurance. However, Jizya, is not implemented 
today and Muslim jurists have not reached a consensus as to whether non-
Muslims living in Muslim States should pay an equivalent to Zakat in taxation49. 
 
2.2.6 Beneficiaries of Zakat 
 
Zakat is divided equally among appropriate groups of beneficiaries. Zakat’s 
beneficiaries are restricted to eight groups which are mentioned in the Qur’an:  
“The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and 
those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, 
and for the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer; a duty imposed by Allah” 
(9:60)50  
 
This Qur’anic passage is important in jurisprudence as it defines eight proper 
beneficiaries of Zakat, the first group of recipients is the poor, those who are in 
material need. The second group are the needy, they are similar to the poor, some 
scholars have treated two groups as synonymous, however, a more traditional 
view is to describe an order of priority, so that the poor take priority over the 
needy. The third category is “those who collect them” this has been interpreted as 
an allocation to cover the costs of collecting and distributing alms. Historically 
when Zakat was collected by Muslim States as a tax, this category was used to 
justify State administrative costs. The fourth category are “those whose hearts are 
to be reconciled” this category represents those who were recently converted to 
                                                 
48 A tax imposed upon non-Muslims who resided under the authority of an Islamic State. 
49 Al Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
50 The Qur’an, Surat Al Tawbah (9:60). 
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Islam, another interpretation includes those who are sympathetic to Islam but are 
not yet believers, this second interpretation has been used to justify financial 
support for missionary activities and potential converts.51 The fifth and sixth 
recipients are captives and debtors. The freeing of captives refers to ransoming 
prisoners captured in war, or the purchasing of slaves’ freedom, although debtors 
may include those who are enslaved, it also includes those who are burdened in 
debt. The seventh category is “for the cause of Allah”, historically, this was used 
to support those who served as warriors for the defence of Islam. The final 
category of recipients is the “wayfarers” this justifies expenditure of Zakat money 
to support travellers52. Thus it is concluded from this that those who are to receive 
Zakat monies are limited and that Zakat was not meant to be allocated towards 
financing public goods and services53. 
 
When it comes to regulating Islamic matters not clearly treated by the Qur’an or 
the Sunna, Islamic theorists turn to ‘Ijtihad’. Ijtihad in Islam is the art of 
interpretation within Islamic jurisprudence; it is the process of seeking to form 
correct legal opinions through reasoning from the Quran and the Sunna. 
Whenever there was no clear text on a particular issue, jurists used methods of 
analogy and consensus, and depending upon the school of thought, custom, public 
policy analysis, necessity, and judicial discretion to reach a decision consistent 
with Qur’anic principles54. And as has been mentioned above55 the Qur’an does 
                                                 
51 Kassis, E. H. (1983), A Concordance of the QUR’A, University of California Press, p. 431.   
52 Al Ghazali, A. H. (1975), The Mysteries of Alms Giving, Books Concern, translated by Nabin 
Faris, pp.5-11. 
53 See pp. 23-28 for a discussion on the limitation of Zakat as a method of redistribution of wealth. 
54 Hallaq, W. B. (1997), A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al 
Fiqh, Cambridge University Press, pp.10-15. 
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not give the definition of the type of wealth upon which Zakat should be paid. 
Also there are different opinions on matters such as paying Zakat on debt56. And 
even when most Muslim theorists believe that Zakat should only be imposed on 
Muslims, there are still some who believe that non-Muslims living in a Muslims 
States should be liable to pay Zakat57. This means that Muslim scholars must use 
Ijtihad to reach a consensus, however, and agreement between different jurists 
isn’t always achieved. There are four main schools of thought in Islamic 
jurisprudence: 
 
 
2.2.7 The Four Classic School of Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) 
 
In Islamic theory, the four main schools of fiqh are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, and 
Hanbali. These schools of thought and interpretation take their names from the 
Islmaic jurists who established them. 
(1) The Hanafis believe that although government authorities may collect Zakat, 
they are limited to collecting “visible” property (live stock and crops). Also the 
Hanafi scholar Abu Yusuf specifically excludes non-Muslims as possible Zakat 
beneficiaries, and donors may not give in ways that benefit themselves58. (2) The 
Malikis allowed Zakat to be imposed upon non-Muslims; along with Shafis (see 
below) the Malikis believe that the poor have an actual property right in the 
wealth of the rich. Unlike Hanafis, however, the Malikis consider all Zakatable 
property to be subject to government collection whether the property is visible or 
                                                                                                                                     
55 See p. 13. 
56 See p. 14. 
57 See pp. 15-16. 
58 Calder, N. (1993), Studies of Early Muslim Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, pp. 32- 154. 
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not.59 (3) Al Shafis, on the other hand, do not view debt as any sort of adjustment 
or limitation on the amount of the Zakat owed. Although Shafis adopt the Hanafi 
distinction between visible and non-visible goods, nearly all goods are considered 
non-visible to the Shafis, thus removing them from the collection powers of the 
government. Further, Shafi jurisprudence generally requires equal distribution to 
the applicable beneficiary categories in order to avoid human discretion in the 
allocation process60. (4)  The Hanbali was influenced by the work of Imam Shafi. 
His jurisprudence emphasized a literal reading of the Qur’an and the Sunna, 
limiting the use of analogy and other interpretive sources which tended to increase 
judicial discretion and innovation. According to the Hanablis, Zakat liability does 
not apply to debt owed on gold, silver, or trade goods in order to avoid the 
situation in which a person might owe Zakat even when his actual net worth does 
not exceed Nisab.61  
 
The above has been an introduction to the meaning of Zakat in Islam; the 
following however, attempts to shed some light on the advantages of Zakat in the 
viewpoint of Islam, as Zakat is believed to achieve social justice in the Muslim 
society. After that some emphasis will be given to the limitation of Zakat as a 
system of redistribution of wealth. 
 
2.3 The Idea of Social Justice in Zakat 
                                                 
59 Hodgson, M. (1985), The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization: 
The Classical Age of Islam: Volume 1, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 97-113. 
60 Aghnides, N. (2009) Mohamedian Theory of Finance, pp. 526-27. In Powell, R. (2009) Zakat: 
Drawing Insight for Legal Theory and Economic Policy from Islamic Jurisprudence, Seattle 
University.   
61 Coulson, N. J. (2003), A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh University Press, pp.71-73. 
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Justice in Islam stands for human equality. Islam does not demand compulsory 
economic equality in the narrow literal sense of the term. This is against nature 
and conflicts with an essential fact which is the differing natural endowments of 
individuals. Enforced economic equality arrests the development of outstanding 
ability and makes it equal to lesser ability.  Since different individuals also have 
different methods by which they earn their livelihood Islam admits the reasonable 
causes of these differences as being differences in strength and endowment. 
Hence, absolute justice demands that men’s rewards be similarly different and that 
some obtain more than others so long as human justice is upheld by the provision 
of equal opportunity for all. Ideally Zakat could ensure, if implemented carefully, 
that the rich do not become poor, but the poor cease to be poor62. From this 
perspective, Islam makes Zakat an obligatory claim on the property of the wealthy 
in favour of the poor. It is a due which the government can exact by the authority 
of the law and by the power of its administration. 
Siddiqi 63 argues that Zakat satisfies the four famous principles of a fair taxation 
system as set up by Adam Smith64 the four principles are: fairness, certainty, 
simplicity and convenience. Smith considered these four pillars as the back bone 
to a just system of redistribution of wealth65. In his attempt to sustain his 
argument that Zakat is an Islamic system of redistribution which parallels with the 
Western idea of taxation, Siddiqi provides that in regards to fairness, Zakat is 
                                                 
62 Benthall, J. (1999) Financial Worship: The Quranic Injunction to Almsgiving, The Journal of 
Royal Anthropological Institute, pp.27-42. 
63 Siddiqi, S. A. (1992), Public Finance in Islam, (2nd edn.) Adam Publishers and Distributors, 
India, p. 113. 
64 Smith, A. (1776), An Inquiry into the ature and Causes of the Wealth of ations, Clarendon 
Press 1976, Oxford, p.1152. 
65 Id. 
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levied on the individual’s savings for the period of twelve months; therefore, 
people with bigger savings contribute more. As an effect the poorer people of the 
community would not be prejudiced, for those with no savings Siddiqi asserts are 
not obliged to pay Zakat. Taxes on the other hand are levied on the income of 
individuals and increase proportionally as there is an increase in income, leading 
relatively to more sacrifice being made by the poor than the rich, as no account is 
taken of the amount of wealth accumulated by the individual. Furthermore, it is 
the poor who benefit more from the revenues of Zakat, which helps to serve one 
of its main objectives, that is to provide social justice. Siddiqi adds that Zakat 
provides certainty for the payer, with its fixed rate which equals 2.5% of an 
individual’s wealth66. He supports this argument by referring to the fact that the 
rate, objectives, and forms of expenditure of Zakat are immutable, unalterable, 
and based on its divine sanction. He adds that in regard to time, amount of 
payments, and forms of expenditure, both for the contributors and the 
governments, no man-made tax could offer more certainty than Zakat does.  
Siddiqi continues by adding that Zakat is also convenient because it is paid 
annually, and by those who are able pay it, i.e. those with wealth which exceeds 
isab
67. And as far as the manner of payment is concerned, Zakat offers the 
convenience of paying it according to its manner of production (i.e. land produce, 
cattle, or articles of trade, or in cash). When it comes to simplicity Siddiqi argues 
that the religio-economic character of Zakat, and simplicity of its calculation, its 
fixed and understandable rate, all of this makes its collection costs lower than 
those of any other tax system. 
                                                 
66 This fixed rate is also called isab See p. 14. 
67 isab is a minimum amount which determines if a person’s wealth is subject to tax. 
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2.3.1 The Difference between Zakat and Taxation 
 
Muslim jurists like to stress that the main difference between Zakat and taxation is 
that Zakat falls on the annual accumulated wealth of the Zakat payer, whilst tax 
falls on the income of the taxpayer; they argue that it is this difference that makes 
Zakat fairer than taxation as it falls more heavily on the rich than the poor68, and 
thus achieves more social justice. However, the response to this is claim is that 
taxes in most fiscal system are levied on capital gains - through the alienation of 
movable and immovable property, taxes are also levied on inheritance, and some 
States impose a mansion tax, proving further that there is a wider basis for 
extracting revenue in taxation than there is in Zakat. The issue of social justice 
rises again when Muslim jurists stress that Zakat as a religious duty cannot be 
changed or altered whether in terms of the wealth it falls on, the isab (the 
minimum wealth that raises Zakat liability), those who are liable to pay it or it’s 
beneficiaries, none of these can be reformed69 whilst this characteristic may be 
viewed as adding certainty to Zakat70on the other side of the argument it can be 
viewed as undermining the idea of social justice. 
 
Despite Siddiqi’s emphasis on the virtues of Zakat (above)71, there is a need to 
take a closer look at what limitations Zakat can have as a system of redistribution 
of wealth.  
 
                                                 
68 See pp. 20-21. 
69 Al Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
70 See p. 21. 
71 See pp. 20-21. 
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2.4 Limitations of Zakat as a System of Redistribution of Wealth 
 
1. Marginalizing non:Muslims  
 
Zakat in Kuwait is to this date voluntary; collection of Zakat is made through a 
governmental institution named ‘Bait Al Zakat’ established in 198272.   
Kuwaiti people argue they reject the idea of personal tax because Zakat can serve 
as an efficient tax system. However the situation is not that simple. Kuwait’s 
Society is now a secular one, with 50% Sunni Muslims, 40% Muslim Shi’a, and 
10% of Christians, Jews and Hindus73. A significant number of non-Muslims 
living and working in Kuwait do not believe in Zakat and thus refuse to pay it74. 
Also the Muslims Shi’a do not pay Zakat as it is known in the Sunni 
jurisprudence. The Shi’a alms are called Khumus (the giving of the fifth in 
Shi’ism). This alm requires every Muslim from the Shi’a belief to pay a fifth of 
certain goods, plus a donation of 20% on income, which will then be distributed 
by the Imam75 on the proxy of Shi’a who he is responsible for76. 
So there is a crucial need to consider the challenges of institutionalizing Zakat. 
Also the efficiency of Zakat as a welfare system ought to be considered by the 
Kuwaiti government which aims to modify a Zakat policy to meet modern 
economic challenges. Questions such as who collects and distributes Zakat raises 
similar considerations. Because Zakat is rooted in religious law, its enforcement 
by a modern state raises questions such as those regarding the appropriate role of 
                                                 
72 Abdullah, N., (2005), The Effect of Introducing Statutory Zakat in Kuwait, MSc in Finance 
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73 The CIA the World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
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74 Abdullah (note 72 supra). 
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76 Housseini, Z., M., (1999), Islam and Gender, Princeton University Press, p.12. 
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religion in the government; these issues are particularly salient for religious 
minorities. The adaptation of Islamic jurisprudence also raises questions related to 
the appropriateness of new interpretations; finding new interpretations of the 
Qur’an and Sunna through Ijtihad as has been discussed above77 may be viewed 
as allowing too much freedom in finding new meanings for the verse of Qur’an 
and the Sunna different from what was initially intended, or interpreting the 
Qur’anic verse in ways to serve the interest of some of the groups in society and 
not others. However, closing the door completely to Ijtihad can also constitute a 
problem as there are some issues such as the implementation of Zakat or the 
equivalent of Zakat in tax on non-Muslims in Muslim States which needs to be 
resolved through Ijtihad78. 
      
2. The Progressivity of Zakat    
 
In the simplest sense, a progressive tax takes a larger percentage from the income 
of the wealthy than it does from the poor. Tax exemption to the extent of isab 
ensures some degree of progressivity in Zakat as a “tax” regime. This is 
particularly true if isab accurately measures minimal living costs. However at 
the upper end of the wealth and income spectrum, there is a drop in progressivity 
because rates are fixed79.     
There are a number of rates for Zakat. Crops from irrigated land are subject to 5%. 
Crops that do not require irrigation are taxed at 10%. Found treasure, ambergris 
                                                 
77 See pp. 17-19. 
78 See pp. 15-19 for a discussion on the scope of donors and beneficiaries of Zakat. 
79 Bankman, J. & Griffith, T. (1987), Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A ew Look at 
Progressive Taxation, 75 California Law Review, pp. 1905-1908.  
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and pearls are subject to 20% Zakat. The main default rate for all other taxable 
goods is 2.5% of the value80. 
The degree of progressivity also depends on the item taxed. Agricultural products 
which are measured annually are likely to represent something like income, 
particularly in agrarian societies. As a form of “income tax” these 5-10% rates can 
be viewed as regressive, particularly because those who produce well above their 
needs pay the same rate as those who make just over isab. However the 2.5% 
tax on wealth does not function as an “income tax” and is less subject to 
criticism81.   
 
3. What system of Zakat to adopt? 
 
 
Some mandatory Zakat systems emphasize the elements of Zakat that function as 
income tax (Malaysia)82. Others emphasize tax on wealth (Pakistan).83 Others 
claim to enforce Zakat according to classical jurisprudence (Yemen)84. Each of 
these options creates particular advantages and challenges for making Zakat an 
effective system of poverty alleviation. Emphasis on taxing agricultural 
production risks putting a disproportionate burden on the poorer segment of 
society. Emphasis on taxing wealth creates challenges in both estimating and 
                                                 
80 Al Bukhari, S. (1997), The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al Bukhari, Dar Assalam 
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collecting Zakat.  In Pakistan deducting Zakat from bank accounts on a fixed date 
caused massive withdrawals to avoid compliance.  
 
4. The Scope of Zakat: Donors, Beneficiaries and =isab 
 
 
As was mentioned above85, the beneficiaries for Zakat are the eight groups 
numbered in the Quran. This is particularly challenging for the development of 
Zakat, and the need to broaden its beneficiaries and its base if Zakat can be 
considered as an efficient redistributive system of wealth. The first and main 
challenge standing in the way of Zakat’s development is closing the door to 
Ijtihad. This means following the Qur’an and the Sunna literally, and not allowing 
broader interpretation or innovation86. Also the fact that Zakat is a religious 
Muslim alms giving limits its beneficiaries and its donors by marginalizing non-
Muslims living in a Muslim society since Zakat requires that Zakat money be paid 
by Muslims, and given to poor Muslims87. The question of how to treat minorities 
within a legal Zakat framework is complex. Zakat as a form of ‘tax’ levied only 
on Muslims reinforces the classical distinction between Muslims and non-
Muslims which legally disadvantages non-Muslims even if the system provides 
for religious toleration88. 
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5. Allowing Donors to choose their beneficiaries  
 
In the absence of alms laws, alms are given on a voluntary and decentralized 
basis89. Economic evidence has provided that voluntary giving to local groups or 
individuals favours certain categories of beneficiaries, for example those with a 
relationship with the giver, and that this pattern of giving tends not to provide for 
sufficient redistribution of wealth to alleviate systemic poverty90. And although 
most Islamic states have established government supported entities to receive and 
distribute voluntary Zakat contributions, donors still prefer to make donations to 
the people they personally know who are in need of it. 
 
6. Zakat’s lack of flexibility  
 
A number of commentators have observed that Zakat systems might become more 
effective if they remained consistent with Qur’anic principles but not necessarily 
according to the rules of traditional fiqh, as some scholars argue that isab ought 
to be recalculated to reflect the true basic cost of living rather than relying 
exclusively on measures of commodities (whether gold, silver, wheat, rice, or 
cows) that have different values in contemporary economies. This move would 
allow countries to ensure that basic living costs are exempt from Zakat and 
contribute to progressivity, but it would require a reinterpretation of the sources of 
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fiqh, however such reinterpretation has been disallowed in Islamic jurisdictions 
for more than 700 years91.  
 
7. The Collection of Zakat 
 
The question of who collects and distributes Zakat also raises questions, because 
Zakat is rooted in religious law. Its enforcement by a modern state raises 
questions regarding the appropriate role of religion in government. These issues 
are particularly salient for religious minorities. In multi-faith societies such as 
Egypt rumours occasionally surface indicating government plans to legally 
enforce Zakat contributions, such proposals have been met with widespread 
opposition; even Islamic scholars from Al-Azhar University in Egypt (The 
world’s oldest University and the most important historical centre in Islamic 
Scholarship) suggest that direct government control and enforcement of Zakat 
would be fraught with inefficiencies and would encourage evasion and 
corruption92. 
 
The above discussion on Zakat in terms of its definition, its advantages and its 
limits as a system of redistribution of wealth in the Muslim world is particularly 
important in order to address the claims by the Kuwaiti people that there needn’t 
be a westernized tax system in Kuwait due to the fact that people see the religious 
duty of  Zakat as an efficient method of taking from the wealthy and giving to the 
less fortunate, and also that people seem to comply to paying Zakat voluntarily 
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simply for its divine nature, an attribute not found in taxation93. This view of the 
Kuwaiti people comes from the ancient correlation between religion and the 
economy. But does religion and religious value have a positive or a negative 
effect on economic development? 
 
2.5 The Effect of Religion upon Economic Development 
 
The modern study of religion and economics begins with Adam Smith’s An 
Inquiry into the ature and Causes of the Wealth of ations (1776). In his book 
Smith applies his innovative laissez-faire philosophy to several aspects of 
religion. However, Smith’s fundamental contribution to the modern study of 
religion was that religious beliefs and activities are rational choices. As in 
commercial activity, people respond to religious costs and benefits in a 
predictable observable manner.  
McCleary94 in her paper Religion and Economic Development provides that 
showing no preference for one religion over others, but rather permitting any and 
all religions to be practiced, creates an open market in which religious groups 
engage in rational discussion about religious beliefs. This setting creates an 
atmosphere of “good temper and moderation”. Where there is a State monopoly 
on religion or an oligopoly among religions, one will find zealousness and the 
imposition of idea on the public; where there is an open market for religion and 
freedom of speech, one will find moderation and reason. McCleary suggests that 
the more religious people are, the less economically developed they will be. She 
                                                 
93 See pp. 8-9. 
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defends her theory by providing four primary indicators of the influence of 
economic development on religion; education, value of time, life expectancy and 
urbanization. Education; the more educated the person is, the more likely he is to 
turn to science for explanations of natural phenomena, with religion intended to 
explain super natural phenomena and psychological phenomena for which there is 
no rational explanation. According to this view the higher the level of educational 
attainment the less religious people will be. On the other hand, a study undertaken 
by sociologist Schwadel (2011) University of Nebraska – Lincoln, found that 
people actually tend to become more religious -by some definition- as they further 
their education. When it comes to Value of time McCleary argues that economic 
reasoning tells us that anything that raises the cost of religious activities would 
reduce these activities. Economic development and participation in the work force 
raise the value of a person’s time as measured by the value of market wages. 
Thus, economic development implies a rising opportunity cost of participating in 
time-intensive activities, such as religious services and prayer. Hence, people will 
participate less in religious activities because their time is now more valuable to 
them. In terms of life expectancy, with people living longer around the globe 
McCleary argues that participation in certain religions will be low and then rise as 
the population ages. Finally, urbanization, in urban areas religion activities 
competes with others, such as the symphony, theatre, museums, and volunteer 
activities. Thus religion takes up your leisure time and competes with other leisure 
activities in addition to work95. 
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Max Weber (1905) identified the significant role that religion plays in social 
change; He went as far as to state that the protestant reformation triggered a 
mental revolution that made possible the advent of modern capitalism. Other 
scholars prefer to avoid correlating religion directly with economic prosperity, 
they try to relate it to fundamental institutions that have been shown to be 
conducive to growth. In his study of development across Italy, for instance, 
Putnam (1993) attributes the prevailing lack of trust toward others in the South to 
the strong Catholic tradition, which emphasizes the vertical bond with the Church 
and undermines the horizontal bond with fellow citizens. In a cross-country study, 
both La Porta et al. (1997) and Inglehart (1999) find evidence for this theory. On a 
similar note, Landes (1998) attributes the failure of Spain to develop in the 16th 
and the 17th century to the culture of intolerance diffused by the Catholic Church, 
which forced some of the most skilful people out of the country. Finally Stulz and 
Williamson (2001) attribute the low level of creditors’ protection present in 
Catholic countries to the anti-usury culture pervasive in the Catholic tradition96. 
Unlike Weber, most of these authors provide compelling evidence in favour of 
their arguments. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales in their article People’s Opium? 
Religion and Economic Attitudes suggest that such evidence, however, can be 
interpreted in two ways. One possible interpretation is that there is something 
intrinsic to certain religions, such as Catholicism, that makes them inimical to the 
development of talents and institutions that foster economic growth. An 
alternative interpretation, which is equally consistent with the results, is that there 
was something in the past (correlated with religion, but not necessarily religion) 
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 32 
 
that trapped a country in a bad equilibrium. According to this interpretation, there 
is nothing fundamental, but it is hysteria that keeps a country trapped in this 
equilibrium97. 
In their paper Religion and Development: Are they Complimentary, Khan and 
Bashar (2008)98 argue that religion may act as a negative force; possible negative 
effects of religion on economic growth include religious restrictions on capital 
accumulation, profit making, credit markets and interest; religion may also 
increase resource allocation towards church activities, such as cathedral building, 
and thereby remove resources from free market activities. Daniels and Ruhr 
(2005) used individual survey data of U.S. residents to test the impact of religious 
affiliation on attitudes towards trade and immigration policies. The results show 
that in general religious affiliation is a significant determinant of individual 
international policy preferences. Specifically, members of the three largest U.S. 
denominations Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists are more likely to favour 
policies that restrict imports into the United States, It was also found that views on 
these issues differ among pre-Vatican II Catholics and post-Vatican II Catholics, 
and among Baptist and non-Baptist African Americans. The authors hence 
suggest that religion is an important form of identity and may represent an 
important source of resistance to a greater economic integration99. 
 
On the positive side of religion’s connection to economic development, religion 
has been found to enhance economic growth and development by promoting a 
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positive attitude toward honesty. Since the concept of ‘truthful living’ is a major 
emphasis in religious practice, it induces people to bring a sincere attitude in all 
interactions and dealings. Religion may increase levels of trust and reduce levels 
of corruption and criminal activity. It may also encourage thrift, which would 
stimulate saving, investments, and therefore economic growth. Besides, religion 
may lead to better health levels by discouraging sinful activities as drugs, 
overeating, gambling, alcohol, etc., for instance alcohol and gambling are strictly 
forbidden in Islam. The principles of Islamic banking and finance are based on the 
premise that any kind of financial arrangements leading to investments in such 
activities are unproductive and socially undesirable and thereby strictly prohibits 
them100. Other supporters of the theory that religion is positively linked to 
economic development are Dahejia and Dahejia (1993)101 who have attributed the 
period of the Mauryan Empire in ancient Indian history (c. 321-c. 185 BC), also 
called ‘The Golden Age’, to strong religious faith. The Mauryan Empire 
witnessed the pinnacle of Advaita Vedantic monotheism, the idiom of Hindu 
thought of that day. The Mauryan Empire become known for its thriving sea and 
land trade with China and Sumatra to the east, Ceylon to the south and Persia and 
the Mediterranean to the west, in addition to the silk routes from Europe to China 
which put India at the centre of a vibrant trade route. This economy of the 
Mauryan Empire was outward looking and confident with a clear parallel between 
the self-assured and bold religious thought of that day and the economy of the 
Mauryan Empire where religion relied on and stressed the actions of individuals 
to generate progress. The authors compare India’s economy during the Mauryan 
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Empire to India’s economy today, where despite impressive infrastructure and 
technical manpower and despite the phenomenal growth of consumerism in 
India’s 200 million strong middle class, the country remains largely grounded 
realizing only a fraction of its growth potential. Religiously India has moved away 
from the Advaita Vedantic principle ancient India had followed, the decline of 
Hinduism – the authors argue – seems to parallel the stagnation of the 
economy102.      
 
The above provides the disparities between opinions that link religion to 
economic development and opinions opposite of that claim. There are also claims 
that ancient civilizations often ruled their States by mixing religion with law, as 
did Islamic civilization when it first emerged. Samson103 points to the fact that 
until the 18th century, most Islamic countries were ruled according to the 
framework of the Sahri’ah; nevertheless, in the nineteenth century and as an effect 
of colonization, most Islamic countries were influenced by western economic 
theories on taxation104. However, is the argument that Zakat is another form of 
taxation a plausible one? Siddiqi105 argues that the Industrial Revolution and the 
emergence of the banking industry had an influence on the Islamic nation and its 
adaptation of western theories. He believes that the Islamic nation should abandon 
western theories, and adopt Zakat as a mechanism to redistribute wealth. Siddiqi 
supports his theory by pointing to the constant development and change which 
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Western tax systems have undergone throughout history, whilst the objectives, 
rates, and form of the Islamic Zakat has not been changed since it was required of 
Muslims by the Qur’an. This stability, Siddiqi claims, gives Zakat a great deal of 
familiarity and certainty. However, in addition to the limitations of Zakat as a 
system of redistributing wealth provided earlier in this chapter106 Siddiqi’s above 
claim can be viewed as a disadvantage against Zakat, there is a need to reform 
fiscal regimes to suit the rapid economic changes occurring worldwide during the 
outbreak of the current wave of globalization thus it is crucial to have a fiscal 
system with the flexibility to develop and the resilience to adapt to change. If 
Kuwait wants to succeed as an emerging economy and be able to attract FDI to its 
jurisdiction and reap the benefits of yielding more tax revenues then it must also 
think very seriously about adopting a system that fits with other fiscal systems 
implemented internationally. Kuwait must move forward and prove that it too can 
keep up with the rapid spread of globalization which, since its outbreak in the 
1980’s, has suggested that States no longer enjoy the prerogative of opting out of 
international rule. Thus there is a need for Kuwait to adopt a system not so deeply 
embedded in ancient religious thought that it keeps Kuwait alienated from the rest 
of the developing world, and not too foreign to the social values stemming from 
Islam which the Kuwaiti people regard and want to keep holding on to.  
As the above discussion hints on the convenience of taxation in a highly 
globalized world, there is a need to look at the theoretical foundation for levying 
taxes and the different theories on what constitutes an optimal taxation system. 
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2.6 Western Theoretical Foundation for Taxation 
 
There are many Western theorists such as Hobbes107, Locke108, Rousseau109, 
Smith110, Murphy and Nagel111 and others who have endorsed taxation as a means 
of financing governments and redistributing wealth. These theorists shared a 
concern over poverty and excessive unequal distribution of wealth and income 
and sought taxation as a means of relieving the disparities between the wealthy 
and the less advantaged112.  
In his theory of the social contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues that tax levying 
is based on a contractual relationship between the State and the individual 
whereby taxes are paid in exchange for services provided by the State, such as 
security and other public services. According to Adam Smith, the contract is a 
rental one whereby the State provides individuals with services and they pay rents 
for them. Smith’s argument is that taxation comes with government, and that 
people must agree to give up a little of their property in order to maintain 
government; what governments do aside from protecting property is important 
enough to justify taxation. Smith suggests that people have a reasonable 
expectation that they will be taxed.  Hobbes on the other hand argues that it is an 
insurance contract where tax is a premium paid by the individual to insure the 
protection of the rest of his wealth113. Murphy and Nagel in ‘The Myth of 
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Ownership’ reject the idea that people’s pre-tax income and wealth are theirs in 
any morally meaningful sense. Property rights are the rights people have in the 
resources they are entitled to control after taxes, not before114. Whilst Locke 
makes property a personal right and regards the protection of personal rights as 
the central task for which governments are established. However he finds no 
alternative to taxation to maintain government and redistribute wealth.  
 
2.6.1 Western Theories on what Constitutes an Optimal System of 
Redistribution  
 
Thomas Hobbes proposed that tax be imposed according to the benefit derived by 
each individual from the existence of the State and from the services it 
provides115. The ensuing centuries saw scholars debate the structure of such a tax 
and, in particular, whether the “benefit principle” could be used to justify 
redistribution of wealth. Some scholars argue that since the wealthy obtain more 
benefit from the protections afforded by that State, they should be subject to a 
higher tax burden. Adam Smith focused on the protection of property and argued 
for a proportional tax on income: “the subjects of every State ought to contribute 
towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their 
respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively 
enjoy under the protection of the State116”. John Stuart Mill suggested that in 
order to promote the utilitarian ideal of “the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number” taxes should impose the least aggregate sacrifice on society by imposing 
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equal sacrifice on tax payers117. Those supporting Mill’s theory provide that if 
sacrifice is negative happiness, then minimizing aggregate sacrifice will 
necessarily maximize the aggregate happiness118. Optimal tax theorists want a tax 
base that is inelastic; favouring utilitarianism over equity. This school goes back 
to the sacrifice theory; they argue that all taxpayers should suffer an equal 
sacrifice while also saying that the least sacrifice should be occasion to the 
whole119. In more recent times, the search for the ultimate principle of taxation 
seems to have abated. Commentators routinely claim that taxation seeks to 
achieve a multiplicity of goals. These goals include supplying public goods, 
redistributing wealth, encouraging beneficial behaviour, discouraging behaviour 
considered detrimental to society and so forth. Tax structures and individual tax 
provisions are evaluated by their ability to contribute to the realization of these 
goals120. Richard Musgrave121 believed that the most important role of taxation 
was provide the means for adjusting the distribution of income. This was based on 
the firm belief that a free private market system, while contributing to the 
achievement of efficiency and growth, should necessarily result in an acceptable 
distribution of income that is important for the quality of life and social stability. 
His interest was to find a system of taxation which would be understandable and 
acceptable to the electorate as he considered most optimal tax policies marred by 
questionable assumptions made and the fact that equity implications were less 
than transparent, moreover he saw that these models often conflict thus raising 
                                                 
117 Mill, J.S. (1848), Principles of Political Economy, The Great Mind Series, p.805. 
118 Elkins, D. (2009), Taxation and the Terms of Justice, University of Toledo Law Review, Vol. 
41, pp. 73-75. 
119 Tiley, J. (2008), Revenue Law, Hart Publishing, p.14. 
120 Elkins (note 118 supra). 
121 Musgrave, R. A. (1958), The Theory of Public Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill, 312. 
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questions about their applicability. There are two dimensions to Musgrave’s 
concept of tax equity; the choice of an appropriate tax base and the rate structure 
which it applies. Musgrave believed in a broad based tax founded on the concept 
of ability to pay. As in recent years public finance economists have turned away 
from income to consumption as a tax base, Musgrave, although acknowledging 
the advantages of a consumption tax, stuck to his belief that income should be the 
preferred base122.  
However, the theory of fair distribution which this chapter places most weight on 
is the very influential Theory of Justice by John Rawls; to Rawls justice is “a 
proper balance between competing claims”123. Rawls explains that ‘justice as 
fairness’ is a very general conception of justice, in which inequalities are 
permitted, Rawls provides that: “the general conception of justice imposes no 
restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible; it only requires that 
everyone’s position be improved...124”  
 
The following looks closely at three of Rawls’ theories on how to achieve social 
justice: the first, Rawls’s ‘principles of justice’ and the ‘original position’, the 
second, Rawls’s ‘social primary goods approach’ and the third the ‘difference 
principle’. The following also provides the theories which rival Rawls’s and 
opinions which criticise his approach to achieving social justice. 
 
2.6.2 Rawls’s Principles of Justice   
 
                                                 
122 Head, J. and Krever, R. (2009), Tax Reform in the 21st Century, Kluwer, p.8.  
123 Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, p.9 -123. 
124 Id. 
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As a secular State125, Kuwait should be promoting social justice for all members 
and groups of its society, however, the marginalizing of non-Muslims living in 
Kuwait who do not pay Zakat due to its religious nature and thus cannot be 
beneficiaries of Zakat even when they are deprived126 constitutes a discrimination 
against non-Muslims in the Kuwaiti society and breaches the universal concept of 
justice for all. Rawls’s idea of justice for all is that which allows discrimination so 
long as such differentiation in the treatment of individuals with different resources 
helps make the worse off better off. 
The Theory of Justice is Rawls’s 127 rework of the old theory of social contract 
brought by early theorists128, however, the distinction between Rawls and his 
predecessors lies in a fundamental difference as to their aims. Rawls is concerned 
with the principles of justice in relation to the distribution of social goods, while 
his predecessors on the other hand generally aimed to defend the legitimacy of 
specific legal systems or regimes129. 
 
2.6.3 Rawls’s Original Position   
 
Rawls’s theory calls on distributing equally amongst all members of society, 
social primary goods liberty and opportunity, income and wealth. Rawls stresses 
that such social goods, income and wealth, should be distributed fairly unless 
unequal distribution of such goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. Rawls 
                                                 
125 50% of the Kuwaiti people are Sunni Muslims, 40% are Shi’a and 10% are Christians, Jews and 
Hindus.  
126 The Majority of Muslim jurists agreed that Zakat should not be paid to non-Muslims, See Al 
Qardawi (note 22 supra). 
127 Rawls (note 123 supra). 
128 See pp. 35-38. 
129 Mcleod, I. (2010), Legal Theory, Palgrave MacMillan, p. 171. 
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lays out a comprehensive system of justice and proposes that justice is fairness 
and is based on two principles:  
1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are 
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged members of society (the difference principle).  
Rawls provides that his principles of justice would be chosen by rational actors in 
an ‘original position’.130 The original position occurs when two conditions are 
satisfied: limited knowledge and motivation. Under these limitations, individuals 
do not have knowledge of their social position, or what stage of economic 
development their society has reached, and Rawls refers to this as the ‘veil of 
ignorance’. As a result, whatever principles are chosen in an ‘original position’, as 
defined above, constitute the principles of justice.  
Rawls’s concept of chosen rational actors in the original position can be criticised 
for not including other groups of society who decisions made under the original 
position will effect. Thus decisions on tax reform made under the original position 
in order to reach social justice will reach that objective if most people of the 
society were not given the right to express their opinion131.  
Rawls’s original position is criticised for its exclusive nature, or as Sen132 puts it; 
Rawls’s ‘original position’ causes ‘exclusionary neglect’ which Sen explains can 
lead to ‘closed impartiality’ which excludes the voice of people who do not 
                                                 
130 The Original Position occurs when two conditions are satisfied: limited knowledge, and 
motivation. 
131 Pogge, T.W. (1998) Realizing Rawls, Cornell University Press, pp. 66-69. 
132 Sen, A. (2010), The Idea of Justice, Penguin, pp. 124-152. 
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belong to the focal group, but whose lives are affected by the decisions of that 
group.  
Sen’s criticism of Rawls’s ‘original position’ as being exclusive in nature and 
neglectful to the people who do not belong to the focal group i.e. the rational 
actors of the ‘original position’ is similar to the criticism aimed at the limitation of 
Zakat in promoting social justice. Zakat as has been mentioned above133 is fixed 
and does not allow reform or amendment, and due to its divine nature only 
Muslim jurists are entrusted to interpret its meaning, thus if any new interpretation 
of how Zakat revenue should be distributed or the expansion of the beneficiaries 
entitled to Zakat, should arise, it can only be done through Muslim jurists who are 
believed to have the credibility to reform this divine duty, this will exclude the 
voice of the people who do not belong to the limited group of Muslim jurists and 
whose lives are affected most by the decisions made on the reform of Zakat. 
 
2.6.4 Rawls’s Social Primary Goods versus Sen’s Capabilities Approach 
 
In A theory of Justice Rawls defends the Social Primary goods on the grounds that 
together they constitute a thin theory of the good, an account of what people want 
whatever else they may want. In subsequent analysis, he grounds the primary 
goods, instead, in the idea of free and equal persons possessed of the two moral 
powers, namely, the capacity for a conception of justice and the capacity for a 
conception of the good. The primary goods approach says that for the purpose of 
                                                 
133 See pp. 24-27. 
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justice we should compare an individual’s holdings of social primary goods134. 
The list of social primary goods is arrived at by considering what conditions and 
resources are necessary for the development and exercise of the two moral powers 
of free and equal persons which are: the capacity for a sense of justice and the 
capacity for a conception of the good. Those goods are: 
 
1. The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, etc) are the 
background institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the 
capacity to decide upon and revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the 
good. Similarly these liberties allow for the development and exercise of the 
sense of right and justice under political and social conditions that are free. 
2. Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of 
diverse opportunities are required for the pursuit of final ends as well as to give 
effect to a decision to revise and change them, if one so desires. 
3. Powers and prerogatives of offices of responsibilities are needed to give scope to 
various self-governing and social capacities of the self. 
Income and wealth understood broadly as they must be, are all purpose means 
(having an exchange value) for achieving directly or indirectly a wide range of 
ends, whatever they happen to be.  
4. The social basis of self-respect are those aspects of basic institutions that are 
normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as 
moral persons and are to be able to realize their highest order interests and 
advance their ends with self-confidence.  
 
Rawls makes implicit claims about the relative importance of the contributions 
these goods make to overall wellbeing. His principles of justice are structured so 
that no compromises are permitted with the equal liberties principle for the sake 
of other goods, and no compromises with the fair equality of opportunity principle 
are permitted for the sake of increased income and wealth. However, the implicit 
assumptions about the relative importance of the different social primary goods to 
                                                 
134 Brighouse, H. and Unterhaulter, E. (2009) Primary Goods Versus Capabilities: Defending the 
Good against the Equally Good? in Reflections on Rawls, An Assessment of his Legacy, (Edit) by 
Shaun P. Young, (2009), Ashgate, pp.46-58. 
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wellbeing, even for the purpose of justice, are not essential to the primary goods 
approach135. 
Sen’s Capabilities approach136 rivals Rawls’s Social primary goods theory. The 
capabilities approach does not look to the resources people have, but to their 
opportunities, or real freedoms, to achieve functioning. Sen takes issue with the 
approaches to evaluating social policy that focus on the aggregated benefits an 
initiative has for the whole society or for future generations, without regard to 
how it effects individuals. According to these views for example, investing in 
education for women and girls is justified by its benefits not for them but for the 
societies in which they live. These approaches to evaluations do not look at 
whether any adult or child is discriminated against in the provision of education, 
because the education is not for these individuals but for a larger grouping, the 
community, then nation, then future generations. 
 
The capabilities approach looks at a relationship between the resources people 
have and what they can do with them. As Sen puts it, in a good theory of 
wellbeing, 
 “Account would have to be taken not only of the primary goods the person 
respectively holds, but also of the relevant personal characteristics that govern the 
conversion of primary goods into the person’s ability to promote her ends”  
 
The notion of capability is essential to Sen, because someone’s actual 
functionings need not tell us very much about how well off she is.137 
One of the apparent advantages of the capabilities approach over the social 
primary goods approach is that it is sensitive to inequalities of natural 
                                                 
135 Brighouse and Unterhaulter, (note 130 supra). 
136 Sen (note 132 supra). 
137 Brighouse and Unterhaulter (note 130 supra). 
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endowments. Whereas the social primary goods are always resources, whose 
value, for the purpose of justice, is defined without regard to what the particular 
individual who has them can do with them, the capabilities approach always looks 
at how well the individual can convert her bundle of resources into functionings. 
On the social primary goods approach, two people with the same holding, one of 
whom is ordinarily-abled and the other paraplegic, are equally well off, but the 
capabilities approach counts the paraplegic as worse off (from the point of view of 
justice)138.  
 
From the above, it can be concluded that Rawls’ social primary goods approach is 
more concerned with taking from the more advantaged and giving to the less 
fortunate in order to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. However, in 
terms of accomplishing maximum utility Sen’s capabilities approach can be 
considered more advanced as it calls on looking at the individual’s ability for 
turning the resources they have and the resources they are given into a utility, 
according to this giving more resources to a poor disabled individual will 
probably not achieve the highest utility if he is not capable of using such resources 
to their full potential, however, putting such resources towards building better 
facilities for the disabled in the community where he and other disabled 
individuals live can achieve higher benefits and relatively more justice since the 
threshold of capability can differ significantly from one poor (or disabled) person 
to the other. In addition to this, Sen’s theory aims to benefit the whole society and 
not just the group of people who are worse off, thus taking from the better off to 
                                                 
138 Pogge, T. (2002), Can the Capabilities Approach be Justified, Philosophical Topics 20/2 
(2002): pp. 167-170.  
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build a school in a disadvantaged area will create more utility and benefit for the 
children who live in that area than distributing such resources amongst the poor 
families in that area, firstly, because we cannot measure the beneficiaries’ level of 
capability in turning such recourses into functionings, and secondly, when the  
poor children of that area gain an education it benefits the society as a whole not 
just the children. Although it can be argued here that Sen’s approach is more 
difficult to implement and harder to prove than Rawls’s social primary goods 
approach, the latter approach cannot only be used, but can also be seen to being 
used, allowing public discussion and debate; the former is harder to monitor 
because it’s difficult to measure people’s capability which makes assessing it 
publically also difficult139.  
Applying the above to a country such as Kuwait, where oil resources for the time 
being are available and the people are not considered poor, and there is a need to 
consider new sources of income for a post-oil Kuwait, Sen’s capability approach 
can be seen as achieving greater benefits for a society such as Kuwait’s. However, 
with Zakat funds being exclusively rewarded to specific, fixed beneficiary 
groups140 who display certain characteristics of poverty and neediness, this 
doesn’t leave much scope for Sen’s capabilities approach on redistribution to 
reach its objective, which may also support the argument to reconsider a more 
efficient redistribution system, or allow more flexibility in Zakat in allocating 
Zakat funds towards services as well and not excluding Zakat as a mere charity 
paid to individuals. 
 
                                                 
139 Pogge (note 138 supra). 
140 See p. 17 and p. 26. 
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In Norman Daniels’ point of view, as countries pursue development, and external 
agencies assist or hinder them in this pursuit, they need to consider what policies 
to adopt; some policies will enhance the wellbeing of some people and some will 
enhance the wellbeing of others and some will enhance no one. Both the social 
primary goods approach and the capabilities approach complement each other and 
have advantages over each other and a redistribution scheme can be beneficial 
when it is drawn from both approaches141.  
 
 
2.6.5 Rawls’s Difference Principle  
 
The second limb of Rawls’s second principle (the difference principle)142 is an 
application of the maximum principle; this principle requires decision makers to 
imagine the worst of all possible outcomes flowing from all possible solutions to a 
given problem, and then to choose the solution which provides the least 
favourable outcome, or, in other words, they are required to maximise the 
minimum outcome143. 
Nozick144 and Sandel145 criticise Rawls’s difference principle; in his Theory of 
Justice, where Rawls provides that his concept of justice “nullifies the accident of 
natural endowments” and that the difference principle is an agreement to use the 
natural endowments which some individuals have as a “collective” or a “social 
                                                 
141 Daniels, N. (2003) Democratic Equality: Rawl’s complex Eglittarianisim, in Samuel Freeman 
(eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge Press), pp.241 -277. 
142 See p. 39. 
143Mcleod (note 129 supra). 
144 Nozick, R. (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York (Basic Books), p. 185.  
145 Sandel, M. (1982), Liberalism and Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p.87. 
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asset to be used for the common advantage”, meaning that those who have been 
favoured by nature, gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the 
situation of those who have lost out. But the question remains why would the 
“exceptionals” (those who have exceptional natural endowments) owe the 
“normals” (who have no special or exceptional endowments) any compensation? 
Why should they be forbidden to exercise their superior endowments without 
helping the “normals”? As Nozick puts it; the “exceptionals” are harnessed to 
serve others, like a horse is harnessed to a wagon, the horse doesn’t ever have to 
move, but if it does, it will have to draw the wagon along with it. What Nozick 
wants to conclude is that Rawls’s conception of justice, by favouring institutional 
schemes under which the exceptionals are harnessed, encourages the use of some 
persons as means for the benefit of others. Nozick affirms that people ought to 
have what flows from their work and their efforts and according to Rawls’s 
difference principle, people can be entitled to less than what they ought to have. 
 
Rawls’s difference principle echoes Siddiqi’s justification for the Islamic duty of 
Zakat146  where he claims that Zakat is necessary to make the worse off better off 
by taking from the more highly endowed to give to the less endowed. 
 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
                                                 
146 See pp. 20-21. 
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In addition to the limits of Zakat as a system of redistribution, there are also many 
instances where Muslim jurists could not agree on crucial practices, such as the 
type of wealth that falls under the base of Zakat147  
As has been seen, Zakat helps reduce income inequality by narrowing the gap 
between the rich and the poor, and it increases the purchasing power of the poor. 
The Qur’an and Sunna provide: ‘The alms are only for the poor and the needy’ 
(the Qur’an, surrah 9:60), and in a Hadith (saying) by the prophet Mohammed, he 
provides:  ‘He should help the distressed one who is in need’.  However, this has 
also proven to be limiting and restricting in terms of beneficiaries, and its 
marginalizing of non-Muslims. Also the fact that Zakat is voluntary in Kuwait 
means there’s a high rate of non-compliance; Zakat also allows the payers to 
choose their beneficiaries leading many Zakat payers to give to relatives or 
acquaintances who they might think are in need, which can completely undermine 
the objective of allocating the funds to the individuals and communities who are 
more entitled to it.  
Closing the door to Ijtihad has disallowed innovation in Zakat whether in 
broadening the scope of its tax base, or reforming it beneficiaries. All the above 
can help confirm that Zakat cannot in its current form be the sole welfare system 
that can finance government expenditure. But does this necessarily mean that 
taxation can provide more social justice in areas where Zakat did not? Or to put it 
differently, can taxation play a more efficient role in redistribution where Zakat 
was found limiting i.e. in redistribution and financing the government in its 
provision of public goods and services? Western theories which argue in favour of 
                                                 
147 See p. 18. 
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the foundation of taxation are convincing, one of such theories is Adam Smith’s 
argument that as individuals we must contribute (in proportion to our abilities) 
towards the state in proportion to the revenue we as individuals could not have 
enjoyed or earned if it weren’t for the protection of the state. Smith’s theory that 
there exists a contract between the people and the state, whereby the state 
provides us with services and we in turn pay for them, is a plausible one, 
especially if we as people took into account that without roads and infrastructure 
we cannot practice our professions, work or business and without health services 
we would not be well enough to work or have healthy clients and consumers. 
Also, without the security which a police force and a justice system provides, we 
would not feel safe and would not be able to secure what flows from our work and 
efforts. However, the implementation of taxation is not as straight forward as the 
theory. When it comes to measuring the proportion which individuals are capable 
of contributing towards the state and whether this contribution should differ 
according to individual capability, taxation becomes more problematic in 
achieving social justice.  
Rawls has argued that injustice is permitted so long as it serves the interest of the 
worse off, i.e. it is not considered unfair (in Rawls’s opinion) to impose a heavier 
tax on the wealthy so long as this makes the worse off better off. Yet Rawls 
neglects in his theory three important issues: the first, is related to the people who 
decide what the ultimate just decision is; Rawls provides that any decision made 
by the ‘rational actors’ under the ‘veil of ignorance’ in the ‘original position’ 
constitutes justice. This neglects the voice of individuals who are not the ‘rational 
actors’ in the ‘original position’ but who are deeply affected by the decisions 
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made in the ‘original position’. Second, Rawls concentrated on transferring 
resources from the better off to the worse off without giving much consideration 
on whether or not the worse off have the capability to turn such resources into 
functionings. Finally, Rawls’s ‘difference principle’ suggests that the better off 
who have been naturally endowed have a responsibility towards the less endowed 
(the worse off) in that they (the better off) must sacrifice some of their earnings to 
help improve the lives of the worse off. This Nozick provides, can be viewed as 
unjust if we believe that people ought to have what flows from their work. 
 
In conclusion, taxation is a successful tool for redistribution and financing the 
government’s provision of public goods and services, however, finding a just 
system of taxation is not a straight forward process.  
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Chapter 3: The Political and Economic Development of Kuwait 
Pre : and Post : Oil  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines Kuwait’s political and economic development by analysing 
the economic and political condition of pre- and post-oil Kuwait. This chapter 
also manifests how the dependency upon a single natural resource i.e. oil, has 
transformed the political and economic structure of Kuwait, and has led to Kuwait 
being classified by some as a ‘rentier’ state.  
 
3.2 Kuwait Pre:Oil    
 
The desert provided Kuwait with little before oil was discovered. The arid stormy 
climate and the sandy soil did not naturally allow agriculture. Only the village of  
“Jahrah” provided efficient crops to supply Kuwait with vegetables, but not with 
grain. The desert economy was strong enough to sustain only the Bedouin, who 
traded in the products of sheep and camels skins, wools, dairy products, and, 
occasionally, meat. Indeed, the harshness of the desert and its productive limits 
virtually forced Kuwait to trade. The sea provided alternative resources. One of 
Kuwait’s first attractions to early settlers was its sheltered harbour. From the 
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beginning of the eighteenth century, the tribe of “Bani Utub”148 took advantage of 
the harbour to send boats out to trade, and the industry of pearl diving was the 
first Kuwaiti industry to flourish. The pearl banks of the Gulf are among the 
richest natural banks in the world, providing for what was in the nineteenth 
century the basis of the Gulf countries’ economy. The pearl trade also had a well-
marked hierarchy, with a distinction drawn between middlemen, who brought the 
pearls directly from the deep sea to the boats and then to the pearl merchants, who 
sold them to the foreign markets of Iraq, India, and Europe149. The crew members 
on the boats were tied to the merchants through a system of debt bondage. The 
captains lent the crews the money their families needed to survive their absence at 
sea, and the crews were obliged to work to repay the loans. Wages were rarely 
high enough to allow a sailor to escape from the system. Most were in debt their 
entire lives and beyond, as the debt became a part of a pearl diver’s estate, and 
thus an obligation on his children and relatives. For most Kuwaitis this was a hard 
life, a life of poverty, work, debt, and thereby early death (caused by drowning, 
shark attacks, and malnutrition from a paucity of fresh food on board).  
Boat building was an important local industry in Kuwait also, and the small state 
was soon exporting its ships to other Gulf ports. Kuwaiti boats sailed to Africa to 
bring wood for construction; they sailed to Europe to bring manufactured goods 
such as guns. Fishing was a significant industry in Kuwait pre-oil, not only 
feeding the local population, but also providing a small surplus for export, and 
                                                 
148 The first tribe to settle in what later became Kuwait. 
149 Lockhart, L. (1947) Outline of the History of Kuwait, J. Royal Central Asian Soc., XXXIV 
(July-Oct. 1947), pp. 262-274. 
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even after the discovery of oil, shrimps remained one of Kuwait’s few non-oil 
exports150.  
  
3.2.1Tracing the Origins of Pre:Oil Kuwait  
 
It was in 1716 that three clans descending from the Bani Utub151 decided to give 
up their nomadic life and migrate to Kuwait to settle there. During the 17th century 
the powerful tribe of Bani Khalid dominated the Arab Peninsula. Their territory 
extended to Kuwait, however when the rule of Bani Khalid began to weaken, the 
people of Kuwait elected a member of the Al Sabah family to rule the small 
state152; it was Shaikh Sabah Al Abdullah who was the first ruler from the Al 
Sabah family in 1756153.   
Subsequently, the practice by which the ruler of Kuwait was chosen was very 
simple.  The first rule was that the Shaikh had to be a male member of the Al 
Sabah family, and to be elected by the Al Sabah family as the next ruler of 
Kuwait. The second rule was for all the heads of the other Kuwaiti tribes, 
merchants and nationals to pay tribute to the new Shaikh on the day following his 
election by the Sabah family, and to demand that he rule fairly, and consult them 
on all significant matters relating to the state. Despite the provision for the 
people’s demand on the ruler to consult with them, in practice the ruler made all 
                                                 
150 Pillai R. V. Kumar M. (1962), The Political and Legal Status of Kuwait, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.11, No.1, pp.108-130.  
151 The tribe of Bani Utub is divided into three clans: Al Sabah (the ruling dynasty today), Al 
Khalifa and Al Jalahima. 
152 Taqi, H. (2010), Two Ethnicities,Three Generations: Phonological Variation and Change in 
Kuwait, PhD Thesis, New Castle University, pp.11-20. 
153 Pillai and Kumar (note 150 supra).    
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decisions (legislative, administrative and judicial) relating to the state 
exclusively154. 
The close contact between Kuwait and Great Britain began when Karim Khan of 
Persia captured Basra155 in 1776. As a result of this action the English East India 
Company made Kuwait, instead of Basra, the south-eastern end of its desert mail 
route to Aleppo156.  The subsequent British influence in Kuwait is considered later 
in this chapter157. 
When Shaikh Mubarak came into power (1896-1915) he transformed the Sabah 
house into a centralized power structure in Kuwaiti society. One of the first 
symbols of this power was Mubarak’s ability to arbitrarily levy taxes. Prior to 
Mubarak, custom duties imposed on certain goods were voluntary contributions 
from merchants that were aimed at maintaining the Sabah house. Khazal (1962)158 
reports: ‘when Mubarak ruled Kuwait… he established a regular custom’s office 
in 1899 and imposed a five percent tax on all goods coming to Kuwait by land or 
sea. This increased gradually until it reached ten percent on some goods. He also 
imposed a real estate tax which required the payment of one-third of the total 
value of a house sold in Kuwait’.   
During Shaikh Mubarak’s reign there was increasing external pressure because of 
Kuwait’s strategic geographical position, therefore, Turkey was increasingly 
trying to exert more influence and power over Kuwait and intervene in Kuwait’s 
                                                 
154 Al Muzaini, A. (1984), Zakat and Taxes in Kuwait: Past and Present, Dar El Salaseil, pp.16-
20, (Arabic). 
155 Basra lies to the North of Kuwait and forms a part of modern Iraq.   
156 Lockhart (note 149 supra). 
157 See pp. 62-66. 
158 Khazal, H. (1962) Tarikh Al.Kuwiat Al Siyasi (The Political History of Kuwait), Beirut, Dar al 
Kutub, Arabic (cited from) Ismael, J. S. (1993), Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State, 
Gainsville: University Press of Florida, p.55.    
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domestic policies. Germany too was looking to extend its proposed Berlin-
Baghdad railway into Kuwait159. In 1897, Mubarak asked Britain for protection 
against the Turks and Germans, and although the position of Kuwait was 
important to Britain, Mubarak’s request to Britain was refused at first due to costs. 
However, in 1898, many factors inclined Britain to reconsider its policy towards 
Kuwait: the Ottoman military activities near Basra, Russia’s intrusion threats and 
the German railway plans that were all threatening British interests in the region 
of the Arabian Gulf, and the Russian construction of the “Transcaspian Railroad” 
connecting it to the most wealthy and influential countries in Central Asia, 
including the Persian Gulf countries. Further the Ottomans were seeking and 
receiving diplomatic and economic help from the Germans who had pencilled in 
Kuwait as the terminus of their Berlin-Baghdad railway project. Kuwait feared the 
Ottoman expansion while Britain feared being displaced by Germany and Russia. 
It was, therefore, in Britain’s interest to come to a protective agreement with 
Kuwait. Lord Curzon (the British Viceroy in India). realizing the threat of Russia 
particularly through its new route to British interests in the Persian region, argued 
for an exclusive British presence in the Persian Gulf. Curzon was eventually 
successful in convincing his government to establish Britain as the unofficial 
protector of Kuwait. On 23rd January 1899, the British Political Resident in the 
Arabian Gulf, Colonel Meade, concluded a protectorate agreement, the Anglo-
Kuwaiti Agreement with the Shaikh of Kuwait (Mubrark Al Sabah), which 
defined Kuwait as ‘an independent country under the British protection’.  Within 
a few years of signing the agreement, the first British political agent took up a 
                                                 
159 Anscombe, F. (1997), The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar 
Columbia University Press, pp.113-132.  
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permanent post in Kuwait with a view to influence the Shaikh into advancing 
British interests in the area. The Royal Navy were quick to turn Shuwaikh port160 
into a British coaling station, and a telegraphic line was passed through Kuwait in 
1913.  The effect of the protectorate agreement was evident with the outbreak of 
World War I in 1914 when the position of Kuwait was threatened. Britain 
provided Kuwait with protection against any invasion and recognized Kuwait as 
an independent state161. The First World War, however, caused serious damage to 
Kuwait’s economy, when the British banned the caravan trade in Kuwait in order 
to limit supplies reaching Ottoman forces. The Kuwaiti economy as a whole 
suffered from this, and the resulting recession deepened after the First World War 
when Ibn Saud (Saudi Arabia today) demanded a 7% transit tax on goods crossing 
Kuwait that were destined for Central Arabia. When Kuwait refused, Ibn Saud 
threatened to attack Kuwait. Finally, the Japanese invention of cultured pearls in 
1920 lowered the price of natural pearls dramatically, mortally wounding the 
Kuwaiti pearling industry162. The last, and perhaps least appreciated by the 
Kuwaiti people, result of the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement was that it gave Britain a 
monopoly over the exploration and production of oil reserves which was exploited 
as will be seen163 in the early 1920s164.  
 
3.2.2 Politics and Economics Interrelate in Pre:Oil Kuwait 
 
                                                 
160 Shuwaikh port lies on the south shore of Kuwait Bay. Shuwaikh port is the main commercial 
port in the country. 
161 Anscombe (note 159 supra). 
162 Pillai and Kumar (note 150 supra). 
163 See pp. 61-62 and pp. 68-69. 
164 Anscombe, (note 159 supra). 
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Before oil, politics in Kuwait was - as indicated above - dominated by the ruling 
Shaikh. However what is also noteworthy about the pre-oil period was that 
politics interrelated very closely with the economics of the state. The wealthy 
merchant families of Kuwait were the link connecting the Shaikh to the funds he 
needed. Merchants extracted revenues from pearl divers rather than from peasants 
and gave a portion of these extracted revenues to the Shaikh through customs, 
pearl boat taxes, and personal loans. Thus the merchants’ political powers grew 
from their economic strength. The independent strength of these merchants lay in 
their control of the mobile pearling and nomadic work force. In the event of a 
dispute with the Shaikh the merchants would simply leave Kuwait taking with 
them their pearl divers. This “temporary exit”165 was a powerful check on the 
Shaikh.  
In 1910, when Mubarak increased the taxes on the pearl merchants, the pearl 
merchants expressed their opposition by leaving with their ships and divers to 
other Gulf ports in an attempt to persuade him to drop the tax increase. However, 
ultimately, Mubarak’s will prevailed. This incident made the merchants 
determined to gain more power over decision making in the state166.  
Mubarak was succeeded by Salim (1915-1921) and the merchants presented him 
with the idea of forming a Council which would allow them to share the decision 
making in the state. This was rejected by Salim. Over time, the merchants’ 
struggle with a continuous increase in taxes inspired them to try again and, in 
particular, use was made of the transition of power after Salim’s death in 1921 
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‘Exit’ was used frequently until the early twentieth century, and it was last used in an important 
political way in 1909, when Kuwait’s leading merchants in a successful protest against new taxes, 
left for Bahrain with 6-8,000 men. 
166 Anscombe (note 159 supra). 
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and with the succession of his nephew, Ahmed (1921-1950). At this time, the 
merchants were politically aware due to other reform movements that were taking 
place in the Arab world. They decided to try to make alterations to the regime in 
Kuwait. They met with the ruling Al Sabah family to inform them about their 
decision to form a Council, and insisted on participation in the country’s affairs. 
In 1921, they presented the family with a pledge which they signed. It provided: 
“We the subscribers of this document concur and decide to make these provisions: 
1) The reform of the ruling dynasty (the Al Sabah family) to avoid any 
disagreement between them in the appointment of the ruler (Shaikh)167; 
2) That the candidates for a position of ruler are: Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah, 
Hamad Al Mubarak Al Sabah, and Abdullah Al Salem AL Sabah; 
3) That when the people choose one of them, their decision will be referred to the 
government for sanction; 
4) That the selected one will be called a president of the advisory council; and  
5) That the election of a specific number of Ministers should be undertaken 
between the people and Al Sabah family for the purpose of managing States 
Affairs on the basis of justice and equality168.”  
As a result, Ahmed Al Jaber was chosen to rule Kuwait, and a Consultative 
(Advisory) Council was formed. It comprised twelve prominent personalities and 
businessmen in Kuwait. One of the leading merchants of Kuwait Hamad Al Saqer 
                                                 
167 Al Shamlan, S. (1959), Min Tareekh AL Kuwait (Some of the Kuwaiti History), Cairo, pp. 212-
220 (Arabic). 
168 Al Shamlan (note 167 supra). 
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was elected president of the Council169. The important points that must be noted 
about this council are:  
1. The members were not elected in accordance with the above document (pledge) 
but instead were appointed by the ruler (Shaikh Jaber Al Sabah); 
2. All the members of this Council represented the merchants and notable persons 
in Kuwait’s society; 
3. The function of this Council was limited to giving advice on state affairs. 
This Council did not last long. It disintegrated after only two months because of  
differences between its members. There is no doubt, however, that this Council 
should be regarded as a landmark in the Kuwaiti state’s political development. 
The older system of personal rule was restored under ruler Ahmed Al Jaber 
(1921-1950) and, as HRP Dickson has noted, “It had always been the custom for 
the Shaikh of Kuwait to rule personally and autocratically and to avoid all 
delegation of authority”170.  
In the early 1930s, the natural transition of Kuwait city into a municipality 
occurred, resulting in administrative regulations being made and giving new 
meaning to local political life. Elections were held for the Kuwaiti Municipality 
Council in 1930 and for an Education Council in 1934. These two steps proved 
that there was significant progress within the ruling family towards encouraging 
some popular participation in order to develop the public administration of the 
state on the one hand, and as a response to pressure from the people to participate 
in the state’s affair on the other. Another attempt from the merchants to gain 
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 Al Farhan, R. (1960), The Summary of the Kuwaiti History, Cairo, Dar Al Orooba, pp. 55-65 
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power and authority in the decision making process, was the creation of the 
National Block. It was secretly formed by twelve people in 1938; the purpose of it 
was to demand the people’s participation in decision making. The National Block 
selected three of its members to meet with Shaikh Ahmed to demand the 
establishment of an elected assembly to discuss the problems of Kuwait’s 
domestic and foreign affairs and to make the Kuwaiti people aware of all 
decisions in these matters171. The National Block succeeded in convincing the 
Shaikh and a Council was formed in July 1938 which consisted of fourteen 
elected members, where all the members of the Council were elected by the 
people; this was the first organized and important election held in Kuwait. In the 
same month as its formation the Council introduced its first constitutional 
document which was approved by Shaikh Ahmed Al Jaber. This constitutional 
document consisted of the five following provisions172: 
Article 1: The nation (people) is the source of power through its representatives. 
Article 2: The Council is to enact the following laws: 
- Budget law: to control the country’s income and expenditure and to regulate them 
fairly, with the exception of Al Sabah properties which the Council does not have 
the right to be involved in. 
- Judicial Law: to administer justice in a fair manner. 
- Law of public order: to enforce public security. 
- Law of education: to advance education. 
- Law of health: to develop a health service. 
- Law of public work: road extension, prison construction, drilling for water and 
other public works. 
- Law of public emergency: to enact the law to cope with a national emergency.   
 
                                                 
171 Pillali and Kumar (note 150 supra). 
172 Al Moqatei, M. (1987), A Study of the Kuwaiti Constitutional Experience 1962.1986, Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Warwick, Department of Law, pp. 24-28. 
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Article 3: The legislative Council (The same Council) is the ultimate authority 
regarding treaties and concessions in connection with foreign affairs and any 
agreement which does not receive the Councils’ approval is null and void. 
 
Article 4: The legislative Council is vested with the authority to act as an appeal 
court until one is formed. 
 
Article 5: The Head of the Legislative Council is in the meantime the head of the 
executive power173. 
 
It is very important to understand the British attitude to the formation of this 
Council. For the British agent in Kuwait it meant that the political life and system 
in Kuwait would take another direction in the operation of the State’s affairs, 
whether in the local or the international arena. Despite this the British government 
advised the Shaikh to accept the Council when The National Block presented him 
with the idea in July 1938, so as not to ignore the demands for reform and also 
due to the British agent’s belief that this council would lead to better relations 
between Britain and Kuwait174. The British Political Agent in Kuwait informed 
the Shaikh: 
HMG trust that this step will lead to the prosperity of Kuwait and to the 
continuation of the happy relations which have existed in the past between the 
ruler and his majesty’s government 175 
 
However, shortly after the formation of the Council and the declaration of the 
constitutional document, the British agent in Kuwait discovered that this Council 
was in fact going to become a hindrance to the relations between Kuwait and 
Britain. 
The British agent in Kuwait found the projected activities of this Council to be too 
ambitious; as it drafted a number of laws which called for abolishing existing 
                                                 
173 Al Roumi, M. (1981), Kuwait and Malta British Imperial Policy, Masters Thesis, Malta 
University, pp. 134-156. 
174 Id. 
175 Al Moqatei (note 172 supra). 
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monopolies, taxes and forced labour for the ruling family. Both the Council’s 
activities and ambitions which included control over foreign affairs, the army and 
calling for the abdication of Shaikh, evoked British opposition176. These facts 
caused Shaikh Ahmed to dissolve the Council only five months after its formation 
in December 1938, which meant the end of this democratic period and the 
resumption of Kuwait’s traditional autocrat rule.  
 
3.3 Discovering Oil in Kuwait 
 
After oil was found in commercial quantities in Bahrain, Britain was certain that 
oil existed in Kuwait and was determined to find it. However, Britain postponed 
searching for oil in Kuwait due to the outbreak of World War I. After World War 
I Britain purchased a majority ownership in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC). The company put forward an offer for the exclusive right to explore for 
oil in Kuwait to Shaikh Ahmed (1921-1950) in 1922. At this time however 
competition had already appeared in the form of a New Zealand Company, 
Eastern and General Syndicate (EGS). In 1923, it offered Shaikh Ahmed higher 
revenues than APOC.  In 1927, the American company ‘Gulf Oil’, purchased the 
EGS interests in the area. This purchase changed the dynamics of the negotiations 
as, unlike EGS, Gulf Oil was a major international company and a respectable 
competitor to APOC. This allowed Shaikh Ahmed to see an opportunity to play 
the two companies against each other for the best deal. It also meant that he could 
balance his British alliance with another strong power, the United States. Initially, 
                                                 
176 Al Roumi (note 173 supra).  
 64 
 
the competition between the two companies intensified, but then, the two 
companies decided to join forces and to form a joint company, the Kuwait Oil 
Company (KOC), which then approached Shaikh Ahmed with a much lower offer 
than Gulf Oil or APOC’s previous offers.  
Subsequently a new company was established, ‘Traders Limited’, which offered a 
better deal to him, and with this new competition, the Shaikh demanded a better 
offer from KOC and got it. In 1934, Shaikh Ahmed signed the first oil concession 
agreement with KOC, giving the company a seventy five year exclusive grant to 
explore for oil in Kuwait.  
Oil operations had to be halted during World War II, and for the next few years 
Kuwait slipped back into a recession. However, when the War ended, operations 
quickly resumed and, in 1946, the first barrel of oil sailed out of Kuwait’s 
harbour177.  
 
 3.4 Kuwait Post:Oil 
 
As seen above, Shaikh Ahmed granted the first oil concession for seventy five 
years to KOC in 1934. This concession granted KOC exclusive ownership of all 
petroleum produced as well as its derivatives. KOC had the right to explore, drill 
for, and produce petroleum, natural gas, asphalt and cognate substances 
throughout the entire country, including all islands and territorial waters178. The 
concession also granted KOC the right to refine and transport petroleum, and to 
                                                 
177 Crystal, J. (1992), Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State, Westview Press, Boulder, 
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either export it or sell it for use within Kuwait. Shaikh Ahmed received an initial 
royalty of $178,000 and $35,000 a year until the first oil export, and $94,000 after 
oil had been exported. While Shaikh Ahmed negotiated the 1934 Concession, he 
could not demand control over oil prices and policies since exploration risks were 
still high. Therefore Kuwait only received 13 cents per barrel, much less than the 
22 cents per barrel Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq were receiving at this time179. 
However, in 1951 profit sharing agreements were introduced in Kuwait after their 
adoption by Saudi Arabia in 1950. The main reason for this was to credit the taxes 
paid to producing countries (by oil companies) against income taxes paid at the oil 
companies’ state of residence.  Since 1939 the US government had offered a tax 
incentive to its American oil companies in the form of percentage depletion 
allowance. It applied by exempting 27 per cent of the gross income generated by 
oil from income tax. Under pressure from British Companies, HM Treasury 
revised its tax rules to make the new producing country taxes deductible against 
UK income tax obligations. These respective tax credit advantages influenced oil 
companies and in this case KOC to introduce a 50-50 profit sharing arrangement. 
Indeed in 1951 Kuwait and KOC signed a 50-50 profit sharing agreement. 
However, this profit sharing agreement eliminated the royalties which were paid 
to the Shaikh, by including the royalties in the payment of 50% of profits of crude 
oil production to Kuwait180. It was also much to KOC’s benefit when it managed 
to pressure HM Treasury in 1951 to deduct royalties paid in Kuwait against its 
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British income tax obligations181. This was also the original purpose of Kuwaiti 
Tax Decree 3/1955 which was introduced to enable KOC to pay royalties to the 
Kuwaiti government by way of taxation in order to obtain tax relief in their 
country of origin. This is discussed extensively in the next chapter182.  
During the 1950s, Kuwait was flooded with oil monies. The economy grew and 
the power of the Shaikh also grew. The need for the delegation of powers became 
imperative. However, it was precisely the presence of these external funds that 
allowed for a dynastic formation whereby senior members of the Al Sabah family 
assumed duties which, in effect, turned them into ministers in charge of 
departments. Thus oil ‘rents’ helped the Shaikh to establish a regular source of 
revenue and to sustain his powers.183 
 
3.4.1 Political and Economic Changes in Post:Oil Kuwait 
  
Oil revenues had shifted power from the hands of the wealthy merchant families 
who were once the link connecting the Shaikh to the funds he needed. The 
revenues once extracted by the merchants184 from the pearl divers as customs, the 
pearl boat taxes and personal loans that were paid to the Shaikh by the merchants 
were now dispensable. The discovery of oil had transformed all of that, and 
transferred power from the merchants to the Shaikh.  
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“Buying the Merchants Off” 
 
The merchants’ withdrawal from public politics post-oil suggests that 
participation in decision-making became tied to the extraction of oil and the 
ability of those who mediated the extraction to influence the distribution of 
extracted wealth. Since with oil, extraction of wealth from the population by the 
state does not occur, there is no demand for political participation. The merchants’ 
historical claim to participate, founded originally on their extractive capacity gave 
them a sense of entitlement and the ability to organize politically. They were the 
one group in the early days of oil capable of sustained, organized and possibly 
successful political opposition to the Shaikh. However, the Shaikh, recognizing 
this possibility offered them economic advantages. Since money was no object it 
was easier for the state to offer economic and financial advantages than to repress 
them185, in order to do this the Shaikh persuaded them that their economic 
opportunities would increase once the protectorate (British Clientcy) had ended, 
and sectors of the economy then dominated by British Nationals were available to 
them to exploit. And in 1960 the Law of Commercial Companies No. 15/1960 
was implemented, and the Kuwaiti merchants were then able to construct their 
own companies, and were not subject to tax under the Tax Decree 3/1955 which 
came to impose corporate income tax liability on foreign enterprises in Kuwait 
and excluded domestic enterprises, even though, theoretically, the Decree had 
scope to tax domestic enterprises. This is discussed extensively in the next 
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chapter186. Oil also gave the regime the resources necessary to develop new allies 
among the national population through its distributive policies. 
 
3.4.2 Politics in Post:Oil Kuwait: The Decline of the Merchants and the 
Beginning of a Limited Democracy  
 
Oil brought new forces into play and restructured political life in Kuwait. Within a 
few years oil revenues dominated the local economy. The most important impact 
of oil was that it gave rulers direct access to external revenues generated outside 
the local economy. Whereas once revenues had to be squeezed from the 
population through merchants who in turn exacted a political price, the Shaikhs 
now received income independently, they did not need to extract taxes from the 
merchants, they were also not keen to win the merchants’ support any longer. This 
type of independence was uniquely attributed to oil. The immediate consequence 
was a breakdown of the economic bases of the historical governing coalition, the 
alliances binding the ruling families, and the development of new unstable 
arrangements which largely excluded the merchants from formal political life. The 
Shaikh turned increasingly inwards to inner family councils that formed within 
the ruling family of Al Sabah. This reaction from the Shaikh caused the merchants 
to try and resurrect their historical claim to decision making. This is how Kuwait’s 
National Assembly came about. 
 
3.4.3 Kuwait’s =ational Assembly 
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During his Shaikhdom, Shaikh Abdullah, (1950-1965) ended the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
Agreement in 1961187. And although all Kuwaiti rulers had traditionally ruled 
personally, Shaikh Abdullah decided to move Kuwait towards a limited form of 
constitutional government. He introduced the Kuwaiti Constitution in 1962, and 
the first Kuwaiti National Assembly was partially elected on January 23rd 1963188. 
In the election 50 candidates were elected; representing twenty five 
constituencies. The first cabinet of Kuwait was formed on January 28, 1963; the 
Shaikh189 appointed the Prime Minister who was a member of the ruling family 
and the Prime Minister appointed 15 Ministers, three of which were elected 
members of the National Assembly190, together they formed the Kuwaiti 
government191. From the moment the first National Assembly convened, it 
quickly asserted itself. A close examination of its proceedings from 1963-1976 
shows a lively National Assembly actively participating in the formulation of 
public policies. Members showed themselves to be well informed on domestic and 
international issues concerning the state, and often unearthed critical information 
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not made public by the government192. Legislative debates were vivid. Outside 
observers - from neighbouring states with no democratic advancement - were 
repeatedly struck by their honesty, openness and frankness. Attendance was high 
since the National Assembly’s internal rules penalized unauthorized absence, and 
because it could not meet unless a majority of its members were present. Although 
parties were illegal the political preferences of the members were well known. 
There were three main political blocs; the first bloc consisted of tribal supporters 
of the ruling family. During the 1960s the regime had granted citizenship to large 
numbers of Bedouins and offered them various advantages: low income housing, 
social services, and jobs in the bureaucracy and the army. In effect, the 
government used these material incentives to turn tribes into political allies. As a 
result, representatives of these tribes became the backbone of support for the 
ruling family in the National Assembly. Members of Kuwait’s business oligarchy 
formed a second important bloc in the National Assembly, and, although this bloc 
wasn’t homogenous, it included primarily independent and moderate reformist 
elements intent on pressing the government to become more accountable and to 
open up the political process193. The third and most vocal were the Arab 
Nationalists. In time, eight members of this bloc were to leave their seats in the 
Assembly in protest against some laws they brandished as freedom chaining194. 
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The 1963 National Assembly passed key pieces of legislation on imports, the oil 
industry, obligatory education, reshaping Kuwait’s Airways Corporation, setting 
up savings and loan banks, the state’s public budget, and real estate. The first 
National Assembly was also responsible for finding Law No. 12/1963, regarding 
the interior regulation and explanatory memorandum of the National Assembly, 
this law regulates the National Assembly’s formation procedure, membership, 
sessions, and activities195.  
Over time, the National Assembly also started pushing to nationalize the oil 
companies and devoted considerable attention to other oil-related issues: the 
marketing of oil in Kuwait, payment schedules, production levels, gas flaring, 
employment and the training of Kuwaitis in the oil sector. Oil soon became the 
National Assembly’s main concern and a source of conflict between the National 
Assembly and the government196. The conflict soared in the 1960s when the oil 
industry in oil producing countries, including Kuwait, was ultimately controlled 
by US and European oil companies. These foreign oil companies paid the host 
governments income either in taxes or royalties based on the posted price the 
companies charged for crude oil on the world market. However, in 1960, new oil-
producing countries began to emerge, causing more competition and with it a 
sharp decline in oil prices. Oil production greatly exceeded world demand. This 
prompted the major oil companies to cut the posted price and thus the royalties 
paid to producing countries diminished. The oil companies reduced the posted 
prices on which the Kuwaiti government’s 50% share of the profit was based. In 
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1960, the  Jersey Standard197 cut the prices for its crude oil by 14 cents a barrel 
(7,5%). This was done unilaterally without informing or consulting the 
governments of oil countries. Due to these oil price cuts The Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)198 was founded in 1962, in order for the 
oil exporting states to have control over oil prices, to coordinate and unify oil 
policies, stabilize oil prices in international oil markets, and finally to eliminate 
harmful and unnecessary fluctuations in prices, due regard being given at all times 
to the interests of oil-producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady 
income for them199.  However, OPEC failed to restore oil prices before the oil 
companies cut them again in 1962200. The oil companies also pushed to reduce the 
royalties paid to the governments of the producing states and demanded that the 
royalties paid to OPEC members be considered as expenses. This would mean 
that the foreign oil companies would register the royalties they gave to the host 
governments as an expense before they (the oil companies) are taxed, thus 
reducing the revenues for the producing governments which, in turn, meant 
reducing the 50% of the profits which the producing governments were entitled to 
under profit sharing agreements. The Kuwaiti government, initially, agreed to 
accept the new arrangement, but when the Shaikh brought the agreement home, 
the National Assembly refused to ratify it, and called instead for consideration of 
royalties as expenses without any further reduction in the price of oil201. Oil soon 
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became a major source of conflict between the government and the National 
Assembly; the latter wanted to be part of every decision made regarding its main 
national resource, and to play a role in other policies made by the government. 
Shaikh Abdullah’s successor, Shaikh Sabah (1965-1977), was not as keen on the 
democratic advancement in Kuwait as featured in the National Assembly. He was 
not impressed by the new and vocal legislative power of the National 
Assembly202, and the constant scrutiny of the government’s policies was not the 
Shaikh Sabah’s idea of a peaceful state. Thus when the National’s Assembly’s 
first term came to end in 1967, the government used in the following election 
various forms of electoral interference and ensured for itself a more docile body; 
one that lacked, in particular, dissenting members. 
However, the government had the means to secure the people’s alliance and 
support, through oil revenues. Oil also enabled successive Kuwaiti Shaikhs 
(Shaikh Sabah 1965-1977 and his successor Jaber 1977-2006) to introduce new 
goals. These goals were directed towards binding the people to the state, and to 
catalyzing the growth of large bureaucracies203. The state became the first 
employer of working nationals with its proverbial “Cradle to Grave” welfare 
system. These welfare and development policies also aided the formation of new, 
relatively large and complex bureaucracies. Power and decision-making remained 
un-institutionalized i.e. there was no meaningful distinction, either political or 
legal, between the person of the Shaikh and the institution of state, the Shaikh’s 
sovereignty was re-asserted. Increasingly, the National Assembly was excluded 
from most important decisions. In time Shaikh Sabah dissolved the National 
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Assembly for five years in 1976 (now called the Parliament). The impetus for 
dissolution came from two sources; members of the National Assembly were too 
vocal for the comfort of Kuwait’s autocratic neighbours, and the members were 
also too vocal for the comfort of the ruler and his family204.   
Kuwait began negotiations in the early 1970s to gain full control over its own 
natural oil resources. By mutual agreements with the company's two original 
partners; British Petroleum205 and Gulf Oil, the State's shareholding in KOC was 
increased progressively until full control was achieved. On March 5th, 1975, an 
agreement was signed by the State of Kuwait and the two oil companies giving 
Kuwait complete control of its oil resources; KOC was nationalized206. Today, 
Kuwait is one of the world's top exporters of oil, with about 2.4 million barrels per 
day exported in 2009207. Kuwait's economy is heavily dependent on oil export 
revenues, which account for roughly 90 percent of total export earnings. However, 
oil in Kuwait has shown serious signs of depletion. Analysts have been concerned 
by the Kuwaiti government’s reluctance in recent years to disclose information on 
oil reserves. Since January 2006208, when Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) 
published a report stating that the internal records of Kuwait only show 48 billion 
barrels of reserves as opposed to official figures of 99 billion, the scale of reserves 
in OPEC's fifth largest producer has remained sensitive and uncertain209.  
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3.4.4 Society in Post:Oil Kuwait 
 
Oil has been a benefit to Kuwait, but it has also brought real costs. Economic 
development has led to over-spending, corruption, inefficiencies, inflation, 
shortages, and bottlenecks. Each of the major social welfare programmes has 
produced unintended side effects. In education, the expansion of schools led the 
government to rely on foreign teachers. In the late 1950s, almost 90% of Kuwait’s 
teachers were non-Kuwaitis, most of them were Arabs, many were from Egypt 
and often brought with them political ideas that troubled the regime210. Nor was 
the system as successful as hoped in matching trained Kuwaitis to the necessary 
standards. In higher education the system turned out more graduates than jobs in 
liberal arts, and the government was particularly unsuccessful in encouraging 
Kuwaitis to enrol on vocational programmes. The result was a bad match between 
graduates and the needs of the economy. In health care, very expensive medical 
equipment was rapidly purchased with little attention given to priority needs or to 
the ability of the system to maintain and use the equipment. Treatment received 
more emphasis than prevention, and as in education the state remained dependent 
on foreign health care workers. The housing programme expanded with little 
planning, resulting in long waiting lists; the programme also drove up the price of 
the land211. To an even greater extent than health and education the housing 
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programme led to the emergence of an industry based almost entirely on foreign 
labour212. 
 
3.4.5 Drawbacks of Oil Dependency in General and in Kuwait specifically 
 
There are various drawbacks to high dependency on oil. It is important to 
highlight such drawbacks in general, but also to focus on the particular 
disadvantages suffered by Kuwait.  
 
1.1 Unequal expertise: Bargaining Power  
 
Governments face significant challenges in their contact with international 
corporations, which have great knowledge and know-how in particular fields. 
Since oil and gas exploration is both capital and technologically concentrated, 
extracting them requires co-operation between governments and experienced 
international companies. In most of these cases, the oil company is more 
knowledgeable than the producing state, especially when it comes to the value of 
the good being sold 213. This situation gives oil companies very strong bargaining 
powers over the producing state, while the latter attempts to find means to 
contract with oil companies in a manner that ensures them a fair deal as well.  
In the case of Kuwait, the oil producing company (KOC) had a wide discretion in 
its decision making when the Shaikh granted KOC the first concession in 1934214 
simply because KOC had the expertise to unearth and export oil. Further, this 
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situation has not changed much today. In 2006, Kuwait began negotiations with 
the Chevron, BP, Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell corporations to obtain 
foreign technology, and reach its production target of 4 million bpd while keeping 
control over its oil and gas reserves. However, negotiations were brought to a halt 
due to opposition from some of the members of the National Assembly, who 
argued that the contracts – the subject of the negotiations – were overpriced215. An 
official of the National Assembly’s Finance and Economy Committee had 
provided that Kuwait will not reach its productions target of 4 million barrels-per-
day (from its current 2.4 million bpd) without the help of established oil 
companies, who deal with challenging oil fields. Also, due to the slowness of the 
talks and the constant clashes between the National Assembly and the Kuwaiti 
government, both Chevron and BP withdrew their top executives from Kuwait in 
April 2009216.   
 
1.2 Dutch Disease 
 
In the 1960s, the Netherlands witnessed significant wealth abundance when large 
natural gas deposits were discovered. This positive, however, had brought major 
negative challenges to the Dutch economy. Whilst the country’s currency soared 
the non-oil exports declined. This syndrome has been named ‘Dutch Disease’217. 
The Dutch manufacturing sector, in particular, had suffered and became less 
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competitive. Subsequently, oil-rich countries that similarly experienced a decline 
in the pre-existing domestic sectors of their economy have been branded with the 
same Dutch Disease218. The disease’s symptoms are shared in all resource-rich 
countries highly dependent on exploiting such resources;  
 
“a sudden rise in the price of natural resource exports produces an 
appreciation in     the real exchange rate. This makes exporting non-natural 
resource commodities more challenging and competing with imports 
across a wide range of commodities becomes almost impossible (the 
spending effect). Foreign exchange earned from the natural resource 
meanwhile may be used to purchase internationally traded goods at the 
expense of domestic manufacturers of the goods” (Humphreys, M. et al. 
(2007), Escaping the Resource Curse, Columbia University Press, pp. 10-14). 
 
 
Domestic resources such as labour and materials, are consequently shifted to the 
natural resource sector (the resource pull effect), causing prices to rises on the 
domestic market and therefore increasing the costs to producers in other 
sectors219.  
Kuwait’s heavy dependency on oil has left it with similar symptoms as the Dutch 
Disease. The booming economic conditions of the 1970s which Kuwait had 
enjoyed attributed mainly to vast oil revenues failed to continue in the 1980s. In 
1981, the government announced a fiscal budget deficit for the first time in 
Kuwait’s recent history, and in 1982, the deficit was twice as large. The economic 
slowdown was reflected in the change in real gross domestic production (GDP) in 
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1981, which was 9.1 percent lower than that of 1980, and declined a further 15.4 
percent in 1982220.  
The decline in revenues from oil exports was responsible for the country’s 
economic stagnation. Revenues from oil exports had been a major source of 
financing government expenditures. These revenues had been responsible for 
generating and sustaining non-government revenue as well. Like most Gulf 
countries, Kuwait’s revenues from oil had been more than 90% of government 
fiscal revenues between 1970 and 1980. This decline in world demand for oil 
followed by reduced oil prices in the early 1980s affected Kuwait’s revenues 
negatively.  
However, the past half decade (2003-2008) has proven to be good for oil 
exporters. Kuwait’s Ministry of Finance figures show that oil revenues almost 
trebled since the fiscal year 2003/2004 going from $23 billion to $67 billion in 
2007/8. This was, again, attributed to oil income rising to 93% in the fiscal year 
2007/8, up from 89% five years earlier. 
Oil in Kuwait accounted for 95% of its export revenues, and 95% of government 
income in 2009221. Also, Kuwaiti officials had committed themselves to 
increasing oil production as has been discussed above222 to 4 million bpd by 2010, 
however, these plans did not materialize. Due to its high dependency on oil 
revenues, Kuwait has done little to diversify and reform its economy and has done 
very little to improve its poor business climate. In addition, there is acrimonious 
relationship between the National Assembly and the government which revolves 
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mainly around the Assembly’s views on the government’s corruption, unwise 
spending of oil revenue and poor distribution of oil wealth223. 
 
 1.3 Volatility  
 
Oil and gas revenues are highly volatile. This volatility is due to the variation over 
time in rates of extraction, and timing of payments by oil companies to producing 
states. The disadvantage of highly volatile income sources is that long term 
planning for future financing is almost impossible to predict, especially when the 
commodity’s value is fluctuating. The result can be high levels of expenditure in 
good years followed by deep cuts in bad years. This in turn can lead to ‘boom-
bust cycles’ and all too often the benefits in the good years are transitory, whereas 
the problems generated during the bad years endure224.  
Applying this to Kuwait, the state witnessed oil stagnation in the 1980s225, and 
another sharp decline in oil prices in 2005 where the price of a barrel of oil 
dropped from $100 to $50. 226  
    
1.4 Living off Capital 
 
Because oil and gas resources are non-renewable, oil-rich states face problems as 
they are constantly consuming their capital rather than income. If all revenues are 
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consumed in each period, then the value of the country’s total capital declines.  
Also when there is an increase in the state’s income, there exists a pressure to 
spend. This is either due to politicians with an uncertain hold on power having an 
incentive to spend sooner rather than to leave opportunities for future political 
opponents, or pressures arising from the people who demand rapid and visible 
improvements in welfare 227.  
Kuwait too had experienced pressure to spend its oil wealth amidst its abundance 
in the 1960s and the 1970s, that need to spend also created the Kuwaiti 
bureaucracy. The main factors underlying the emergence of a Kuwaiti 
bureaucracy were the ambitious plans to establish a welfare state, the accelerated 
pace of this establishment, the limited administrative capacity, low productivity 
and qualifications and limited participation of the “native” labour force.228 While 
the ruling family secured its powers through oil revenues, and the National 
Assembly’s powers were diminishing, a third institution was inexorably 
developing; namely the Kuwaiti Bureaucracy. The bureaucratic demands of the oil 
industry, as such, were relatively small as oil operations were handled by foreign-
owned companies. However, a small government bureaucracy did emerge to 
monitor the oil companies, to handle some oil-related operations, and, eventually, 
to take over the industry after nationalization.  The real force for expanding the 
bureaucracy, however, came from the need to spend the vast revenues created by 
oil229. Following the introduction of the 1962 constitution new ministries were 
formed from the old departments. Rapid growth continued as Kuwaitis were hired 
in large numbers as a means of redistributing the oil revenues nationally, and even 
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larger numbers of expatriates carried out the vast technical functions which 
nationals, who were small in number and poorly educated, could not230. The first 
international oil price hike in 1973 resulted in a significant change in the 
economics of Kuwait and the scope of its activities. For instance, the GDP and per 
capita income in Kuwait grew by 137.7 percent and 125.1 percent respectively 
between the years 1973 and 1974. The increase in per capita income resulted in a 
surge in demand for goods and services which, as a consequence, increased the 
demand for imported goods and labour, thus contributing to an imbalance in the 
labour force and the population mix. Economic and service demands, such as 
education, health and utilities continued to grow during the early 1970s, far 
exceeding the growth in population. In this period, public spending was 80% of 
the total revenues. Wages  accounted for 45% of total permanent expenditure; this 
reflected the policy of the state of distributing wealth by guaranteeing 
employment to its citizens231. The Kuwaiti government also initiated and 
supported a policy for massive naturalization of the Bedouin population and 
encouraged their settlement. Many of the tribesmen lacked qualifications and were 
not given the opportunity to be trained, which led to continuous pressure to 
increase the budget allocation for unskilled jobs to absorb them within the 
bureaucracy232. 
When the influence of the merchants in decision-making declined gradually 
throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, this paved the way for other political groups 
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to influence decision-making through increasing political participation233. 
Decision-making was carried out in the old autocratic fashion. Department heads 
or ministers from the ruling family had great discretion over their own decisions 
without effective accountability. As a result, the central government suffered from 
a lack of uniformity and coordination. Many major decisions were either not taken 
or postponed to maintain balance among the ruling family members, and decision-
making focused on day to day business with little or no emphasis on policy 
formulation. The quality of decision-making was impeded by the low profile of 
top officials. Most decisions reflected particularistic interests rather than the 
public interest. Decision making was carried out on an ad-hoc basis, without 
reference to strategic planning or studies234.   
 
1.5 Insufficient Investment in Education 
 
Studies have shown that exaggerated consumption yields poor investment in 
education. When states rely on natural resource wealth there is a tendency to 
forget the need for a diversified and skilled workforce that can support other 
economic sectors once the resource wealth has dried up. As a result, the share of 
national income spent on education declines. While the costs of such declines 
might not be felt in the short term, as capital-intensive activities take up a larger 
share of national production, their effects are likely to become more significant in 
the longer run as soon as economies start trying to diversify. It is possible to 
understand this problem in terms of the nature of the source of wealth. When a 
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country’s wealth depends on investments in manufacturing or other productive 
activities, human capital investment is an essential part of wealth creation. 
However when a country relies mainly on extracting and selling oil, investment in 
human skills will not have priority235.  
 
Applying the above to Kuwait, as has been seen earlier in this chapter236, the 
Kuwaiti government has failed to match trained Kuwaitis to the necessary 
standards and was unsuccessful in encouraging Kuwaitis to enrol on vocational 
programmes. However the oil and gas sector has also limited employment 
opportunities because of its very capital intensive nature237. 
 
1.6 Spoliation 
 
Almost all oil-rich countries suffer from high levels of corruption. The temporary 
availability of large financial revenues increases the opportunity for theft of such 
assets by political leaders. Politicians in control of the assets use that wealth to 
maintain themselves in power, either through legal means (e.g. spending in 
political campaigns) or coercive ones (e.g. funding militias). To some extent, 
corruption is a hallmark of the oil business itself. But oil and gas dependence can 
also affect corruption indirectly. The presence of oil and gas wealth can produce 
weak state structures that make corrupt practices considerably easier for 
government officials. Statistics show that natural resource dependence is a strong 
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predictor when seeking to account for variation in levels of corruption across 
different countries238. Corruption related to natural resources takes many forms; 
bribing government officials when  mining and oil companies seek to lower their 
costs, obtaining the resource below market value. In other cases, the natural 
resource is sold to domestic firms at below full value, with government officials 
either getting an ownership or share. In practice, the risk of corruption in 
resource-rich environments is considerable and the costs of such corruption to 
national economies are enormous239.  
Applying the above to Kuwait, a former chairman of Kuwait Petroleum 
Corporation (KPC) commented on the contracts which the Kuwait government 
had planned to sign with BP and Chevron in 2006240 to increase its oil production, 
by saying: 
“We’ve been producing our own oil for 60 years, and we’ve been able to develop 
oil abroad in difficult areas, which leads us to think there must be some financial 
reward involved for oil officials to insist on giving contracts to foreign 
companies241”.  
 
1.7 Weak, Unaccountable States 
 
Resource-rich states use their resources to finance expenditure, thus they are less 
reliant on their citizens in wealth extraction. When citizens are not taxed, on the 
other hand, they know less about the state’s activities and, in turn, demand less 
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from the state. Even if they disapprove of the state’s actions they lack the means 
to withdraw their financial support from states. As a result, states have less need 
to engage with civilians. Relying on external income sources rather than domestic 
revenue, states have less need to develop an apparatus to collect tax 242. The need 
to collect taxes is widely thought to have contributed to the emergence of state 
and even democratic institutions in many Western Countries243. The lack of 
reliance on tax revenue in favour of reliance on external sources of revenue is thus 
thought to hinder the development of effective states in many resource-rich 
developing countries244. 
 
Applying the above to the situation in Kuwait, as has been discussed above245, oil 
diminished the need for the ruling family to exact taxes from the people. It also 
gave the Shaikhs the power to provide for the people and secure their alliance. 
The Shaikh also had the power to dissolve the National Assembly, whenever the 
latter became too vocal for the comfort of the ruling family. 
 
The fact that oil still to this day accounts for 95% of the Kuwaiti government 
income suggests that Kuwait is still enveloped in rentierism as its dependency on 
oil rises246. But what is rentierism? And what are its drawbacks? 
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3.5 What is a Rentier State? And does Kuwait Qualify as One?  
 
The Iranian economist, Hussein Mahdavi247, introduced the rentier concept in 
1970. Other economists, notably Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi, also 
elaborated on and applied the theory of rentier states to the oil producing Arab 
Gulf States248. Since the theory of a rentier state was postulated by Mahdavi, it 
was appropriated by a community of Middle East specialists in their discussion of 
the Arab World. The theory in its broadest sense defines rentier states “as those 
countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external economic 
rent”. The theory doesn’t define the rentier state with references exclusively to the 
Persian Gulf or the Middle East. However, rentier theorists have had Arab oil 
exporting and oil transiting states in mind, particularly during the historical period 
1951-1981 when these states appropriated a larger share of the economic rents 
associated with the petroleum industries249.  For Mahdavi, the stage at which a 
state can be called a rentier state is determined arbitrarily but he was primarily 
interested in cases in which “the effects of the oil sector are significant and yet the 
rest of the economy is not of secondary importance”. He cites Kuwait and Qatar 
as extreme examples of the phenomenon, with, in his opinion, limited capabilities 
for industrialization and few alternatives to rentierism250. On the other hand, 
another commentator, Beblawi251, delineates four characteristics of a rentier state; 
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“first, the rentier economy of which the state is subset must be one where rent 
situation predominates. Beblawi argues that, in this respect, there is no such thing 
as a pure rentier economy and concurs with Mahdavi’s view that the 
determination of when an economy becomes rentier is matter of judgment. 
Second, the origin of this rent must be external to the economy. In other words, 
the rents must come from foreign sources. Domestic rent, even if it were 
substantial enough to predominate, is not sufficient to characterize the rentier 
economy, because domestic rent is a factor income that only results from 
production (labour), investment (interest), and management of risk (profit) i.e. 
internal forces of production.  Third, in a rentier state, only the few are engaged 
in the generation of rent, while the majority is involved in its distribution and 
consumption. Therefore, an open economy with high levels of foreign trade is not 
rentier, even if it depends predominately on rent (e.g. tourism), because the 
majority of society is actively involved in the creation of wealth. Finally, the 
government must be the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy. 
This last characteristic is closely related to the concentration of rent in the hands 
of the few, it also, using a phrase popular among contemporary political scientists 
“brings the state back in” to the idea of the rentier state” (Beblawi, H. and 
Luciani, G. (1987) The Rentier State, London: Croom Helm, pp. 48-60). 
Conversely, Luciani252 places less emphasis on the nature or “structure” of state 
revenue i.e. (rent and taxes) and more on its origins or sources (external/internal). 
The key feature of a rentier state according to Luciani is that  
“external rent liberates the state from the need to extract income from the 
domestic economy. Mahdavi notes that the oil industry’s most significant 
contribution is that it enables governments of the oil producing countries to 
embark on large public expenditure programmes without resorting to taxation” 
(Beblawi, H. and Luciani, G. (1987) The Rentier State, London: Croom Helm, 
pp. 48-60). 
Before the discovery of oil, Kuwait had a relatively efficient tax system253, 
however, the large oil revenues had allowed the government to depend entirely on 
oil revenues to cover expenditure and abandon taxation; this dependency has had 
drawbacks and disadvantages as has been seen earlier254 and in this discussion on 
rentier states. 
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Luciani takes this state autonomy as his point of departure and proposes a new 
categorization which defines states by their allocative and productive functions. 
Unlike the productive state that relies on taxation of the domestic economy for its 
income and in which economic growth is therefore inevitable, an allocation state 
does not depend on domestic sources of revenue, but rather is the primary source 
of revenue itself in the domestic economy. The policy of a production state is, 
therefore, designed to increase economic growth while an allocation state fails to 
formulate anything deserving the appellation of economic policy. The primary 
goal of economic policy in an allocation state is spending. But beyond spending 
(which all states must do) Luciani breaks from Mahdavi and Beblawi and 
specifies conceptual boundaries for his rentier allocation state as one whose 
revenue derives predominately more than 40% from oil, and whose expenditure is 
a substantial share of GDP255.  
 
 3.5.1 Drawbacks of Rentierism 
 
Countries with large endowments of natural resources, such as oil and gas, often 
perform worse in terms of economic development and good governance than 
countries with fewer resources as has been seen in the discussion on the Dutch 
Disease256. Paradoxically, despite the prospects of wealth and opportunity that 
accompany the discovery and extraction of oil and other natural resources, such 
endowments all too often impede rather than further balanced and sustainable 
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growth257. On the one hand, the lack of natural resources has not proven to be a 
fatal barrier to economic success for the star performers of the developing world - 
the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan). All achieved 
booming export industries based on manufactured goods and rapid economic 
growth without large natural resource reserves, while many natural resource-rich 
countries have struggled to generate self-sustaining growth. Thus, resource-rich 
countries grew less rapidly than resource-poor countries during the last quarter of 
the twentieth century and alongside these growth failures are strong associations 
between resource wealth and the likelihood of weak democratic development, 
corruption, and civil war258. There is also a high degree of variation in well-being 
across resource-rich countries. The United Nation’s Human Development Index 
illustrates this by measuring income, health, and education across countries 
worldwide. Thus Norway, a major oil producer, ranks at the very top of the index, 
yet Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Yemen, Nigeria, Angola 
and Chad, all oil-producing countries, fall at the other extreme259. To understand 
the natural resource paradox there is a need for a sense of what makes natural 
resource wealth different from other types of wealth. As has been mentioned 
above260 natural resources of wealth - unlike other sources of wealth - do not need 
to be produced, they simply need to be extracted (even if there is often nothing 
simple about the extraction process). Since it is not a result of a production 
process, the generation of natural resource wealth can occur quite independently 
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of other economic processes that take place in a country; it is, in a number of 
ways “enclaved”261. A government can often access natural resource wealth 
regardless of whether it commands the co-operation of its citizens or effectively 
controls institutions of state, through the government can - and in the case of 
Kuwait does – give a false perception of oil revenues and the state’s budget. In 
April 2010, oil revenues in Kuwait appeared larger than estimated, the reason 
behind this is that the Kuwaiti budget is calculated according to the next year’s oil 
revenue, and since there is no way to accurately estimate such a fluctuating 
resource each year there appears to be a surplus in the revenues. The Kuwaiti 
Ministry of Finance calculates its budget at a very modest price. In the Financial 
Year 2010-2011, the budget was calculated according to a price $37.8 per barrel, 
and a daily production of 2.2 million barrels a day. However, prices of oil in this 
year reached $80.8 per barrel at a production rate of 2.45 million bpd in the first 
quarter of the financial year. Hence actual income reached KD 16.8 billion262, 
higher by 8.2 billion than the budget estimated; only 1 billion of the revenue came 
from non-oil resources. The total budget for 2010-2011 would reach KD 17.9 
billion, and this when compared to the estimated expenditure of the state KD 
16.162 should mean a surplus of KD 1.7 billion for the entire fiscal year263. 
The fact that extraction of rent is undertaken quite separately from the political 
process means that rulers do not need their people’s consent or participation in the 
process of extracting that wealth. This also results in a false political stability 
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produced by the rentier economy’s effect on social structure264. Because these 
states do not tax their citizens, they do not have to worry about taxpayer-based 
groups pressuring them for accountability, demanding to know how their tax 
dollars are spent, or demanding something in return for their contribution to the 
state. If there are groups with complaints, the large revenues allow the rentier state 
to buy their compliance, to co-opt them265.  
 
Applying the above i.e. the description and requirements of a rentier state, the 
drawbacks of rentierism – to Kuwait, it is evident that rentierism does exists in 
Kuwait266. Oil revenues in Kuwait have historically come from foreign oil 
companies. The industry itself creates few local upstream and downstream 
linkages. It normally employs few local workers, as it is a very capital intensive 
industry, and it is almost an economic enclave. In a rentier economy, revenues go 
directly to the state. A rentier economy is distinguished from most economies 
highly dependent on foreign trade, because the income from foreign trade goes to 
the private owners of the commodity-producing properties and not directly to the 
state. This was the case in Kuwait before oil. As seen above267, the Shaikhs 
collected taxes on the pearling and trading boats owned by the merchants. Oil 
revenues, however, go directly to the state. The fact that oil revenues go directly 
to the state is important because it means that money is centralized in the state. 
Individuals can become rich only through their relationship to the state, or with 
                                                 
264 Ross, Michael L., (2004), What do we Know about atural Resources and Civil War?, Journal 
of Peace Research, 41(3): pp. 337-356. 
265 See pp. 84-85. 
266 Beblawi and Luciani (note 212 supra). 
267 See pp. 55-56. 
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the state elite268. Finally, in a rentier economy rents are large. Unless rents are the 
only important revenues in the economy, they will not dominate the economy. As 
has been mentioned above269, Kuwait is highly dependent on oil; sales of oil 
account for 95% of the state’s revenues270. The most important administrative 
functions of most states, rich and poor alike, is to extract revenues, that is, to draw 
taxes from the population. Because rentier states do not rely on taxes from the 
local population for income, they do not have to carry out this extractive function. 
Instead of extracting revenues, they distribute them. In Kuwait, pre-existing 
traditions - patterns of paternalism and group solidarity271- already predisposed 
Kuwait to distribute revenues.272 This function has become institutionalized, and 
revenues are now distributed by the state through direct transfer, social services, 
and state jobs. One result of this distributive function is that the institutions of 
rentier states differ from most other states. In Kuwait, as will be seen273, there is 
only an embryonic tax system and consequentially, a small non-independent tax 
department within the Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, it has extensive 
distributive institutions representing the state such as the Ministry of Health, 
Social Affairs, and Education. It also has a large Oil Ministry to ensure that its 
capacity to distribute will continue. Kuwait, however, despite its excellent 
distributive capacity, has virtually no redistributive capacity. It can give to the 
poor, but it cannot take from the rich. The lack of an extractive, hence 
                                                 
268 Beblawi and Luciani (note 212 supra). 
269 See p. 79. 
270 KAMCO Research, (2011), Kuwait, Economic Outlook, p.6 
http://www.menafn.com/updates/research_center/Kuwait/Economic/kamco170211ee.pdf [visited 
14/6/2011]. 
271 See chapter 2 of this thesis on more about the Islamic Almsgiving of ‘Zakat’ practiced in 
Kuwait p.7-9. 
272 Auty (note 257 supra). 
273 See pp. 99-104 
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redistributive, capacity means that the state has fewer policy tools, fewer fiscal 
options, and less flexibility should it need it. All the above cover the first and 
second requirements which Beblawi argued274 satisfy the definition of a rentier 
state i.e. a state economy where rents predominates, and where the origin of these 
rents are from a foreign source. The third consequence of a rentier economy, 
which Beblawi points out, is that the rents – on which a rentier state 
predominately depends radically change the relationship between state and 
society, primarily by creating new social classes. In Kuwait, oil weakened the old 
classes who had previously prevailed, such as the merchants, because the state no 
longer depended on them for money, and Kuwaitis no longer depended on the 
merchants for employment. However if oil ‘destroys’ certain social groups, it also 
creates new ones. These were the bureaucrats and middlemen-contractors, groups 
defined by their dependence on the state for their creation and sustenance275. The 
third and the fourth requirements which constitute Beblawi’s rentier state276 
provide that in a rentier state only a few are involved in the generation of the rent, 
while the majority are beneficiaries of its distribution277. And finally, the 
government of a rentier state is the principal receiver of the rents. In this context, 
Kuwait has the oil company, KOC, which is run by a limited number of 
employees and executives, while the rest of the state’s service providing 
institutions spend the revenue it generates. Oil revenues in Kuwait have allowed 
the Kuwaiti government to spend not only on essential services such as health, 
                                                 
274 See p. 88. 
275 Smith, B. (2004), Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999, 
American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2): pp. 232-246. 
276 See p. 88. 
277 Stauffer, T. (1987), Income Measurement in Arab States, in Beblawi H. and Luciani (note 212 
supra). 
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education, housing, and social insurance, but also on water provision, benefits, 
social allowances and loans278. The state pays premium wages, and collects 
minimal rents on its properties. It sells goods, especially food, below cost, and 
charges only a fraction of the market price for energy. Bus and aeroplane fares are 
subsidised279. The state covers medical expenses and student fees, and assists 
almost every commercial or agricultural venture with inexpensive land and 
interest-free loans280.  Finally, the rent yielding company in Kuwait, KOC, is state 
owned and thus its revenues go straight to the state281.  
 
3.6 The Crucial need for Kuwait to Move away from Dependency on Oil 
Revenues  
 
From the above, it can be seen that oil has brought Kuwait a curtailed democracy 
in the shape of a National Assembly answerable to the ruler of the state, a society 
dependant on its government for income and provision of welfare, and an unstable 
source of income - oil revenue. Oil has led to a rigid and increasingly growing 
bureaucracy, and turned Kuwait into a Rentier state. The general drawbacks that 
are found in states totally reliant on oil (or any extracted natural wealth) i.e. poor 
social responsibility, Dutch Disease, volatility, etc. are evident in Kuwait282. And 
thus there is a crucial need for Kuwait to move away from its dependency upon 
oil which over time is initially, a diminishing resource. However with no industry, 
                                                 
278 Khalaf, S. and Hammoud, H. (1988), The Emergence of the Oil Welfare State: The Case of 
Kuwait, Dialectical Anthropology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Vol., 12, pp. 343-350.   
279 Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, a Report of the Main Characteristics of Inhabitants and Labour 
Force, April 1993. 
280 Pipes, D. (1982), The Curse of Oil Wealth, The Atlantic,  http://www.danielpipes.org/163/the-
curse-of-oil-wealth, [visited on Saturday 2nd of July 2010].  
281 Stauffer (note 277 supra). 
282 See pp. 76-88. 
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zero tourism and a very poor environment for agriculture and investment283 this 
task is a challenge. The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC): 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, have shown some 
willingness to diversify their economies through industrialization and the 
development of productive activities, spending part of their oil revenue on 
infrastructural works and large industrial projects. Until recently, there was little 
or no co-ordination between these States, in these respects. Within the limitations 
imposed by a shortage of labour, relatively small markets and the strong 
dependency of most projects on the availability of free oil and gas, the scope for 
‘diversification by industry’ has of course to be questioned 284. Indeed, the success 
which some individual members states of the GCC have enjoyed in lowering their 
dependency on oil in their government revenues and exports have been modest. 
However, Kuwait (alongside Bahrain) can be considered the least successful of 
the GCC states in decreasing its dependency on oil in its government revenues 
and exports. The table below shows the role of oil in GCC countries’ government 
revenues, exports and GDP from 1980 – 2007285. 
  
        Government Revenues                      Exports                            GDP 
 1980 2007 1980 2007 1980 2007 
Bahrain 77.0 80.0 33.6 79.2 28.0 24.6 
Kuwait 82.0 93.1 90.0 94.4 59.7 53.2 
Oman 86.0 76.4 92.4 75.8 59.3 45.1 
                                                 
283 Al Tony (note 223 supra). 
284 Beblawi and Luciani (note 212 supra). 
285 Basher (note 237 supra). 
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Qatar 94.0 60.0 95.0 80.8 64.0 56.4 
Saudi 
Arabia 
91.2 82.5 99.9 88.0 65.8 50.9 
UAE 96.0 77.0 94.0 38.5 57.0 11.1 
Table 3.1: GCC States Exports and GDP from 1980 : 2007  
 
The ambition of the Kuwaiti ruling elite to ‘industrialise’ has always been 
limited286, and the cautious plans for industrial diversification have been shelved 
in the recent period287.  
Also as has been discussed earlier288 the Kuwaiti government only plans to 
unearth new oil wells and increase its daily oil production from the current 2.1 
million bpd to a substantial 4 million bpd with the help of foreign oil companies. 
Thus, there is more need than ever to break away from oil dependency and 
diversify the economy; taxation is an option which a rentier state such as Kuwait 
can benefit from, especially when rentierism and other drawbacks such as 
spoliation and a weak, unaccountable state presently prevail289.  
 
The next chapter provides an overview of Kuwait’s economic tax system which 
reflects, in many ways, the existence of Kuwait’s rentier economy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
286 Robert G. Fowler D. (1995), Built by Oil, Ithaca press, 1995, pp. 30-37. 
287 Reuters, (2011), Kuwait in Crisis as Ruling Family Splits, MPs Rebel, 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16048:kuwait-
in-crisis-as-ruling-family-splits-mps-rebel&catid=54:Governance&Itemid=118 [visited, 
15/6/2011]. 
288 See p. 77.  
289 See pp. 80-88. 
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Chapter 4: An Overview of the Kuwaiti Tax System 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Tax is a compulsory levy imposed by an organ of the government for public 
purposes290. Income tax in Kuwait is currently only applied to foreign income291 
attributed to a foreign enterprise carrying on business or trade inside 
Kuwait.292There are also duties and other fiscal charges, such as zakat, which are 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter293.  
Chapter 3294 emphasized the downside of oil dependency in general and in the 
case of Kuwait especially, this chapter suggests taxation as a possible solution to 
help reduce Kuwait’s oil dependency. Thus, it is important to analyse and assess 
closely Kuwait’s current tax system and to understand its shortcomings in order to 
be able to suggest a fiscal system that might best suit a post-oil economy in 
Kuwait. The Income Tax Decree 3/1955 was the first major attempt of 
constructing a tax system in Kuwait295, this Decree continued to govern the 
imposition of income tax in Kuwait until it underwent some amendment in 2008. 
However, it should be noted that the 2008 amendments reinforced the majority of 
the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 Articles except for a few changes which will be 
                                                 
290 Morse, G. and Williams, D. (2004), Davies: Principles of Tax Law, fifth edition, Thomson, p.3. 
291 The term ‘Income’ means gains and profits of a body corporate derived from carrying trade or 
business in Kuwait, Article 2 (h) of Kuwait’s Income Tax Decree 3/1955. The same definition is 
repeated in Article 2 (g) of the 2008 amendments to Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
292 Article 1 of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
293 See pp.103-104. 
294 See pp. 76-88. 
295 A preliminary Income Tax Decree was implemented in 1951 which was then replaced by 
Income Tax Decree 3/1955.  
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discussed in more detail below296. Thus, there is a need to look closely at the 
Kuwaiti tax system pre and post the 2008 amendments. 
This chapter starts by outlining the taxes and duties currently implemented in 
Kuwait, then provides a detailed description of Income Tax Decree 3/1955 with 
special emphasis on the shortcomings of the Decree and concludes with a critical 
analysis of the 2008 amendments.  
 
4.2 Taxation in Kuwait 
 
4.2.1 Income Tax 
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 3297, foreign oil companies paid royalties for the 
oil they extracted and exported from Kuwait to their home countries and thus the 
original purpose of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 and the former income Tax 
Decree of 1951 was to enable the Kuwaiti Oil Company (KOC), which was 
jointly owned by the British Petroleum Company and Gulf Oil to pay royalties to 
the Kuwaiti government by way of taxation in order to obtain tax relief in their 
country of origin298. However, when reading the Articles of the Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955 the language used does not specify taxpayers as foreign oil 
companies only, but uses the general term ‘corporate body’ to define taxpayers 
under the Decree299. Nevertheless, tax liability under the Decree falls in practice 
                                                 
296 See pp. 138 - 154. 
297 See pp. 65 - 66. 
298Baker, P. (1986), Kuwait: The Taxation of International Commercial Transactions, Arab Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 141-156.  
299 “The term ‘taxpayer’ means any body corporate subject to income tax imposed by this Decree” 
Article 2 (a) of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
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on any foreign enterprise carrying on trade or business in Kuwait300. When KOC 
was nationalized by the Kuwaiti government in 1976, income taxes continued to 
be imposed on the income attributed to enterprises applicable to all foreign 
companies carrying on trade or business in Kuwait.301 
Income Tax Decree 3/1955 applies a progressive tax rate302 that ranged from 5% 
to 55%303. Both natural persons and national enterprises304 are not liable to pay 
taxes in practice. Although domestic enterprises are not explicitly excluded from 
tax in the Decree, it should be established here that the Kuwaiti tax system has 
scope to tax domestic enterprises, although this situation of excluding domestic 
enterprises from income tax remains until this day. The reason behind excluding 
domestic enterprise from income tax, is the legislator’s intention to encourage 
nationals to start up businesses. However, it should be noted here that some 
national enterprises are subject to a 1% zakat, whether such companies are 
public305 or closed shareholding companies306. Domestic enterprises must also 
make a 1% contribution to Kuwait’s Foundation for Advancement of Sciences 
                                                 
300 “There shall be imposed on every body corporate wheresoever incorporated, carrying on trade 
or business in Kuwait an income tax..” Article 1 of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
301Although there is no Article in the Income Tax Law 3/1955 explicitly excluding domestic 
enterprises, they are in practice (to this day) excluded from taxation.  
302 See p. 109 for the Decree’s table of tax rates. The 2008 amendments abolished the progressive 
rate for a single 15% flat tax rate. 
303 Article 2 of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955.  
304 i.e. domestic companies which are fully owned by nationals, with no foreign shareholders. 
305 A public shareholding company’s shares are available for trade on Kuwait’s Stock Exchange.  
Foreigners could not own shares in such companies until the Ministerial Resolution No. 205/2000 
came into practice. 
306 A closed shareholding company’s shares are not open for public ownership. They are held only 
by the partners who incorporated the company. This company is usually fully owned by Kuwaiti 
nationals. Foreign nationals can only hold 49% of a company’s shares; however, in the case of 
49% foreign ownership the company cannot engage in banking or insurance activities, Articles 63-
179 of the Kuwaiti Company Law 15/1960.    
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(KFAS) and the 2.5% National Labour Support Tax (NLST)307; each of these tax 
liabilities will be discussed in more detail below308.  
Foreign individuals are also not subject to income tax in Kuwait. There are no 
taxes on the personal income of individuals in Kuwait, including the salary 
income of employees. There is no stamp duty, property tax, sales tax, value added 
tax, or inheritance tax309.  
The Income Tax Decree 3/1955 does not differentiate between the different types 
of income of foreign enterprises carrying on trade or business in Kuwait. So 
business profits, capital gains, dividends, interests or royalties fall under a single 
income tax base and are taxed at the applicable tax rate. Tax under the Decree was 
and continues to be imposed on Kuwaiti sources of income310. The Kuwaiti Tax 
Department continues to interpret the phrase “carrying on business or trade in 
Kuwait...”311 in the widest sense possible, thus, in the case of contracts involving 
performance inside or outside Kuwait, the entire revenue from the contracts, 
including the revenue relating to the performance outside Kuwait, must to be 
reported for tax to the Department of Income Tax in Kuwait. This includes work 
carried out outside Kuwait (offshore activity) under a contract that also involves 
activity in Kuwait (onshore activity)312; royalties, franchise, licence, trademark 
and copyright fees received by overseas foreign corporate bodies from Kuwait are 
                                                 
307 Kumar, R., Albazie & Co. (2010), Taxation in Kuwait, Albazie & Co. Public Accountants, 
pp.19-20.  
308 See pp. 103 - 109. 
309 Ernst & Young, Kuwait Taxation, (2010), pp.8-10. 
310 Article 2 (h) of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
311 Article 1 of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
312 See Article 2 (i) (ii) of Income Tax Decree 3/1955, also see Ernst and Young (note 290 supra). 
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also subject to income tax in Kuwait313. Kuwait’s jurisdiction to tax in an 
international context is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6314.  
 
4.3 Other taxes in Kuwait 
 
4.3.1 Custom Duties 
 
Duties have always been a part of the Kuwaiti fiscal system as has been 
mentioned in Chapter 2315. For many years, beginning in 1752, 5% duties were 
collected on all imports into Kuwait.316 These duties were reduced, however, to a 
4% import duty by the Kuwaiti Importation Law No. 43/1964 which now 
regulates import duties in Kuwait with the exception of products imported from 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); for the treatment of products from GCC 
states see Chapter 5317.  
 
4.3.2 Contribution to the Kuwait Foundation for Advancement of Sciences 
(KFAS) 
 
Although national companies do not pay income tax under the Income Tax Decree 
3/1955, Kuwait shareholding companies whether public or closed are required 
                                                 
313 See Article 1 (c) of Income Tax Decree 3/1955, also see Ernst and Young (note 290 supra). 
314 See pp. 183 - 233.  
315 See pp. 7-8. 
316
 Al Muzaini, A. (1984), Zakat and Taxes in Kuwait: Past and Present, Dar El Salaseil, pp.16.20. 
(Arabic). 
317 See pp. 157 - 159. 
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under Article 6 of the Memorandum of Associations of KFAS to contribute 1% to 
the KFAS which supports scientific progress within Kuwait318.  
 
4.3.3 The =ational Labour Support Tax (=LST) 
 
The National Labour Support Tax (NLST) Law No. 19 of 2000 came into force in 
May 2001. The law was originally proposed in order to support and encourage 
Kuwaiti nationals to work in non-governmental institutions319. The law imposed a 
duty on all Kuwaiti Shareholding Companies to register with the Ministry of 
Finance. The NLST is computed at 2.5% of the annual net income of their 
companies before the board of director’s remuneration, contributions to KFAS, 
donations, grants, Zakat and NLST have been taken into account. However the 
annual net income is computed after deducting costs and expenses incurred by the 
company in earning its profits320.  
 
4.3.4 Zakat 
 
Zakat played a key role in the redistribution of wealth in Kuwait for many years 
when it was compulsory and collected on livestock. However, after the discovery 
and exportation of oil in 1946 zakat was made voluntary321. Zakat became 
mandatory again for national companies in 2006. Law No. 46 of 2006 imposes a 
mandatory Zakat of 1% on all Kuwaiti public and closed shareholding companies 
                                                 
318 Al Bazie & Co. (Member of RSM International), 2009, Taxation in Kuwait, p.9. 
319 This law has been amended through Ministerial Resolution 24 of 2006, See Al Bazie & Co. 
(note 319 supra). 
320Albazie (note 319 supra). 
321 See pp. 9-10 
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excluding government entities and foreign companies. The zakat is computed at 
1% of annual net profits before board of director’s remuneration, contribution to 
Kuwait Foundation for advancement of Sciences, donations, grants, NLST and 
zakat are taken into account, and after deducting costs and expenses incurred by 
the company in earning those profits.  For more details on Zakat in Kuwait see 
Chapter 2322. 
 
 
4.3.5 Offset Program Law =o. 9 of 2007 
 
A National Offset Company was incorporated in 2006 to manage and administer 
the offset programme on behalf of the government. The programme obliges 
foreign companies which win procurement contracts from Kuwaiti government 
entities to invest 35% of the contract’s value in either a project suggested by the 
Offset Programme management which meets the economic priorities of the 
Kuwaiti government, or investment projects proposed by foreign companies as 
long as they meet the Offset Programme’s requirements. Alternatively foreign 
companies can participate in one of the Offset’s funds.323 Contracts that fall under 
the Offset Programme are civil contracts of value equal to or greater than KD 10 
million, and defence contracts of value equal to or greater than KD 3 million324.  
The above outlines the taxes of Kuwait’s fiscal system. However, in December 
2007, the Kuwaiti National Assembly approved amendments to Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955. The amendments took effect and were published in the Kuwaiti 
                                                 
322 See p. 9 – 28. 
323 AlBazie (note 319 supra). 
324 Id. 
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Gazette in February 2008. It should be noted here that the amendments were only 
made to some of the articles in Income Tax Decree 3/1955; other fiscal liabilities 
mentioned above i.e. custom duties, Zakat, KFAS, NLST, and the Offset 
Programme continue to be implemented as described above. The amendments to 
Income Tax Decree 3/1955 were made to attract more foreign direct investment to 
Kuwait. The high tax rates imposed on foreign companies under the Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955 were seen to hinder the flow of foreign investment into the 
country. Thus, the value of FDI in Kuwait had in the years prior to the 2008 
amendments barely reached $110 million in 2006, which was the lowest in the 
Gulf region and far smaller than the $8.3 billion attracted by the United Arab 
Emirates or even the $2.9 billion attracted by Bahrain325 during the same period.  
 
4.3.6 Deemed Profits 
 
The concept of deemed profits is perhaps not another added fiscal liability upon 
foreign enterprises carrying on trade in Kuwait, however, it does constitute a 
fiscal barrier for foreign investment, as Circular No. 43/2002 provides that 
whenever the Tax Department is not satisfied with or convinced by the taxpayers’ 
(foreign enterprises) accounts, or whenever the taxpayer (foreign enterprises) 
declares losses, the Tax Department will automatically assume that the Taxpayer 
(foreign enterprise) has made a profit, and will impose a tax according to ‘deemed 
profits’ of a rate of 15%.  
                                                 
325 The Kuwait Times, Change to Corporate Income Tax Law to Attract more Foreign Investment, 
(2008), The Kuwait Times Website, http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php  [visited 
11/7/2010].   
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Circular 43/2002 on the unification of the bases of tax inspection No. 14 on 
disregarding the books of accounts provides: 
“In accordance with the department’s targets to unify the bases of tax inspection, 
and in the interest of work requirements, the following has been resolved: 
 
Bases of disregarding the books of accounts: 
 
First: The accounts books of the company shall be disregarded in case of express 
violation of the Income Tax Decree No. 3 of 1955 especially in the following 
cases: 
 
1. Violation of the Ministerial Resolution No. 206 of 1985 concerning the 
commercial books, which stipulates the keeping of books as general journal 
and inventory sheets registered, and that these books should be kept regularly 
and updated and registered with the Ministry of Justice. 
2. Unavailability or lack of documents in support of the accounts, or 
inconsistency of the documents with the records. 
3. Taxable revenues are not reported in the tax declaration. 
4. The Auditors withholds the company’s account books. 
5. The company did not adhere to providing the company’s books and records 
required for inspection after not complying to two official letters sent to it by 
the Tax Department. 
Second: The deemed profit percentage is determined by the following: 
 
1. Similar cases. 
2. The amount of revenues. 
3. Type of activity. 
4. Stagnation and stability of the economy. 
5. Accounting year and profitability in prior years.”   
 
4.3.7 Foreign Direct Investment Law =o. 8/2001 
 
The Foreign Direct Investment Law 8/2001, which came into force on April 17th 
2001, does not impose another fiscal liability upon foreign enterprises carrying on 
trade in Kuwait; on the contrary, it was found as an initiative to create an 
incentive to draw foreign investment to Kuwait. The Foreign Direct Investment 
Law allows 100% foreign ownership for certain economic activities and 
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projects326. It also - on the condition of satisfying certain requirements - offers 
between 3 – 10 years’ tax holidays for foreign enterprises carrying on trade or 
business in Kuwait. However, Law 8/2001 has proved to be more effective in 
theory than in practice, imposing numerous restrictions and burdensome 
requirements for foreign investments to fulfil; Article 3 of the Foreign Investment 
Law 8/2001 stipulates that in order for a foreign enterprise to obtain a license to 
own 100% of its business in Kuwait it will require the approval of the Minister of 
Commerce, the Ministry of Commerce Committee’s recommendations, and the 
approval of the competent authorities. Also, the time to issue a license can take up 
to eight months. Article 13 (5) of the Foreign Investment Law 8/2001 also 
provides that the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers shall issue a decision determining 
the ratio of national labour in respect of projects subject to the provisions of this 
law, i.e. obliging foreign investors who wish to own 100% of their business in 
Kuwait (under Law 8/2001) to employ a specific number of national labourers.  
  
Income Tax Decree 3/1955 as will be seen below327, is a poorly drafted piece of 
legislation; the fact that it was founded to answer the request of foreign oil 
companies that demanded paying taxes instead of royalties to the Kuwaiti 
government in order to gain tax credits in their state of residence in return328 
meant that it had to be drafted in a short period of time by a novice Kuwaiti 
government that did not have much experience in dealing with foreign 
                                                 
326 See Al Bazie, (note 319 supra). 
327 See pp. 124-125. 
328 See pp. 65 - 66. 
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corporations or the exploration of natural resources329. In order to maintain a clear 
and comprehensive overview of the pre-amended Income Tax Decree 3/1955 
there’s a need to fragment it into sections: the first section defines the meaning of 
tax as provided in the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. The second section defines the 
meaning of a body corporate which is in current practice the only taxable subject 
under the Decree. Section three defines the debatable meaning of agency and 
attempts to differentiate between what is considered a taxable agency and an 
excluded distribution relationship under the Decree. The Final section deals with 
method of tax computation under the Decree.  
 
  
4.4 Explaining the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 in Sections  
 
4.4.1 Definition of Tax under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 
 
Article 1 of the Income Tax Decree provides the tax implemented under the 
Income Tax Decree. 
Article 1 of Income Tax Decree states: 
 “There shall be imposed for each taxable period ending after 31st December 1954 
on every body corporate wheresoever incorporated, carrying on business in 
Kuwait during such taxable period, an income tax the amount of which shall be 
determined as follows:    
 
                                                 
329 The Kuwaiti ruler at the time (1922) Shaikh Ahmed, had to trust the foreign oil companies’ and 
satisfy their fiscal demands as he relied entirely on them for the exploration and yielding of oil (see 
pp. 63-65). With oil wealth came economic expansion and development which raised the need for 
the delegation of power, this is when the Kuwaiti ruler formed his first government (see pp. 66-
70); the combination of a novice inexperienced government that relied entirely on the foreign 
expertises of foreign oil companies produced a weak inadequate tax legislation that only focuses 
on the oil companies’ requirements.  
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(a) Compute the appropriate percentage of the income of the body corporate for 
the taxable period such percentage being determined under article 2 (j) in 
accordance with the bracket into which the income of the body corporate for the 
taxable period falls:  
 
(b) Compute the appropriate percentage of the maximum amount of income 
falling in article 2 (j) bracket immediately below that applicable to the body 
corporate for the taxable period and add to such amount the excess of the income 
of the body corporate for the taxable period over such aforesaid maximum amount 
of income330” 
 
The table in Article 2 (j) shows the manner in which the income of a company 
carrying on trade or business in Kuwait is computed for the purposes of Article 1 
(a):  
  
Figure 4.1: Tax rates of Income Tax Decree 3/1955331 
 
Exceeding K.D. But not Exceeding K.D The percentage shall be 
0 5.250 nil 
5.250 18.750 5% 
18.750 37.500 10% 
37.500 56.250 15% 
56.250 75.000 20% 
75.000 112.500 25% 
112.500 150.000 30% 
150.000 225.000 35% 
225.000 300.000 40% 
300.000 375.000 45% 
375,000 -- 55% 
 
To explain provision (b) above more clearly, a company may pay tax at the 
preceding tax rate, plus pay over the entire profits in excess of the top of that tax 
rate. For example, on an income of 375,005 Kuwaiti Dinars (KD) a company 
would pay income tax at 50% plus 5 KD as the excess profit over the top of the 
preceding tax band. This means that if the taxable profit is only slightly higher 
than the previous limit, tax is then calculated by adding the actual excess to the 
amount payable on the previous limit.  
                                                 
330 Article 1 of Income Tax Decree 3/1955, p.3. 
331 Table of Tax Rates, Article 2 (j) of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
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It is relevant to mention here how income earned by foreign corporate bodies 
holding shares in national and GCC entities are taxed under the Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955. 
   
4.4.2 In the Case of =ational and GCC Companies with Foreign 
Shareholders 
 
 
National companies as mentioned earlier332 are - in practice - excluded from 
income tax in Kuwait, this is also the case with companies owned wholly by 
nationals from the GCC, which are excluded on the grounds of national treatment; 
this is discussed in more detail below333. However, in the case of foreign 
corporate bodies owning shares in companies registered in Kuwait or any of the 
GCC countries and carrying on business or trade in Kuwait or in the areas known 
as the Specified Territory334 . Income tax is imposed on the share of taxable profit 
of the Kuwaiti or GCC companies attributable to the foreign corporate bodies.335  
In order to understand how taxation is implemented under the Income Tax Decree 
3/1955, there is a need to understand the meaning of a taxable body corporate 
mentioned in Article 1336 and defined in Article 2 (f) of the Decree. 
 
                                                 
332 See p. 101. 
333 See pp. 113 - 114. 
334 This includes Kuwait’s Islands: Kubar, Qaru, and Umm Al Maradim, and the offshore area of 
the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  
335 As mentioned on p. 102 the Kuwait Tax Department interprets the phrase “carrying on trade or 
business in Kuwait..” in Article 1 of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 in the broadest sense, thus 
foreign bodies that own shares in national domestic entities will be liable to pay tax on this foreign 
earned profit in Kuwait. See Ernst and Yong (note 310 supra). 
336 See pp. 109-110.  
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4.4.3 The Meaning of a Body Corporate provided in Article 1 and defined 
under Article 2 (f) of Income Tax Decree 3/1955 
 
The following provides a clarification to what is considered a taxable body 
corporate under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 and when under the Decree is a 
body corporate excluded from tax. Article 2 (f) defines a body corporate as: 
“the term body corporate wheresoever incorporated, carrying on trade or business 
in Kuwait includes any body corporate carrying on trade or business in Kuwait 
either directly or through an agent provided such agent is a body corporate, and 
also any body corporate carrying on trade or business in Kuwait as an agent for 
others”.   
 
Article 2 (f) provides a definition of a body corporate for the purposes of defining 
an agent and specifying the cases in which the relationship between a foreign 
company and a domestic agent raises tax liability. In this respect, it is also critical 
to ascertain the meaning of ‘body corporate’ in the Decree’s interpretive notes, 
these notes are at the end of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955, they have binding 
authority when it comes to interpreting different provision of the Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955. In this respect, interpretive notes provide:                                                
“A ‘Body Corporate’ refers to an association that is formed and registered under 
laws of any country or state and is recognised as having a legal existence entirely 
separate from that of its individual members”337. 
 
The interpretive notes continue:  
‘since there is at present no law in Kuwait which provides for the formation and 
registration of such associations, the term ‘Body Corporate’ can be applied only to 
companies or other associations registered abroad338’  
 
 
The Interpretative Note appears to exclude national companies from the definition 
of a body corporate due to the fact that a national body corporate simply did not 
                                                 
337 Definition of Body Corporate and agent in Income Tax Decree 3/1955 Interpretive Notes, p. 9. 
338 The Income Tax Decree 3/1955 Interpretative Notes.  
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exist in Kuwait at the time of the Decree’s enactment in 1955. However, the 
situation is different today where a large number of national companies operate in 
Kuwait. Although nowhere in the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 does the legislator 
mention that the term ‘body corporate’ applies only and exclusively to foreign 
enterprises and excludes national companies, in practice, national companies are 
not liable to pay income tax, but may be liable for small percentage tax liabilities 
that fall on national companies such as the zakat, KFAS, and NLST which are 
mentioned above339.  Thus, it may be concluded from the above that it was not 
necessarily the intention of the legislator to exclude national companies from 
taxation under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955.  
Provision for the establishment of national companies emerged in Kuwait 
following the introduction of the Kuwaiti Company Law No. 15/1960, and the 
Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980. So why then are national companies still 
not liable for taxes under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955? The undeclared reason 
behind relieving national companies from income tax is the intention of the 
Kuwaiti government to encourage the creation of local and national businesses. 
There is also an unofficially declared consensus that national businesses should be 
treated favourably as an initiative to protect local goods and services against 
foreign competition340.  
Another undeclared reason behind relieving national companies from taxation is 
the very strong opposition which any proposition to tax them would generate from 
those who have a vested interest in the majority of such domestic businesses.   
                                                 
339 See pp. 103 – 105. 
340 See p. 101. 
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Kuwait’s apparent difference in the treatment of foreign and domestic 
corporations may conflict with the fundamental principles of the WTO 
agreement341, especially the Most Favoured Nation (MFN), and the National 
Treatment Principles342. Kuwait became a WTO member in January 1995343.  
In addition to relieving national businesses from income tax liability, no income 
tax is currently imposed on companies registered in other Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) countries which are owned wholly by nationals of Kuwait or other 
GCC nationals344. Thus, Gulf companies are treated like national companies 
provided their activities abide by the provisions of the Unified Economic 
Agreement (UEA) and the resolutions of the GCC Supreme Council345. A more 
detailed discussion on the GCC Unified Economic Agreement and the 
implications it has on the economic activities of its member states follows in 
Chapter 5346.  
 
Article 1 of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955, as has been seen above347, does not 
explicitly exclude national companies from taxation, in practice however, this has 
always been the case, leaving only foreign enterprises liable for income tax in 
Kuwait. However, in terms of understanding the second half of the definition of 
body corporate i.e. ‘...carrying on trade or business in Kuwait...” there is a need to 
                                                 
341 See pp. 159-160. 
342 Article 1 and 3 of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), replaced by the WTO. The 
same text of GATT applies to the WTO.   
343 A more detailed discussion about Kuwait’s attitude towards international trade and its Double 
Tax Treaty negotiation strategy can be found in Ch. 6, pp. 172 – 219. 
344 The GCC Unified Economic Agreement & Customs Law, Section 4:Priviledges and 
Exemptions, (2002), p. 13. 
345 The GCC Unified Economic Agreement & Customs Law, Section2:Permited Activities,(2002), 
pp.4-8. 
346 See pp. 157-169. 
347 See p. 111. 
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see Article 2 (i) of the Income Tax Decree which lists activities that fall under the 
meaning of carrying on trade or business in Kuwait. 
 
4.4.4 The Term Carrying on Trade or Business in Kuwait 
 
Article 2 (i) provides: “carrying on trade or business in Kuwait, includes:  
(i) The purchasing and selling in Kuwait of property, goods or rights 
thereto and maintaining a permanent office in Kuwait where the 
contracts of purchase and sale are executed; 
(ii) The operating of any other manufacturing, industrial, or 
commercial enterprise in Kuwait; 
(iii) The letting of any property located in Kuwait; and 
(iv) The rendering of services in Kuwait;  
but do not include the mere purchasing in Kuwait of property, 
goods, or rights thereto”.  
 
Article 2 (i) lists the activities which raise tax liability when undertaken by 
foreign enterprise in Kuwait under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. However, 
foreign body corporates carrying on any of these activities in Kuwait must do so 
either through a national agent or through holding 49% of shares in a national 
company where national shareholders hold no less than 51% of the company. This 
is also according to the meaning of Article 2 (f): 348 
“the term body corporate ... includes any body corporate carrying on trade or 
business in Kuwait either directly or through an agent ...”  
 
Where ‘carrying on trade or business directly’ means holding 49% of a national 
company, and ‘through an agent’ implies doing business indirectly. Both these 
                                                 
348 For full Article see p. 111. 
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concepts of minority shareholdings and the relationship between the national 
agent and the foreign company are discussed below. 
 
4.4.5 The meaning of agent under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 and the 
circumstances by which an agency relationship is taxed under the Decree 
 
In order to  understand fully the position of foreign investment in Kuwait, i.e. the 
restrictions that surround the ability of foreign persons to engage in economic 
activities in the country, which in general are the insistence upon domestic 
participation, this is done either by demanding that a foreign enterprise carries on 
business in Kuwait through a national Kuwaiti agent349, or demanding a wider 
domestic participation i.e. requiring that 51% of the foreign enterprise carrying on 
trade in Kuwait is owned by Kuwaiti nationals350; there is a need to study other 
laws linked to the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 such as Company Law 15/1960 
which restricts foreign participation to certain forms of enterprise and also 
restricts the percentage of a foreign shareholding in an enterprise351.  There are 
also other technical restrictions to foreign investment in Kuwait such as limiting 
the ability to import goods to Kuwaiti nationals; all such restrictions will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
i. Other Laws pertinent to the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 
 
                                                 
349 Article 24 Kuwaiti Commercial Law 68/1980.  
350 Article 23 Kuwaiti Commercial Law 68/1980. 
351 See pp.116 - 122. 
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For a better understanding of the commercial activities which raise taxable foreign 
income under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955, and the restrictions which foreign 
investments face in Kuwait, there is a need to look at other laws involved i.e. The 
Kuwaiti Commercial Law 68/1980, Kuwaiti Company Law 15/1960, Kuwaiti 
Industrial Law 56/1996, the Kuwaiti Importation Law 43/1964, and Agency Law 
36/1964.     
 
1. Commercial Law 68/1980 
 
All commercial activities in Kuwait are subject to the Commercial Law 68/1980, 
Article 23 provides:  
“No person other than a Kuwaiti may carry out trade in Kuwait unless he has one 
or more Kuwaiti partners, provided that the capital investment by the Kuwaitis in 
the joint trading firm is no less than 51% of the total capital of the trading firm”. 
 
 
In addition, Article 24 provides:  
‘No foreign company may establish a branch thereof nor carry on trading 
activities in Kuwait except through a Kuwaiti agent’.  
 
 
 
2. Industrial Law 56/1996 and Importaon Law 43/1964 
 
Article 6 of the Industrial Law No. 56/1996 provides that only enterprises with a 
51% Kuwaiti ownership may receive a licence or be registered under that law352, 
and Article 1 of the Importation Law No. 43/1964 stipulates that:  
“A licence shall be necessary for the importation of all goods (except a small 
excluded group of goods). The right to import goods, material, and equipment 
however, shall be confined to the citizens of Kuwait, and Kuwaiti partnerships; if 
all the partners hold Kuwaiti nationalities, and joint stock and limited liability 
companies where Kuwaitis hold 51% or more of the total capital”.  
                                                 
352 Article 6 of Industrial Law No. 56/1996. 
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3. The agency Law 36/1964 and Company Law 15/1960 
 
 
In effect, therefore, foreign enterprises in Kuwait are restricted to carrying on 
trading activities in Kuwait in one of the following forms: 
 
1. Activities carried out through an agency: a foreign enterprise may sell its 
goods in Kuwait through a local commercial agent. Here the Agency Law 
36/1964, provides that only Kuwaiti citizens or Kuwaiti legal persons may 
act as commercial agents. Thus a foreign company can operate in Kuwait 
through a branch. This is subject to Commercial Law 68/1980 which states 
in Article 24 that a foreign branch must be established through a 
commercial agent who is a Kuwaiti national and the liability of the branch 
to Kuwaiti tax will depend on the scope of the agent’s activities and 
authority. The definition of agent, and what constitutes an agency 
relationship liable to corporate income tax in Kuwait is discussed in more 
detail below353. 
 
 
2. Partnerships and joint ventures: the Kuwaiti Company Law of 15/1960 
contains provisions permitting the formation of joint ventures in Kuwait. 
A joint venture does not have a separate legal personality, but takes the 
                                                 
353 See pp.122-136. 
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form of a partnership contract between the joint venture parties354. In the 
case of an integrated joint venture between a Kuwaiti and a non-Kuwaiti 
entity tax is imposed on the non-Kuwaiti share of the profit355. However a 
set of financial statements covering the full operations of the joint venture 
is required to be submitted to the Department of Income Tax (DIT). For 
divided joint ventures (where each partner’s responsibilities and share of 
contract revenue is specified in a joint venture agreement)356 between 
Kuwaiti and foreign entities, only the foreign partner is required to submit 
a tax declaration  and pay tax, and in this case the foreign partner’s status 
for tax is that of a branch of a foreign company357. See below358 for types 
of partnership i.e. General and limited partnership. 
 
3. Participation in a Kuwaiti legal entity: There are three types of legal 
entities in Article 2 of the Company Law 15/1960 which are open to 
foreign participation all of which (with the exception of a joint venture) 
enjoy separate legal personality. The forms of legal entities which may be 
established under Company Law 15/1960 are:  
 
a. Shareholding Companies: 
 
                                                 
354 Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Company Law 15/1960. 
355 Circular No. 02 of 2005 provides that in the event of a partnership, a joint venture or any other 
form of enterprise where a foreign shareholding exists tax is imposed only on the foreign share of 
income. This is computed by taxing all the profits as if the entity is fully foreign owned, then 
compute 49% of the taxed profits in order to show the foreign share of the income. 
356 See Ernst &Young (note 310 supra)  
357 Id. 
358 See pp.120-121. 
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1. Public shareholding company: also called an open joint stock company, 
where the company’s shares are available for public subscription. Under 
Article 68 of the Company Law 15/1960, shareholding companies are 
generally restricted to Kuwaiti ownership, although the same Article 
allows as an “exceptional measure” of non-Kuwaiti participation if it is 
“necessary to invest foreign capital or use foreign expertise”. However a 
foreign share may not exceed 49% of the company’s share capital and in 
the case of banks and insurance companies the national share of the 
company must be no less than 60%. Any income attributable to the foreign 
shareholding is subject to corporate income tax359. When there’s a foreign 
shareholding the tax liability is computed by taxing all the profits as if the 
entity is fully foreign owned, then compute the foreign share which in this 
case is 40% (in most cases its 49%)  of the taxed profits in order to show 
the foreign share of the profit.  
 
2. Private Shareholding Company: also called a closed joint stock company, 
As opposed to the Public Shareholding Company, the shares of the Private 
Shareholding Company are not available for the public’s subscription. The 
maximum foreign ownership in this type of company is again 49%360. All 
income attributable to the foreign shareholder is subject to Kuwaiti income 
tax361. A Private Shareholding Company can be With Limited Liability362 
(WLL), or With Unlimited Liability. In the former, the shareholder’s 
liability is limited to their share in the company. In the latter, shareholders 
                                                 
359 Gerald, J. (1991),  Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Kuwait, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 
4, p. 325. 
360 Article 23 of Commercial Law 68/1980. See also p. 111. 
361 See pp. 110-111. 
362 Holding shares in a WLL used to be restricted to natural persons until Article 195 of the 
Commercial Company Law 15/1960 was amended in 1995 to allow corporate shareholding in a 
WLL. 
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are all equally liable for all the company’s debt. In both cases, Kuwaiti 
nationals are required to hold 51% of the shares363.    
 
b. Partnerships: Partnerships are treated similarly to Joint Ventures 
discussed above364. They are not popular in Kuwait, except with 
respect to certain small businesses where unlimited liability is not of 
primary concern. Foreign companies seldom use partnerships as a 
means to conduct or invest in business in Kuwait, since partners 
generally have unlimited liability. There are two types of partnerships 
in Kuwait: 
1. General Partnership: in this partnership, partners “shall jointly be liable 
to the extent of all their property for all obligations of the 
partnership365”. A general partnership may include non-Kuwaitis. 
However 51% of the partnership must be owned by Kuwaiti 
nationals366. 
2. Limited Partnership: in this partnership there are partners with limited 
liability367 who are liable to cover the partnership’s obligations (debts) 
to the amount of the share of the capital for which they own in the 
partnership. However such partners are not allowed to participate in 
the management of the partnership368. There are also general partners 
who are liable with all their property for all obligations of the 
                                                 
363 Article 23 of the Commercial Law 68/1980. Also in Kassim, A., Joint Venturing in Kuwait 
Company Law Explained, (1986), Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.1, No.4, pp. 432-435. 
364 See p. 118. 
365 Article 3 of chapter 1 of the Company Law 15/1960. 
366 Article 23 of the Commercial Law 68/1980. 
367 The Limited Partnership can also be a partnership limited by shares, also called “commandite 
partnerships by shares” in which the capital of the partnership is divided into shares.  
368 Article 42 of Chapter 2 of the Company Law 15/1960. 
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partnership. Income tax is imposed on the foreign share of partnership 
income and Kuwaiti nationals must own at least 51% of the 
partnerships capital369. 
 
The above discussion provides guidance on the meaning of tax, taxpayer and the 
definition of a body corporate liable to tax under the Income Tax Decree and 
shows the restrictions surrounding the carrying on of trade and business by 
foreign enterprises in Kuwait. In this section it has also been concluded that when 
a foreign entity carries on trade or business in Kuwait through a minority 
shareholding (usually 49%) in a national enterprise, a tax liability will only arise 
in regards to the foreign share of income. However, there is a need to identify the 
second method by which a foreign entity can carry on trade or business in Kuwait 
i.e. through a national agent; what is an agent under the Income Tax Decree? And 
when does an agency relationship cause a tax liability to arise under the Decree? 
This is what the forthcoming discussion provides. 
 
ii.  Article 2 of Income Tax Decree 3/1955 and the definitions of agent 
 
Article 2 is another critical article in the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. Its 
importance lies in the definitions it provides for the terms used in the Decree, such 
as the definition ‘agent’. It also sets out incidents which raise tax liability, whether 
                                                 
369 See Gerald (note 360 supra). 
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they were commercial activities370 or an agency relationship between a foreign 
company and a national agent.  
 
 
 
iii. The Agency Relationship between a Foreign Enterprise and a 
Kuwaiti =ational Agent 
 
 
Article 2 (f) of the Income Tax Decree provides: 
 
“...a body corporate carrying on trade or business in Kuwait either directly or 
through an agent provided such an agent is a body corporate, and also anybody 
corporate carrying on trade or business in Kuwait as an agent for others.” 
 
It must be established here that a body corporate carrying on trade or business in 
Kuwait directly, when a foreign company owns 49% of the shares in a domestic 
company; this method of undertaking business in Kuwait by foreign businesses 
has been discussed above371. Understanding the meaning of the term ‘agent’ and 
the agency relationship that may exist between a Kuwaiti national and a foreign 
enterprise is important in terms of distinguishing between taxable and non-taxable 
corporate income. The Interpretive Notes at the end of the Income Tax Decree 
1955define an agent as: 
 
“a person authorised by a principal to enter into a binding contract with a third 
party on the principal’s behalf within the scope of that authority.”  
 
The interpretative notes continue:  
 
“Income derived by a foreign body corporate from carrying on trade or business 
in Kuwait through an “Agent” who is not himself a body corporate is not liable to 
tax under this Decree, provided that the “Agent’s” authority is in accordance with 
the terms of the definition given above.   
 
The payment of commission or other remuneration will not of itself be deemed as 
constituting an “Agency” under the Decree. Similarly, in the case of a partnership 
                                                 
370 See p.114. 
371 See pp.116-120. 
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between a foreign body corporate and a person who is not a body corporate the 
latter will not necessarily be considered as the “Agent” of the former for the 
purposes of the decree unless he has full authority to enter into a binding contract 
on behalf of the partnership.  
 
Income derived by a foreign body corporate from carrying on directly any trade or 
business in Kuwait will be liable to tax under this Decree notwithstanding the 
appointment of an “Agent” in Kuwait for the conduct of other business”372. 
  
 
Taking the first part of the interpretative notes for the meaning of agent:  
“Income derived by a foreign body corporate from carrying on trade or business in 
Kuwait through an “Agent” who is not himself a body corporate is not liable to tax under 
this Decree, provided that the “Agent’s” authority is in accordance with the terms of the 
definition given above373...” 
 
When reading this definition with the definition provided in Article 2 (f)374 a 
confusion may stem from the wording; the statement that: “income derived from a 
foreign business through a national agent who is not himself a company i.e. a 
natural person will not be liable to tax Provided he has the authority” is unclear. 
The reason being, that the word ‘provided’ changes the meaning, using the word 
‘provided’ here may lead to the interpretation that foreign enterprises deriving 
income from Kuwait through an agent, who is not himself a company, are not 
liable for tax. This is misleading because the tax law imposes income tax on a 
foreign enterprise whose income is derived through an agent. However, when the 
agent is not a body corporate, the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 does not tax the 
principal Unless this agent has authority to sign binding contracts with third 
parties on behalf of his principal.  
Thus, instead of using the word ‘provided’, the legislator should have used the 
word Unless, changing the interpretative note to: 
“Income derived by a foreign body corporate from carrying on trade or business 
in Kuwait through an “Agent” who is not himself a body corporate is not liable to 
tax under this Decree Unless the “Agent’s” authority is in accordance with the 
terms of the definition given above” 
 
                                                 
372 Definition of ‘Agent’ in the Income Tax Decree 3/1955, p.9.  
373 i.e. a person authorised by a principal to enter into a binding contract with a third party on the 
principal’s behalf within the scope of that authority, see Tax Decree 3/1955 interpretative notes, p. 
101.  
374 See p.122. 
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This leads to the conclusion that where an agent, who is a natural person, has 
authority to sign binding contracts with third parties, the foreign enterprise will be 
liable to income tax in Kuwait.  
Further, reading Article 2 (f) in isolation may lead to the understanding that there 
is no tax liability upon a foreign enterprise engaging in business in Kuwait 
through an agent where the agent is not a body corporate. The reality is that an 
income tax liability rises when a foreign enterprise undertakes business in Kuwait 
through an agent whether that agent is a body corporate or a natural person as 
long as - the agent - has the authority to enter into a binding contract with third 
parties. 
So without the interpretative notes, it might be argued that a natural person as an 
agent for a foreign principal yielding income in the state of Kuwait will lead to the 
exemption of such foreign principal from income taxation in Kuwait. This could 
not have been the intention of Article 2 (f) as it has been established earlier375 that 
domestic companies were not established in Kuwait until the Kuwaiti Company 
Law 15/1960 came into practice in 1960, thus there were no domestic body 
corporates to begin with in order for them to serve as national agents for foreign 
enterprises. Also the insinuation that foreign enterprises with natural persons for 
agents are exempt from tax liability would have created a loophole and provided a 
very easy opportunity to avoid taxation by hiring a Kuwaiti natural person as an 
agent for the foreign enterprise to carry on business or trade in Kuwait. This 
interpretation is supported by Circular No. 34 of 2002 issued by the Ministry of 
                                                 
375 See pp. 122 – 123. 
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Finance, entitled “On Unifying the Base of Tax Inspection, Regarding the Agent 
and the Guarantor”376. The Circular provides the following definition of “Agent”: 
“He is the person, who is continuously negotiating for concluding the deals on 
behalf of the principal for fees. His engagement may include entering into these 
deals and execution thereof in the name of the principal and on behalf of him or 
his engagements shall be restricted to negotiating with the others as introduction 
for including the deals for the account of the principal. The agent may be the sole 
distributor of the industrial and commercial products in certain area377” 
 
 
The Circular does not confine the meaning of “agent” to a legal person, so that a 
foreign principal may be taxed on the corporate income yielded in Kuwait 
whether the national agent is a natural person or a legal person as long as such an 
agent has authority to negotiate and conclude business deals on behalf of the 
principal.  
 
Later in 2006, a binding resolution by the Council of Ministers was issued to 
confirm that in a distribution relationship, a foreign principal merely supplies the 
Kuwaiti sole distributor with goods for the latter to sell inside Kuwait i.e. the 
distributor does not have the authority to enter into binding agreements with third 
parties on behalf of his principal (the foreign enterprise). Such a distributor was 
excluded from the statue of agent for tax purposes, the Resolution provides:  
“an agent in the 1955 tax decree, refers to the person authorized by the principal 
to conclude contracts on his behalf with third parties within the given authorities, 
which will exclude the sole distributor from the scope of the Income Tax Decree 
implementation378. The status of a sole distributor will be discussed later in this 
chapter379. 
 
The Kuwaiti Courts have also confirmed that it is the authority which the agent 
has that determines whether or not the relationship between him (the agent) and 
foreign enterprises yielding income in Kuwait is an agency which raises income 
                                                 
376 Circular No.34/ 2002, issued by the Ministry of Finance on 11th September 2002. 
377 Circulars relating to tax are issued by the Ministry of Finance and signed by the Director of the 
Department of Income Tax. They are binding legal instruments. According to Article 10 of the 
Income Tax Decree 3/1955: “The Director shall administer and enforce this decree...”.   
378 Council of Ministers Resolution No. 287/2006. This is a binding resolution which excludes a 
foreign principal, who only supplies a Kuwaiti sole distributor with goods, from tax liability in 
Kuwait.   
379 For a discussion on the difference between an agent and a distributor, see pp.121 -136. 
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tax liability. The Kuwaiti courts are competent to hear all disputes concerning 
personal status (matrimonial), civil, commercial (including taxes) and criminal 
matters. There are three levels of courts: 
 
Figure 4.2 Kuwait’s Judicial System.  
 
 
For purposes of personal status, the courts divided into 3 sections, Sunni, Shi’i, 
and non-Muslim (for laws applicable to religious minorities). Under the 1959 Law 
Regulating the Judiciary 380 following rulings by the courts of first instance, tax 
appeals are transferred to the High Court. Further appeals are transferred to the 
Cassation Division of the Supreme Court. 
 
The Tax Objection and Appeal Process  
If the taxpayer objects to the department’s assessment, he can file an objection in 
the Tax Department within 60 days from the date of the tax assessment letter, if 
the Department responds within 90 days from filing he objection but the taxpayer 
is not satisfied with the department’s decision, he may raise the issue to The Tax 
Appeal Committee (appointed from Tax Department employees) within 30 days 
from the Department’s decisions to his initial objection. However, if the 
Department fails to respond to his initial objection within 90 days from the date of 
                                                 
380 The Kuwaiti Judiciary system is regulated by law No. 15/1959 as amended by law No. 19/1990. 
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filing the objection, he can file an appeal through The Tax Appeal Committee 
within 30 days after the end of the 90 days period. If the taxpayer is still not 
satisfied with the Committees decision, he has an option of referring the case to 
the Settlement Division (also within the Tax Department), if the taxpayer is not 
satisfied with the decision of the Settlement Division, he has the right to pursue 
the tax dispute through civil courts within 60 days from the date of rejection by 
the Tax Appeal Committee.  
 
iv. The Kuwaiti Courts on Agency and the Income Tax Liability  
 
In Coca Cola versus The Ministry of Finance and the Beverage Trading 
Company381, in this case of Coca Cola (the plaintiff) against The Under Secretary 
of The Ministry of Finance (1st defendant) and the Beverage Trading Company 
(2nd defendant), the court found that the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
2nd defendant did not constitute an agency relationship in respect of a tax liability 
in Kuwait.  
 
The Ministry of Finance had issued a tax assessment holding the plaintiff liable 
for corporate income tax in Kuwait for the years between 1993-2001, arguing that 
the plaintiff conducted business and generated profits in Kuwait through its 
agency agreement with the Beverage Trading Company (a domestic company).  
Coca Cola, an American company, whose business activity is confined to the 
manufacturing and the selling of soft drinks objected to the tax liability imposed 
on it and argued that it was not liable to pay corporate income tax in Kuwait 
because its agreement with the Beverage Trading Company did not constitute an 
agency. Coca Cola argued that the agreement between itself and the Beverage 
Trading Company entitled “The Bottle Filler Agreement” only gave the Beverage 
Trading Company a licence to prepare and fill the drinks to distribute and sell 
them in Kuwait. It did not give this company the authority to conclude contracts 
with third parties on behalf of Coca Cola. Also the Beverage Trading Company as 
                                                 
381 Coca Cola versus The Ministry of Finance and the Beverage Trading Company, Case No. 
2012/2006, Court of first instance, Circuit 3, Civil Commercial and Government matters 
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required by Coca Cola had no authority under this agreement to sign contracts that 
were binding on Coca Cola. 
 
The court indicated that Tax Decree 3/1955 defines an ‘agent’ as the person 
authorized by his principal to conclude binding agreements with a third party on 
his behalf within the scope of the authorized powers382. However after examining 
the agreement concluded between Coca Cola and the Beverage Trading Company, 
the court found that the latter only had a limited licence to purchase the drinks 
from a third party and the manufacturer, fill the drinks in bottles bearing the 
plaintiff’s trade mark and distribute and sell the drinks at a price not exceeding the 
maximum limit specified by Coca Cola. Also under the agreement the Beverage 
Trading Company had to bear all costs incurred due to the manufacturing, 
promoting and commitment to provide management and acceptable publicity for 
the product. Nowhere in the agreement was there a provision which obligated 
Coca Cola to pay a certain fee to the Beverage Trading Company. Also the court 
found that the Beverage Trading Company had no authority to conclude binding 
contracts on behalf of Coca Cola, both of which are necessary requirements in 
constituting an agency according to Article 2 (f) of Tax Decree 3/1955. Thus the 
court concluded that there existed no tax liability upon Coca Cola to pay corporate 
income tax in Kuwait, as the agreement between itself and the Beverage Trading 
Company did not constitute an agency according to the meaning of agency in Tax 
Decree 3/1955.  
 
This case illustrates that the significance of an agency agreement which gives rise 
to taxable income lies in the actions undertaken by the agent with third parties and 
whether or not such actions reflect directly on the principal.  
 
The meaning of agency for tax purposes can be compared with the meaning of 
“agency” under the Kuwaiti Commercial Law 68/1980. Under this law agency can 
take several forms: Contract Agency, Commission Agency a Distribution 
                                                 
382 The interpretative notes of Income Tax Decree 3/1955, p.9. 
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Agreement and a Commercial Representation383. In each of the above types of 
agencies the authority of the agent differs. In a contractual agency384, the agent 
undertakes to handle the negotiation and conclusion of transactions in a certain 
territory under the knowledge of the principal and in the principal’s name in 
return for a fee. In a commission agency385, however, the agent enters into 
contracts in the agent’s own name for the principal’s benefit in return for a fee. 
While in a distribution agreement386 a local agent distributes the principal’s 
product in a specified area provided he is the sole distributor of the product, for a 
share of profit.  Finally, a commercial representative is a national individual/entity 
employed by a merchant or a commercial entity to carry out some of the 
principal’s commercial work.  
 
The court, in the Coca Cola case, effectively found that the relationship between 
the two parties – Coca Cola and the Beverage Trading Company- did not go 
beyond a distribution relationship and, as seen, most definitely did not amount to 
an agency for tax purposes. The court added that restrictions and obligations 
imposed by Coca Cola upon the Beverage Trading Company militated against an 
agency.  Moreover Coca Cola’s need to ensure that the Beverage Trading 
Company’s production of the product complied with international measures, came 
from its need to maintain its worldwide reputation, since any deficiency in the 
manufacturing of the product would jeopardise that reputation, and this did not, 
the court found, qualify the relationship as an agency. 
Further, the fact that the relationship between Coca Cola and the Beverage 
Trading Company was in effect a distribution agreement meant that Coca Cola 
was not liable to income tax, by virtue of resolution No. 287 made by the Kuwaiti 
Council of Ministers in 2006 which excludes distributors from generating income 
tax liability for their principals, as seen above.387  
 
                                                 
383 The Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980, Articles 260-305. 
384 Articles 271 of the Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980. 
385 Article 287 of the Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980. 
386 Article 286 of the Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980. 
387 See p.125. 
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It should be added here that although this resolution was made relatively recently, 
the exclusion of the sole distributor of a foreign business from agency status had 
been adopted, in practice, for some time. This practice was prompted by the 
national sole distributors’ arguments that their foreign principals only supply them 
with the goods which they (the sole distributors) then sell in Kuwait bearing all 
the costs associated with the selling of such products, and thus if the Department 
of Income Tax began to tax these foreign principals or the income derived from 
these agreements, there was a chance they would stop supplying national sole 
distributors with their products.   
 
It should also be mentioned here that the mere payment of commission or other 
remuneration will not, in itself, be deemed as constituting an ‘agency’ under Tax 
Decree 3/1955. The interpretive notes to the Decree also provide: 
  
“the payment of commission or other remuneration will not of itself be deemed as 
constituting an ‘agency’ under the decree388”  
 
 
In the following case, the Kuwaiti courts have confirmed that the mere payment of 
a commission does not qualify a relationship between a foreign enterprise and a 
national distributor as an agency which yields taxable corporate income in 
Kuwait. 
 
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Limited Company versus The Minister of 
Finance, The Under Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the Director of the Tax 
Department, and the Chief of Tax Appeals Committee389, Matsushita, a Japanese 
manufacturer of electric appliances, sought to write off the claimed taxes imposed 
on it by the defendants on the basis that it was a company that conducted business 
in Kuwait under the agreement it had with a local agent, namely Essa Al Yousifi 
Company (Al Yousifi). The defendants required that Matsushita pay corporate 
                                                 
388 The interpretative notes of Income Tax Decree No. 3/1955, p.9. 
389 Case No. 2325/2006, Court of First Instance, Commercial, Civil and Governmental Circuit/2, 
December, 2006. 
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income tax upon the corporate profits it had allegedly yielded in Kuwait for the 
period between1996-2003.  
Matsushita argued that it was not liable to pay taxes in Kuwait due to the fact that 
the contract it had with Al Yousifi did not amount to an agency contract. 
Matsushita also argued that the agreement with Al Yousifi was a mere distribution 
agreement, whereby the latter was not entitled to conclude contracts in 
Matsushita’s name or to create any rights or obligations on its behalf. Further, the 
fact that Al Yousifi determined the selling price and received the sale proceeds 
including profits then delivered them to Matsushita (the principal) did not qualify 
the relationship as an agency.  
The defendants claimed that the contract between Matsushita and Al Yousifi 
provided that the latter (Al Yousifi) received 5% of the value of the sales as a 
commission, and by virtue of this provision the contract qualified as an agency. 
Also the defendants referred to Article 286 of the Commercial Law 68/1980 
which states that “a distributing contract shall be considered equivalent to the 
contract agency390” 
The court agreed with Matsushita, accepting that Al Yousifi was not an agent as it 
simply carried out the sales of the products manufactured by the plaintiff under its 
own name, and on its own account, and received the sale proceeds. 
In its judgment, the court indicated that when it comes to analysing an agreement 
signed between a foreign business and a domestic representative, each contract 
should be examined separately according to the nature of the contract between the 
two parties. In this case, the agreement provided that Al Yousifi distribute 
Matsushita’s products in Kuwait exclusively and undertook to exercise its best 
efforts to sell the principal’s products and promote them. All purchases were to be 
made at prices which were determined by Al Yousifi and in consideration for 
these activities Al Yousifi received 5% of the value of the sales as a commission.  
The court explained that the commission received by Al Yousifi referred to in the 
agreement was not due to its capacity as an agent for Matsushita but as 
consideration for the distributor’s dedication and activity in selling the 
commodities. The court held that the payment of commission or other 
                                                 
390 Article 186 of the Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980. 
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remuneration would not of itself be deemed as constituting an ‘agency’ under the 
Tax Decree 3/1955, as indicated in the interpretative notes in the Decree391. Also 
the court dismissed the defendants’ argument that Article 286 of the Commercial 
Law 68/1980 provides that a distributor is the equivalent of a contract agent. The 
Article states:  
“The distribution contract shall be considered equivalent to the contract agency 
and is subject to the provisions of Articles 275, 281, 282, 283, 284, and 285, 
under which the merchant undertakes to promote and distribute the products of an 
industrial or a commercial entity in a certain territory provided that such a 
merchant shall be the exclusive distributor in that territory”.392  
 
The court provided that although Article 286 states that a distribution contract is 
considered the equivalent of a contract agency, Article 286 also provides that this 
similarity between the two contracts lies exclusively in relations to the 
Commercial Law 68/1980 mentioned in Article 286. The court provided that these 
Articles relate to the common features of the status of distributor and contract 
agent, to the treatment of external and procedural issues concerning the contracts 
(agency and distribution) and are not relevant to the authority of the agent in 
relation to these contracts e.g. Article 275 provides that a contract agency must 
not be shorter than 5 years when the agreement holds the agent responsible for the 
provision of a warehouses for the principal’s products, or for a venue to exhibit its 
products. While Article 281 provides that the principal is not entitled to terminate 
the contract without a fault from the agent’s side, and in the case of the principal 
doing so, he will be liable to compensate the agent for damages. These mutually 
applicable Articles are not, therefore, significant in defining the authority of a 
distributor and a contract agent; the scope of authority for a contract agency is 
defined in Article 271393 as: 
“A contract where a local agent undertakes on a continuous basis and in a 
specified territory to promote the principal’s business, negotiate and conclude 
transactions on behalf of the principle in return for a wage. The agent may 
conclude and execute such transactions in the name of the principal and to his 
account”.   
 
                                                 
391 Page 9 of  Tax Decree 3/1955. 
392 Article 286 of Commercial Law 68/1980. 
393 Article 271 of Commercial Law 68/1980. 
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While the definition of a distribution contract is in Article 286 of the Commercial 
Law 68/1980 which provides: 
“the merchant who undertakes to promote and distribute the products of an 
industrial or a commercial facility in a certain territory provided that that such a 
merchant shall be the exclusive distributor in that territory”.  
 
The definition, the court added, does not include negotiating and concluding 
contracts in the name of the principal or on his account.  
For the above mentioned reasons the court found that Matsushita was not liable to 
pay income taxes in Kuwait. 
 
It is concluded from the case above that a payment of a commission by a principal 
to a domestic distributor does not constitute an agency, and that a court will 
always look at each contract separately and analyse its provisions closely in order 
to reach a decision whether or not it represents a taxable agency contract. 
However, the difference between the term agency in the Kuwaiti Commercial 
Law and the Kuwaiti Tax Law needs to be closely examined. 
 
 
v. The meaning of agent under Commercial Law 68/1980 
 
The Kuwaiti Commercial Law 68/1980 recognises two types of agents (a contract 
agent and a commission agent); it also recognises the commercial representative, 
and finally the distributor394. The definition of distributor is provided above395  
 
Then there is the Contract Agent and the Commission Agent. The contract agent 
is:  
 
“a local agent who undertakes to promote the principal’s business by negotiating 
and concluding transactions on behalf of the principal on a continuous basis in a 
specified territory and in return of a wage. The agent may conclude and execute 
such transactions in the name of the principal and to his account396”. 
                                                 
394 See p.132. 
395 See p.132. 
396 Article 271 Commercial Law 68/1980. 
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In a Commission Agency on the other hand: 
 
“the agent enters into contracts in his own name for his principal’s account in 
return for a fee, the agent may not disclose his principal’s name without the 
principal’s consent397”.    
 
Articles 197 – 305 of the Commercial Law 68/1980 define and regulate the 
commercial representation contract. The commercial representative is defined as:  
“a Kuwaiti individual or entity employed by a merchant or a commercial entity 
through contract to carry out some of the principal’s commercial work”398. 
 
These definitions do not follow the definition of agent in Income Tax Decree 
3/1955399, thus the contract agent, commission agent, and the commercial 
representative can not be agents for the purpose of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955.  
 
 
An example of a contract agency is provided in the case of Jassim Mohammed 
Thunayan Al Ghanim and Sons for General Trading and Contracting versus The 
Ministry of Finance. In this case400, filed by Jassim Mohammed Thunayan Al 
Ghanim and Sons for General Trading and Contracting (Al Ghanim) against the 
Ministry of Finance, Al Ghanim rejected the Ministry of Finance’s order to 
submit its financial statements and a tax declaration covering the contract it had 
with a supplier of information systems, a foreign company called “Oracle”. It was 
alleged that Al Ghanim was the national agent for Oracle and that it should submit 
to the Ministry of Finance its agency contract, and its financial statements for 
1993-1998, on the grounds that Oracle had provided services in Kuwait through 
its national agent, Al Ghanim for that period. This information would enable the 
Ministry of Finance to issue a tax statement upon the profits of Oracle in Kuwait. 
Al Ghanim challenged the Ministry’s order and objected to the assumption that it 
had served as a domestic agent for Oracle. The Court of First Instance examined 
                                                 
397 Article 287 Commercial Law 68/1980. 
398 Article 297 Commercial Law 68/1980. 
399 A person authorized by a principal to enter into a binding contract with a third party on the 
principal’s behalf within the scope of that authority, see interpretive notes of Tax Decree 3/1955. 
400 Case No. 351/2001, The Court of First Degree, Commercial circuit/ 5. 
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the contract between Al Ghanim and Oracle and found that the latter had 
authorized the former to enter into contracts with third parties on its behalf, and to 
carry out marketing activities for Oracle. Therefore, the court found that the 
relationship between Al Ghanim and Oracle constituted an agency and Oracle’s 
profits in Kuwait were taxable under the Tax Decree of 1955. 
Al Ghanim appealed to the Court of Appeal401. It stated that its relationship with 
Oracle was that of a licensor and a licensee and that it was not an agent or a 
representative of Oracle. It further alleged that it maintained and sold software 
inside Kuwait to several parties while Oracle provided training services. It stated 
that all contracts it concluded were in its own name and for its own account and 
not in the name of Oracle or for its account, and that there existed no agency 
contract between the two companies.  
The court indicated that should any dispute arise in regard to the description of a 
contract it was for the court to interpret the contract or the disputed articles therein 
and verify the intent of the contracting parties as long as the interpretation was 
within the text and meaning of the contract. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
decision of the Court of the First Instance by recognizing the relationship as an 
agency. The court concluded that the contract allowed Al Ghanim to contract with 
third parties. Also it was evident from the contract that Oracle was entitled to 
receive certain fees from Al Ghanim in return for undertaking its obligations to 
provide consultations. In the event,  the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal and 
supported the ruling of the Court of  First Instance, confirming that the 
relationship between Al Ghanim and Oracle was an agency, and that the revenue 
Oracle raised in Kuwait was liable to corporate tax in Kuwait. 
 
It is concluded from these case studies that a distribution agreement between a 
principal and a local distributor does not yield a taxable income in Kuwait so long 
as the distributor does not have the authority to conclude transactions with third 
parties for his principal’s account. Also the payment of commission from the 
principal to a distributor does not necessarily qualify the relationship as an 
                                                 
401 Appeal No. 1422/2001, Commercial Appeal Circuit/5, 27/3/2002.   
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agency. The courts need to examine each case separately and to look closely at the 
provisions of the contract between the foreign company and the domestic 
merchant to determine whether or not the relationship does constitute an agency. 
 
After attending to the Income Tax Decree’s most problematic Articles and 
definitions and before moving on to the 2008 amendments of the Decree, it’s 
important to explain the meaning of ‘Income’ and how the computation of  tax is 
carried out under the Decree. 
 
 
 
4.5 Meaning of Income and Computation of Tax under the Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955 
 
The Income Tax Decree 3/1955 defines income as the gains and profits of a body 
corporate derived from carrying on trade or business in Kuwait402. 
Under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955, taxable income is derived by deducting all 
costs, expenses and losses incurred in connection with carrying on trade or 
business in Kuwait from gross revenue403 and after the adjustment of certain costs 
such as staff indemnities, depreciation as per tax rates, head office administrative 
overhead allowance, etc.  
Taxable profit of foreign shareholder’s participation in local enterprises is 
determined on its share of the taxable profit; when the foreign share in the 
company is 49%, the tax inspector computes all the taxable profits of the 
enterprise as if it was fully foreign owned, then the inspector computes 49% from 
all the profits to show the share profit of the foreign entity. In the case where the 
foreign enterprise is carrying on business or trade in Kuwait through an agent, the 
                                                 
402 Article 2 (h) of the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
403 Article 3 of Income Tax Decree 3/1955. 
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same procedure is carried out; 3.5% is allowed as agent’s commission404 any 
commission paid in excess of 3.5% is added to the taxable profits405.  
 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter406, the Income Tax Decree 
3/1955 was amended in some respects in 2008.  Not all the articles of the Income 
Tax Decree were amended in 2008, in fact only four amendments can be 
considered significant; the explicit exemption of the national sole distributor who 
buys and transfers goods to his own account, the reduction of the tax rate 
imposed, the reduction of some allowances, and finally the withholding of a 15% 
tax on foreign earned dividends whilst excluding trading profits. 
 
 
 
4.6 The 2008 Amendments  
 
 
In 2007, the Kuwaiti Parliament approved a bill amending Tax Decree 3/1955. 
The Kuwaiti government introduced these amendments with a view to attracting 
more FDI. Law 2/2008 was passed by the Kuwaiti Parliament in December 2007 
and was published in Kuwait’s Gazette in February 2008. This law amends a 
number of the articles in Tax Decree 3/1955; it also repeals others407.  
Kuwait’s Government found that the majority of the profits of foreign enterprises 
engaging in business in Kuwait fell within the K.D. 375,000 slot and thus were 
taxed at the highest tax rate of the income tax table408. A rate of 55% income tax 
on the net profit of foreign enterprises was considered a very high tax rate and not 
a very competitive one, especially when compared at that time to neighbouring 
countries such as Saudi Arabia which imposes a 30% tax on the net profits of 
                                                 
404 Administrative Order No. 274/1998. 
405 Al Bazie (note 319 supra). 
406 See pp. 99-100. 
407 Articles 1, 3, 7, and provision 2 (f), and provision a (5) have been amended. Article 2 (h) is now 
2 (g) and 2 (i) has been amended to Article 1 and 2 (j) has been replaced by a single flat tax of 
15%, and new Articles 13 (bis) and 13 (bis A) have been added by Law 2/2008.  
408 See tax table p. 109. 
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foreign corporations409.  In Bahrain the rate is 46%,410 whilst in UAE there are no 
corporate income taxes except a 55% rate on foreign oil companies, and a 20% on 
foreign banks411; Oman imposes 30% on foreign companies412 and finally Qatar 
has a gradual tax rate between 5% - 35% on foreign corporations413.  
The government realized that in order to make its tax system more attractive to 
foreign investors414 and more competitive in the region it needed to amend the tax 
rate, and so a new low flat tax rate of 15% was introduced on all body corporates 
carrying on business in Kuwait. The reduction in the tax rate was one of the 
significant 2008 amendments (see later) 415 but the focus here is the 2008 
amendments and their impact on the meaning of agency for tax purposes.  
 
4.6.1 Article 2 of Tax Law 2/2008 Explicitly Excludes the Sole Distributor 
from Tax Liability 
 
Under Tax Law 2/2008, both the definitions of ‘taxpayer’ and ‘body corporate’ 
have not been changed; they appear exactly the same as they were in Income Tax 
Decree 3/1955416. However when it comes to the definition of agent for tax 
purposes, the amendments in Tax Law 2/2008 differ from Tax Decree 1955. Here, 
Tax Law 2/2008 clearly and explicitly exempts a distributor417 from the meaning 
of ‘agent’ for income tax purposes. Article 2 (f) of Tax Law 2/2008 provides:  
“The term ‘Agent’ mentioned in (e) means, the authorized person by his principal 
to practice the business or trade or any of the activities provided in article (1) of 
                                                 
409 Ernst & Young (2010), World Wide Corporate Tax Guide, 2010, p. 57. 
410 Association of International Life Office (2007), Bahrain Tax Facts, pp. 1-2. 
411 KPMG’s International Tax Centre (2006) KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey, p.23. 
412 Foreign trade Barriers, The Office of the United States Trade Representative, p. 461.  
413 Ernst & Young, Middle East Tax Review, 2010, p. 2. 
414 In a view that revenue brought into the state by FDI can possibly create a source of income. 
415 See pp. 142 - 145. 
416 The definition of Body Corporate in Article 2 (e) of the 2008 amendments is the exact replica 
of 2 (f) in the Income Tax Decree 3/1955, see definition of body corporate on pp. 109-110 and 
definition of taxpayer on pp. 109-112.  
417 The definition of the Kuwaiti distributor in Article 2 (f) Tax Law 2/2008 is different from the 
definition of ‘distributor’ in Article 286 Commercial Law 68/1980, see p. 115. 
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this law or to contract with a complied agreement with third party on behalf of his 
principal and for his account and within the authorized power given to him, that 
the profits of the Kuwaiti merchant, of his sale to some goods he bought and 
transfer to his own account shall not be subject to this tax.”418 
 
So the definition of agent in the 2008 amendments differs from the definition of 
agent in Tax Decree 3/1955 in that it is more expansive then the interpretative 
notes of Tax Decree 3/1955 which defined an agent as follows: 
 
“An agent is a person authorized by a principal to enter into a binding contract 
with a third party on the principal’s behalf within the scope of the authority”.419 
 
 
The above definition of ‘agent’ in Tax Law 2/2008 states the functions which the 
agent can carry out when authorized by his principal i.e. business or trade or any 
of the activities provided for in Article (1) of Tax Law 2/2008. Such activities 
include concluding contracts, selling, leasing, granting franchises, and exploiting 
trademarks, patents design or copyrights, other activities include entering into 
representation agreements, commercial mediation, undertaking industrial and 
commercial businesses, disposing of assets,  the selling of properties and goods, 
the leasing of property and finally rendering any services.  To this point, the 
definition of ‘agent’ in Tax Law 2/2008 seems to coincide with the previous 
definition of agent in Tax Decree 3/1955, although the new definition adds more 
detail by explicitly referring to the commercial and industrial activities listed in 
Article 1 that can fall within the authority of the agent.  
A confusion similar to that in Income Tax Decree 1955 on whether a natural 
person can serve as a national agent for a foreign enterprise420 or not, rises again 
                                                 
418 Article 2 (f) of Tax Law 2/2008. 
419 The definition of agent in the interpretative notes of Tax Decree 3/1955, p. 9.  
420 See pp. 122 – 136. 
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in the 2008 amendments, as Article 2 (e) of the amendments repeats the same 
mistake as 2 (f) of Decree 3/1955 by requiring the agent to be a body corporate421:  
“The term body corporate ... includes any body corporate carrying on trade or 
business in Kuwait... through an agent, provided such an agent is a body 
corporate..” 422 
 
However 2 (f) of the 2008 amendments provides that the term agent in (e) means 
an authorized person , without specifying whether that person is natural or legal. 
Then there are the Bylaws of the 2008 amendments, where Article 1 (3) provides 
that an agent is: 
“Every and each natural or corporate person authorized by his principal to carry 
out business, trade or any of the activities stipulated in the law or to enter into a 
binding agreement with a third party on behalf and for the account of his principal 
within the limits of his powers...” 423 
 
The bylaws contradict Article 2 (e) of the 2008 amendments by asserting that a 
natural person can in fact serve as a national agent for a foreign enterprise 
carrying on trade in Kuwait. This confusion and contradiction can be attributed to 
the poor wording of the amendments which will be underlined again below424. 
 
What is particularly interesting in the new definition of ‘agent’ is whether the 
legislator has succeeded in distinguishing between an agent and a distributor 
which under the previous Tax Decree 3/1955 was a matter of debate until 
Ministerial Resolution 287/2006 was issued425. Is it possible now under the new 
definition to identify clearly and easily when an agency is established for tax 
purposes, with the consequent effect this may have for foreign enterprises? 
                                                 
421 See p. 122. 
422 Article 2 (e) of the 2008 amendments. 
423 Article 1 (3) of the 2008 Amendments Bylaws. 
424 See p. 141. 
425 See p.125.  
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In this respect there may be some uncertainty. Although Article 2 of Tax Law 
2/2008 clarifies that a national merchant buying foreign products for his own 
account and reselling them in Kuwait for his own account will not be an agent for 
tax purposes, this fact can be easily concluded as it has been established426 that 
national companies are excluded from income tax in practice, even when such a 
company is serving as a national agent for a foreign enterprise, although in this 
last case the foreign principal is liable for income tax. 
The position of a foreign supplier under Tax Law 2/2008 has not changed either; 
the foreign company is not taxed on the profits it makes when it supplies a 
national distributor with products while the distributor sells the product to his own 
account in Kuwait and bears all expenses vital to the selling the product i.e. 
marketing and promoting, etc. This is the same practice as under Tax Decree 
3/1955, where as long as the distributor does not have the authority to conclude 
contracts on behalf of his foreign principal, the latter will remain excluded from 
tax in Kuwait427. However, the later part of Article 2 (f) of Tax Law 2/2008 which 
exempts the national distributor from agency status is poorly drafted: 
“...that the profits of the Kuwaiti merchant of his sale to some goods he bought 
and transferred to his account shall not be subject to this tax.428” 
 
Despite the poverty of the drafting, this final part of Article 2 (f) of Tax Law 
2/2008 appears to restate the intent of the 2006 Ministerial Resolution that 
domestic distributors (Kuwaiti merchants) do not qualify as agents for income tax 
purposes.429 Also, although this part of Article 2 (f) of Tax Law 2/2008430 appears 
                                                 
426 See p.100. 
427 See pp. 122 - 136. 
428 Article 2 (f) of the 2008 Amendments.  
429 See pp. 122-136 for a discussion on the agency and distribution contract with supporting cases.  
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to exempt the distributor, it does not describe him (the Kuwaiti merchant) as a 
‘sole distributor’, which is how the distributor is defined in Commercial Law 
68/1980: 
“a distributor promotes and distributes a product in a certain territory, as long as 
he is the sole distributor in that territory.”431 
 
Not requiring that a distributor be the ‘sole distributor’ may allow more than one 
Kuwaiti merchant to buy and sell the same foreign principal’s product on their 
own account in Kuwait and still avoid being classified as an agent in Kuwait for 
tax purposes. What could also result from this broad exemption is that a foreign 
principal may supply products to more than one Kuwaiti merchant (distributor) 
and make profits without bearing any tax liability in Kuwait, on the basis that he 
(the foreign principal) is only a supplier and his relationship with the Kuwait 
merchant is merely a non taxable distribution relationship.  
Neither does the definition of agent in the bylaw of Tax Law 2/2008432 mention 
the sole status of the distributor, thus echoing Article 2 (f) of Tax Law 2/2008 by 
not requiring that a distributor be a sole distributor.  
 
Ministerial Resolution 287/2006 mentioned earlier433, clarifies the difference 
between agent and distributor for the purpose of excluding the ‘sole distributor’ as 
an agent for tax purposes.434 
 
                                                                                                                                     
430 See p.138. 
431 Article 286 of Commercial Law 68/1980. 
432 See p. 139 for definition of agent in Article 1 (3) of the 2008 Bylaws.  
433 See p. 125. 
434 Resolution 287/2006 provides: “the agent in this law is referred to the person authorized by the 
principal to conclude agreements on his behalf with a third party within the given authorities, 
which will exclude the sole distributor from the scope of implementation of the income tax 
decree.”  
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The second significant reform brought by the 2008 amendments is replacing the 
progressive tax rate under the Tax Decree with a single flat tax rate of 15%.  
 
4.6.2 The Tax Rates Before and After the Amendments of Tax Law 2/2008: 
From a Progressive Tax Rate to a Flat Tax (Article 1 of Tax Law 2008) 
 
Changing the tax rate from a progressive 5% - 55% rate435 to a single flat 15% tax 
rate, can be considered the most significant amendment made to Tax Decree 
3/1955. Tax Law 2008 amends Article 1 of Tax Decree 3/1955, where Article 1 of 
the 2008 amendments provides: 
“An annual income tax is hereby imposed on the income of every body corporate 
wherever incorporated, carrying on trade or business in the state of Kuwait, 
particularly: 
 
1. The profit realized from any contract that may be totally or partially completed 
in the State of Kuwait. 
2. The amounts collected from the sale, lease, granting franchise to use or exploit 
any trademark, patent design, or copyrights. 
3. Commissions due or resulting from representation agreements or commercial 
mediation. 
4. The profits of the industrial and commercial business. 
5. Profits realized from disposing assets. 
6. Profits resulting from the purchase and the sale of properties, or goods, related 
rights and opening a permanent a permanent office in the State of Kuwait where 
in sale and purchase contracts are concluded. 
7. Profits resulting from the lease of any properties. 
8. Profits resulting from rendering any services. 
 
However Tax amounts in accordance with this law is hereby fixed at 15% of net 
taxable income436. 
 
                                                 
435 See tax rate table p. 109. 
436
It should be noted here that the term ‘income’ has the same definition as in the Tax Decree 
3/1955, Article 2 (g) of the amendments of Tax Law 2/2008 provides: “The term ‘income’ means 
gains and profits of a body corporate derived from carrying on trade or business in Kuwait”. 
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The profits of the incorporated entity resulting from trading operations within the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange shall hereby be exempted from the tax already imposed 
under this law, whether it has been executed directly or via portfolios and 
investment funds”437. 
 
Thus Article 1 outlines the commercial activities which yield taxable income438, 
and it’s evident from Article 1 that the 2008 Amendments like the Income Tax 
Decree of 1955439 do not differentiate between different types of income and 
profits, thus everything from business profits, capital gains, royalties and interest 
fall under a single income tax base and all is taxed under a 15% tax rate after 
deducting all expenses440. Article 2 (g) of the 2008 Amendments provides:  
“The term income means gains and profits of a body corporate derived from 
carrying on trade or business in Kuwait”.  
 
Distributed dividends, however, are subject to a withholding tax of 15%; this will 
be discussed in more detail below.441  
This non differentiation in the treatment of different types of income and profits 
can cause uncertainty when the foreign beneficiary transfers’ revenues yielded in 
Kuwait to its state of residence, where the latter requires a clear statement 
distinguishing between taxes paid on each type of income, in order to grant tax 
credit. Although Kuwait’s Double Tax Treaties differentiate between their tax 
treatment of different profits and incomes, this will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6.442  The Kuwaiti Department of Income Tax have, however, confirmed 
                                                 
437 The exact wording of Article (1) of Tax Law 2/2008. 
438 Taxable Income means: Net Income, and Net Income means: The gross income realized by the 
tax payer after allowable expenses. See interpretive notes of  the amendments of Tax Law 2/2008, 
p. 20. 
439 See p. 101-102. 
440 Article 1 (9) of the Bylaws of the 2008 amendments provide: “Net Income is the gross income 
realized by the taxpayer after allowable deductions”. Article 1 (10) of the same Bylaws provides: 
“Taxable income is net income”. 
441 See p.151. 
442 See pp.182-233. 
 145 
 
that a statement of the treatment of different types of income is given to the tax 
payer upon request443. 
 
Focusing again on the extreme drop in the tax rate applied to foreign taxable 
income needs more attention here. Although a reduction in the tax rate is welcome 
especially for foreign companies with incomes that exceed K.D 56.250 whom 
according to the previous progressive tax rates used to pay between 20% to 55% 
tax on their income, it is on the other hand very damaging for small businesses 
with incomes of K.D 56.250 and under, who used to (under the Decree) pay 
between 5 – 10% tax, now under the amendments pay 15% tax, which means they 
now pay 5% - 10% more tax than they did under the Decree. Furthermore, 
although no exclusion of domestic companies from tax is provided for in the 
amendment, in practice, national companies are still exempt from tax in Kuwait. 
This exclusion and favourable treatment of national companies is due to the facts 
mentioned earlier in this chapter.444  
It should also be mentioned here, that in practice the income of natural persons 
whether nationals or foreign, was excluded from tax under the Income Tax Decree 
3/1955. The 2008 amendments, however, explicitly exempt the income of natural 
persons, where Article 8 (2) of the executive bylaws of the 2008 amendments 
provides:   
“Without prejudice to the exemptions stipulated under the provisions the Decree 
and its amendments and the provisions of other laws or international treaties, the 
following shall be exempted from tax: 
 
                                                 
443 From a personal interview conducted with the head of the Tax Claims division at the Kuwaiti 
Tax Department, 12/3/2009. 
444 See p. 100 and p. 112-113. 
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2. The income realized by a natural person (shareholders) from practicing a trade 
or business in the state of Kuwait unless he proves that he is representing the 
share of an incorporated body.”445 
 
 
Thus a natural person (national or a foreign) shall not be liable to pay income tax 
Kuwait unless proven to be a representative of a corporate entity.  
 
As has been mentioned before446 the 2008 amendments have brought some 
change to the Income Tax Decree 3/1955. The explicit exclusion of the national 
sole distributor from tax liability and the reduction of the tax rate have already 
been discussed above. However, some amendments have also been made to 
allowable and disallowable expenses and finally, the withholding of 15% tax on 
foreign earned dividends whilst excluding trade profits.   
 
4.6.3 Reducing the Allowable Expenses 
 
The 2008 amendments have had some effect on the allowable and disallowable 
expenses implemented recognised in Tax Decree 3/1955. The amendments of Tax 
Law 2/2008 reduce some of the allowable expenses in Tax Decree 3/1955.  This 
reduction is perhaps surprising when the amendments were introduced in order to 
attract FDI to Kuwait.  
 
The Tax Decree 3/1955 was supported by Administrative Circulars issued by the 
Department of Income Tax. Issues such as allowable expenses were not provided 
for specifically within the Tax Decree 3/1955 and thus guidance on issues such as 
                                                 
445 Article 8 (2) of chapter 2 of the Executive Bylaw of Law No. 2/2008.  
446 See pp. 136-137. 
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these had to be made official in these binding Administrative Circulars in order to 
unify the basis of tax inspection. These circulars were issued and enforced by the 
Director of the Department of Income Tax (DIT) and they were binding. Article 
10 of Tax Decree 3/1955 simply stated: 
“The director shall administer and enforce this decree...447” 
So the circulars relate to the administration of tax issues not covered by the 
articles of the law such as conditions for filing a tax declaration448 and the 
maximum rate for the commission that an agent or a guarantor is allowed to 
deduct from taxable income449. Further, some tax practices were regulated through 
Administration Orders and Ministerial Orders which were issued by the Minister 
of Finance and are also binding according to Article 13 of the 2008 amendments; 
the Article states: 
“The Minister of Finance will issue the executive regulation within six months 
from the date of publishing this law in the official gazette.” 
 
 
By clarifying issues not made clear in the Decree such circulars and Orders unify 
the base of taxation. They cover vital allowable and disallowable expenses of 
taxable income. It’s crucial here to outline the most important amendments made 
to allowances in 2008.  
 
Head Office Expenses and Agent Fees 
 
Head Office Expenses and Agent fees were under the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 
as follows: 
                                                 
447 An exact replica of Article 10 as reproduced in the amendments of Tax Law 2/2008.  
448 Circular No. 37/2002. 
449
 Circular No. 34/2002. 
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1. In the case of contractors and others operating through an agent only 3.5% 
of revenue is allowed as head office expenses (excluding sub-contract 
costs);  
2. Foreign shareholders: in this case foreign entities who are shareholders in 
Kuwaiti companies can only deduct 2% of their foreign entity’s share of 
revenue from their taxable income as head office expenses. This is also 
applied to joint ventures450.  
3. Insurance companies operating in Kuwait shall be allowed to calculate and 
add to their expenses 3.5% of their net premiums (direct premiums, less 
the share of re-insurance, plus re-insurance commission collected)451. 
 
 
 
 
After the 2008 amendments the agent fees were reduced as follows: 
 
1. Agent’s fees are restricted to 3% of contract revenue excluding reimbursed 
revenues, subcontracts costs and other income; 
2. Agent’s commission shall not be calculated in the case of foreign 
companies participating in Kuwaiti companies. It will also not be 
calculated in joint ventures where the partner is the agent452. 
 
 The Head Office Expenses were reduced as follows: 
“The expenses of the head office shall be debited... after deducting the following: 
 
1. The works executed by subcontractors and the like; 
2. Incidental revenues; 
3. Reimbursed costs; 
4. Design costs (except for the design costs of the head office).” 
 
The branch share of the head office expenses is as follows: 
 
1. The companies operating in Kuwait are allowed to calculate and add 
1.5% of the direct revenue realized in the state of Kuwait, less the 
amount in paragraph (1)  
2. Body corporates which are partners in Kuwaiti companies, or firms 
participating in Kuwaiti companies or companies carrying out 
contracts, are allowed to calculate and add 1.5% of the revenues 
realized in the state of Kuwait, less the amount in paragraph (1). This 
rate shall be deducted from the share of the foreign partner. 
                                                 
450 See p. 118. 
451 Administration order No. 274/1998. 
452 Circular No. 34/2002, 
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3. Insurance companies operating in Kuwait are allowed to add 1.5% of 
the direct premiums less the reinsurance rate and plus collected 
insurance commission. 
4. Banking companies are allowed to add 1.5% of the direct revenues 
realized in the state of Kuwait less the amount stated in paragraph 
(1)453.  
 
4.6.4 The Method of Deducting Allowable Expenses from =ational 
Companies with Foreign Shareholders 
 
No provision is made for the calculation of allowable expenses of national 
companies with foreign shareholding under Tax Decree 3/1955 or the 2008 
amendments. However, in practice, when there’s a joint venture or a shareholding 
company where a national owns 51% of the company while the foreign partner 
owns 49%, the first thing a tax inspector does is to disregard the fact that 51% of 
the company is under national ownership i.e. exempt from tax liability. The tax 
inspector will do a full inspection of the company as if it is a 100% foreign owned 
company and disallow all allowable costs available. Thereafter the inspector takes 
only 49% of the total disallowances which equals only that portion of 
disallowances relating to the foreign share of the company454. Below is an 
example455: 
 
 
                                                 
453 Article 5 of the 2008 Amendments. 
454 This practice was undertaken under Tax Decree 3/1955, and is still followed today after the 
amendments of Tax Law 2/2008. This practice is not in any formal legal shape such as a tax 
department circular or a ministerial order, it is also not mentioned in the existing laws.   
455 This computation example was provided by a practicing tax auditor in Kuwait. 
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Net Profit as Per Tax Declaraon =  KD 570,603
456
 
Add:  KD 
1. Insurance expense  42,580 
2. Salaries 41,070 
3. Communication expenses  12,812 
4. Advertising expenses 76 
5. Stationary expenses 2,477 
Total Addions =  99,015 
Share of foreign partner 49% = 48,517 
Net profit subject to tax  619,120 
Tax due at 15% 92,868 
Less: paid as per declaration  85, 590 
Due amount 7,278 
                                                 
456 In Kuwaiti Dinars (KD). 
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Further under the old circulars, insurance companies were allowed to deduct 3.5% 
of their net premiums (less the share of re-insurance, plus collected re-insurance 
collected), Today, under the 2008 amendments, the rate is lowered to only 1.5%. 
As for Agent fees, foreign companies used to be able to deduct 3% of what they 
paid their national agents from their taxable income (under the old circulars), 
today they can only deduct 1%. This leads to the conclusion that although the tax 
rates were reduced457, the allowable expenses on the other hand were reduced as 
well, undermining  the objective of the lower tax rate (15%) imposed by the 
amendment of Tax Law 2/2008.  
 
4.6.5 The Depreciation of Assets According to the Income Tax Decree 3/1955 
and the Amendments of Tax Law 2/2008 
 
Most of the depreciation rates on buildings and equipment of foreign enterprises 
carrying on business in Kuwait have not changed. However some of them have 
been reduced458 causing the taxable income of foreign companies doing business 
in Kuwait to rise459. 
There is no clear explanation why the amendments of Tax Law 2/2008 have 
reduced the allowable expenses. However, in personal correspondence with 
                                                 
457 See pp.142-145. 
458 Under the 2008 Amendments; the depreciation rate of plants and buildings was reduced from 
20% to 10% Amendments also the depreciation rate of Drilling equipment has been reduced from 
33 1/3% to 25% , Cars were reduced from 33 1/3% to 20% and finally Trucks and Trailers were 
reduced from 25% to 15%. 
459 Article (3) of the amendments of Tax Law 2/2008 covers asset depreciation, and Article (4) the 
bylaw of Tax Law 2/2008 covers the depreciation rates of companies.  
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Kuwait’s Tax Department460 enquiring why the allowances were lowered when 
the objective was to lower the tax liability in order to attract more FDI to Kuwait, 
the department’s justification was that since a significant reduction was made to 
the tax rate, there was a need to compensate for the loss in tax revenues by 
reducing some of the allowances. A number of foreign companies doing business 
in Kuwait have indicated to the author that the drop in the tax rate – from a 
progressive rate between 5% - 55%461 to a 15% flat rate under the 2008 
amendments, has not really accomplished the decrease which they had hoped to 
see in their tax liability. The companies confirmed that although the overall tax 
rate upon their taxable income has dropped, the deductions which they are entitled 
to on agent fees and head office expenses have dropped too, causing the incentive 
behind lowering the tax rate – attracting more foreign business – to lose its effect. 
The attitudes of foreign enterprises working in Kuwait towards the amendments 
of Tax Law 2/2008 will be the focus of Chapter 7.462 
The final significant 2008 amendment is the withholding of 15% tax on foreign 
earned dividends by the distributing company whilst excluding trade profits.  
 
 
4.6.6 Withholding a 15% Tax on Dividends and Exempting Trade Profits   
 
As previously emphasized463 the 2008 amendments are poorly drafted, the 
amendments themselves do not tell us directly that a withholding tax is imposed 
on profits distributed to foreign beneficiaries, however, the amendments loosely 
imply this by explicitly excluding trade profits, initially in Article 1 of the 
                                                 
460 Correspondence with Head of the Tax Department, Ms. Aseel Asad, 12/5/2009. 
461 See page 109 for the tax table under Tax Decree 3/955.  
462 See pp. 251-261. 
463 See p. 141. 
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amendments and again in Article 8 (1) of the Executive Bylaws of the 2008 
Amendments464.  
 
Article (1) of the 2008 amendments provides: 
“The profits of the incorporated entity resulting from trading operations within the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange shall hereby be exempt from the tax already imposed 
under this law, whether it has been executed directly or via portfolios and 
investment funds” 
 
Article 8 (1) of the Executive Bylaws provides: 
“... the following shall be exempt from tax:  
1. The incorporated body’s profit resulting only from trades in Kuwait Stock 
Exchange Market, whether directly made or through investment portfolios or 
funds.”   
 
Although the legislator here does not clearly differentiate between distributed and 
undistributed profits, in practice465, dividends earned by a foreign beneficiary466 
and distributed by a national company registered in Kuwait Stock Exchange 
(KSE) shall be subject to a 15% withholding tax, where the national company 
distributing the dividends withholds 15% at source and forwards them to the 
Department of Income Tax (DIT)467. However if the foreign company who owns 
shares in a national company registered in KSE sells its shares in the market and 
makes gains due to such sales, then such profits shall not be subject to a 15% 
withholding tax.  
 
                                                 
464 Profits and gains but not collected by the foreign beneficiary. As long as such trade profits 
remain in Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) they remain exempt from taxation, once they are 
distributed then they are taxed in the hands of the distributed company.   
465 Through communication with Department of Income Tax in Kuwait via e-mail between myself 
and tax auditor Mr. Ravi Kumar, May 12th 2011. 
466 Only a foreign enterprise is taxed upon dividends in Kuwait, as natural persons foreign and 
national are exempt.  
467 The national distributing company is responsible for withholding a 15% tax upon dividends 
distributed to foreign beneficiary and forwarding such taxes to the DIT within 30 days. 
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When a foreign enterprise yields dividends in addition to other profits due to  
carrying on trade or business in Kuwait directly by holding 49% of a national 
enterprise or indirectly through an agent,  this situation will not give rise to double 
taxation, as the national company will withhold 15% on the dividends at source 
and forward them to the DIT. The foreign enterprise is required to report the 49% 
profits it had made through holding shares in a national company to the DIT, 
where the latter imposes tax on such profits minus the 15% withheld tax already 
forwarded by the distributing company468. 
 
The 2008 amendments are clear in their exemption of trading profits made by 
foreign enterprises holding shares in domestic enterprises registered in KSE, but 
not explicit on their treatment of dividends. Through personal communication 
with Kuwait’s DIT enquiring on the position of dividends, the department 
confirmed that dividends are taxed with a rate of 15% at source while profits 
made by foreign shareholders in KSE are exempt.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has provided an outline of the Kuwaiti fiscal system before and after 
the 2008 amendments and has highlighted the ambiguities and disadvantages of 
the Kuwaiti tax system under the Tax Decree 3/1955 and the 2008 amendments. 
The amendments have carried on a lot of the previous Decree’s inefficiencies and 
                                                 
468 The same process is carried out if the foreign enterprise carries on trade or business in Kuwait 
through an agent. This information is provided by Tax Auditor Mr. Ravi Kumar, The Department 
of Income Tax, Kuwait, May 12th 2011. 
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the study below proves there is scope for improvement and reform469, however, if 
tax reform is unavoidable special attention should be given to any regional or 
international obligation which might impose some restrictions upon the ability of 
Kuwait to undertake reform.  The next chapter explores the Unified Economic 
Agreement and WTO agreement to which Kuwait is a party and examines 
whether this economic agreement provides any limitation on Kuwait’s ability to 
undertake fiscal reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
469 See Ch. 7, pp. 289-292. 
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Chapter 5: International Tax Obligations I The Unified Economic 
Agreement of the Gulf Co:operation Council: A study of the UEA 
agreement and its impact on Kuwait’s Fiscal Sovereignty.  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Tax competitiveness has become a crucial matter which each country must 
consider carefully, as harmful tax competition can hurt a state’s prospect of 
attracting foreign direct investment.  
Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Co-operation Council Unified Economic 
Agreement (UEA) to which other Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, 
Qatar, and Oman) with mutual economic and fiscal similarities are also a party. 
This chapter examines this agreement and whether or not the UEA imposes any 
restrictions upon Kuwait in reforming its fiscal system and its fiscal sovereignty.   
The first unified economic agreement was implemented between the members of 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in 1981. However this agreement was later 
amended in 2001. Thus there is a need to dedicate some attention to the early 
1981 unified economic agreement (UEA) then give some focus to its amendments 
in 2001.  
 
 
5.2 The UEA in 1981 
 
5.2.1 What is the UEA? 
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Investors from the six Member States of the GCC, which as seen above are Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman, are entitled to a wide range of 
reciprocal entitlements, benefits and privileges. The UEA which originated in the 
GCC is ratified by all of its Member States and gives all the citizens of the GCC 
countries equal treatment in other Member States without any discrimination or 
differentiation in the following domains470: 
(1) The freedom of movement; and 
(2) The right of ownership, guiding and bequeathing; and 
(3) The freedom to conduct economic activity; and 
(4) The freedom of transfer of financial institutions471.  
The first UEA was signed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 11 November 1981 and it 
came into operation four months from the date of signature. Its first chapter, 
Articles (1-7), deals with commercial exchange and requires free movement 
within the GCC of agricultural produce, livestock, industrial products and 
products from natural resources of national origin and their treatment on an equal 
basis with the goods produced in each member state. Article 1 provides:  
“a. The member states shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, 
animal, industrial, and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also 
they shall permit exportation thereof to other member states; 
b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from 
member states shall receive the same treatment as national products.” 
Article 2 provides: 
 
a. all agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of 
national origin shall be exempted from reciprocal charges; 
b. fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation,    
freight or unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are 
levied on domestic products. 
                                                 
470 These domains are set out in the UEA of 1981; see Article 8 of Chapter 2. 
471 Al Hayyan, A. (2003) The Kuwaiti Foreign Investment Law: Comments and Suggestions, Arab 
Law Quarterly, p.328. 
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As has been mentioned in Chapter four of this thesis,472 Kuwait had traditionally 
imposed a 4% duty on all imported goods. Other Member States of the GCC 
imposed different rates of import duties on foreign goods entering their 
territories473. Under the UEA such duties are abolished when the goods imported 
are products which are produced in any of the GCC Member States. This is 
according to Article 2 (a) above which states that:  
“... products that are of national origin shall be exempted from reciprocal 
charges474”.  
Article 3 (a) of the UEA provides that ‘products with national origin’ means:  
“For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the 
value added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less than 
40% of their final value as at the termination of the producing plant shall not be 
less than 51%”.  
 
The above Article provides the conditions required in order to designate industrial 
products as “national products” which enjoy exemption from Member States 
duties, Article 3 (a) requires products to have additional value added to them 
during their production in the GCC countries, and that this added value is not less 
than 40% of the final value of the product upon completion of its production and 
that the producing company is fully owned by nationals of GCC countries or a 
minimum of 51% is owned by GCC nationals475. 
 
Article 3 (2) states how to prove that such products satisfy the rule of national 
origin which will entitle them to be exempt from import duties when entering any 
of the GCC Member States it provides: 
 
“Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of 
origin duly authenticated by the appropriate government agency.” 
                                                 
472 See p. 102. 
473 GCC Member States had different import tariff rates implemented before the UEA’s Customs 
Union came into force in 2001: Kuwait, Qatar and UAE all imposed a 4% import tariff, while 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman all had an escalating tariff structure ranging between 12% to 
20%.   
474 The different rates of import duties imposed in each of the Member State of the GCC.  
475 The GCC Unified Economic Agreement and Customs Law, 2002. 
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A customs free entry into Member States of the GCC for national products is not 
the only advantage which the UEA provides for products that are of national 
origin. Such national products are also entitled to the ‘National Treatment’ given 
to local products in the Member State where they are imported, Article 1 (b) 
provides:  
“... products that are from Member States shall receive the same treatment as 
national products.”  
 
‘National treatment’ - for products of national origin - here means allowing 
importation and exportation of national products throughout the GCC States 
without the requirement of a local agent or taking any other procedures except for 
the certificate of origin and the export manifest. And in the event of duties being 
levied on any national origin goods due to questions as to their origin, those duties 
shall be reimbursed to the importer after their national origin476 has been 
ascertained.  
As mentioned in chapter 4477Kuwait does not follow the WTO’s MFN and 
National Treatment principles by providing a more favourable treatment to 
national enterprises which are excluded (in practice) from the income tax Kuwait 
imposes on foreign enterprises carrying business in its jurisdiction; Kuwait’s 
favourable treatment of its national entities has not been challenged by the 
WTO478. However, there is here another breach of the WTO agreement, where the 
GCC provides National Treatment for GCC companies i.e. companies with 51% 
of shareholding belonging to nationals from GCC states. The UEA also provides 
                                                 
476 Objectives of the Trade Cooperation between the GCC States, The GCC Website, 
http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=56 [visited on 5/9/2010]. 
477 See pp. 113-114. 
478 See WTO websites. 
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National Treatment for products of national origin, i.e. products that have been 
produced in GCC, states and exempts such products from import duties; this 
favourable treatment is not available for foreign products imported into GCC 
states. There are no cases where the GCC’s treatment of GCC companies and 
GCC products was challenged by the WTO. 
 
In the second chapter of the 1981 agreement, Articles 8-9 establish the principle 
of freedom for all citizens of Member States to move, work, reside, acquire 
property, engage in economic activity and transfer capital throughout the GCC. 
They also call for the encouragement of inter-state joint ventures in the private 
sector to help create the right climate for such interchange. Here states can impose 
restrictions, such as requiring certain degrees of local participation in certain GCC 
ventures for up to five years. In this respect, Kuwait, for instance, allows GCC 
citizens to own up to 75% of the capital of a Kuwaiti company formed for the 
pursuit of permitted activities under the UEA. Qatar has a similar provision. In 
addition, Kuwait has published Ministerial Resolution No. 75/1984 providing that 
nationals of GCC states shall enjoy the same employment conditions as Kuwaitis. 
Kuwait has also allowed GCC citizens to own shares in Kuwaiti shareholding 
companies through Decree No. 33 of 1988.479 Decree No. 33/1988 was issued in 
an attempt to strengthen the economic, financial and commercial ties between the 
Member States of the GCC by allowing citizens from Member States to own 
shares in local Kuwaiti companies registered on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. 
Article 1 of the Decree states:  
                                                 
479 Roy, J. and Zarrouk, J. (2006), Completing the GCC Customs Union, The World Bank, pp.5- 6. 
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“Citizens of the Gulf Co-operation Council may hold shares in Kuwaiti 
shareholding companies which were established at the time when this law came 
into force, and in Kuwaiti shareholding companies which were established after 
the implementation of this law”.480 
 
The third chapter (Articles 10-13) of the GCC UEA calls for co-ordinated 
development programmes, oil policy, industrial regulation and joint ventures in 
various fields. 
Chapter four (Articles 14-17) is concerned with scientific co-operation where 
Member States are encouraged to negotiate “transfer of technology agreements 
with foreign governments jointly at GCC level”.  
Chapter five (Articles 18-20), recommends the free movement of passengers, and 
goods traffic (if not detrimental to local facilities), and calls for cooperation and 
integration in all fields. The UAE, for example, has ordered all insurance 
companies to recognize driver’s licences issued in GCC states as equivalent to the 
UAE driver’s licence. Oman has provided for the equal treatment of ships owned 
by GCC states or their nationals in Omani ports. 
The sixth chapter (Articles 21-23), outlines the nature of financial and economic 
cooperation aspired to. Article 21 states that Member States shall seek to unify 
investment rules and regulations in order to achieve a joint investment policy 
aimed at directing their domestic and foreign investment towards serving their 
interest481. Article 22 states that Member States shall seek to coordinate their 
financial, monetary and banking policies, including the endeavour to establish a 
joint currency482. Lastly, Article 23 states that Member States shall seek to 
                                                 
480 Article 1 of the Decree No. 33/1988 on allowing citizens from the GCC to hold shares in 
Kuwaiti shareholding companies. 
481 Article 21 of Chapter 6 of the 1981 UEA.  
482 Article 22 of Chapter 6 of the 1981 UEA.  
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coordinate their external policies in the sphere of international and regional 
development aid.483 
 
When the GCC was established in May 1981, the aim and desire was to develop 
and enhance economic, monetary and financial ties between Member States by 
concluding the UEA. Within the Articles of the 1981 UEA lie the provisions of 
the GCC Free Trade Area (FTA), i.e. the FTA was characterised by the exemption 
of industrial, agricultural goods and the natural resources of the GCC States from 
customs duties subject to the presentation of a certificate of origin. (see above, 
Article 2 (a) and Article 3 of the 1981 UEA).  
The GCC FTA came into force in 1983. It continued until 2001 when it was 
replaced through the amended UEA of 2001 by the GCC Customs Union484. 
When Member States agreed on the FTA with its main objective i.e. eliminating 
tariff on goods of national origin485 while each country of the Member States 
maintained its own external tariffs, the GCC had a bigger ambition of an 
economic union whereby the FTA would serve as a preliminary step towards a 
Customs Union (CU) followed by an economic union. Thus, the FTA represented 
a modest integration by means of an agreement to apply symmetric preferential 
treatment of imports. The reason why the FTA was a strategic move towards the 
CU was that it abolished tariffs among Member States yet demanded little or no 
economic harmonization. The attractiveness of the FTA amongst the GCC States 
was the benefit of free trade between Member States without the immediate 
                                                 
483 Article 23 of Chapter 6 of the 1981 UEA.  
484 Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the amended 2001 UEA. This Article states that trade between 
Member States will be conducted under the framework of a Customs Union that should be 
implemented by Member States no later than the first of January 2003.    
485See p. 143 for Article 3 (a) of Chapter 1 of the 1981 UEA . 
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giving up of economic independence. The disadvantage of the FTA, however, and 
the reason why the FTA was a temporary measure for the GCC Member States, 
was that countries outside the area redirected their trade and targeted the country 
with the lowest tariffs in order to access the market within the area. Thus in order 
to prevent this problem which could have caused tension between the Member 
States, there was a need to adopt a form of economic integration, this took the 
shape of the CU which was implemented through the amended UEA and signed 
by Member States in 2001486. 
 
5.3 The Customs Union Realized under the Amended UEA of 2001 
 
The UEA was in force until it was replaced in 2001 by the new “Economic 
Agreement between the States of the Cooperation Council” concluded at the GCC 
summit in Muscat in 2001.  
Forming the UEA in 1981, the GCC Member States had already agreed on two 
main issues: first, they set up the objectives, rules and functions of the GCC and 
its structure; second, they decided on implementing gradually a unified economic 
agreement towards establishing an economic union. Thus, since the establishment 
of the UEA in 1981 and the insertion of the FTA within its Articles the plan to 
advance the economic integration between the GCC by implementing the 
amended UEA of 2001 and replacing the FTA with the CU already existed487. 
However, this advancement had to be achieved gradually due to the fact that the 
                                                 
486 Although the CU was imposed by Article 1 of the amended UEA of 2001, the Member States 
had until January 2003 to implement it according to Article 1, Chapter 1 of the 2001 UEA.  
487 Rettab, B. and Istaitieh, A. (2007), GCC Economic Integration in Focus with Special Reference 
to the UAE, Dubai’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, pp.19-20. 
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CU, when compared to the FTA, required a much greater level of institutional 
integration. Under the CU, Member States do not only give up their capacity to set 
up external tariffs, but also harmonize and make compatible other aspects of their 
respective national trade policies488. 
The amended UEA of 2001 set out ambitious targets for the next stage of the 
integration process, drawing up a map for the creation of a fully integrated 
common market and preparation for a monetary union. In this respect, the 
Supreme Council of the GCC agreed on a timetable that called for the 
implementation of a CU in 2003489, the establishment of guidelines, including 
criteria, for a Monetary Union by 2005, and finally the adoption of a single 
currency by 2010490. To date only the first of these three objectives i.e. the CU, 
has been introduced. 
 
5.3.1 What is the CU? 
 
As has been mentioned above491, the UEA was amended in December 2001 
during the GCC Summit. It called in its first Article on Member States to 
implement a CU: 
“Trade between the GCC Member States will be concluded within the framework 
of a Customs Union that will be implemented no later than the first of January 
2003. It shall include, at a minimum, the following: 
  
i. A common external customs tariff (CET) 
ii. Common customs regulations and procedures  
                                                 
488 Id.  
489 The 2001 UEA introduced the CU and gave Member States until January 2003 to implement it, 
Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the 2001 UEA. 
490
Kamar, B. and Naceur, S. (2007), GCC Monetary Union and the Degree of Macroeconomic 
Policy Coordination, IMF working paper, pp.25-28. 
491 See p. 164. 
 165 
 
iii. Single entry point where customs duties are collected  
iv. Eliminating of all tariff and non- tariff barriers… 
v. Goods produced in any Member State shall be accorded the same treatment 
as national products”
492
.   
 
In accordance with the Customs Union Agreement that followed in 2003493 the 
GCC Heads of State adopted an across-the-board Common External Tariff (CET) 
of 5%494 on most foreign products entering the GCC countries495. Certain 
commodities are exempted 496 and Member States may nominate a list of 
‘protected commodities’ on which they charge a duty of 12% or 20%497 . 
The objectives of the CU include: 1) minimizing the difficulties and restrictions 
hindering the movement of foreign and national goods in the GCC countries, as it 
applies a single common duty of 5% on foreign goods at a single point of entry 
once,  allowing foreign goods to move freely between Member States without 
collecting Customs Duties on such goods again; 2) increasing intra-GCC trade 
between members; 3) increased competition, high production rates, and optimal 
utilization of the available resources due to the facilitation of the flow of the intra-
GCC trade leading to reduced consumer prices; 4) enhancement of the collective 
                                                 
492 Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the 2001 UEA. 
493 The amended UEA was signed by Member States in December 2001, while the CU Agreement 
was signed in 2003. 
494 Article 1 of the CU Agreement of 2003 states: “An external Common Customs Tariff (ECT) 
charging a 5% duty rate on all foreign exports...” 
495 Article 1 of the 2001 UEA states: “Trade between Member States will be conducted within a 
framework of a Customs Union that will be implemented no later than the first of January 2003”.   
496 Article 1 (i) of the CU Agreement of 2003 provides a list of 417 items of food stuff and 
agricultural products exempt from tariff and other goods such as tobacco, pork, and alcohol 
products attract a tariff of 100% taxed in countries (this differs from one Member State to the 
other) where importation of such products is permitted. 
497 For example Saudi Arabia identifies a list of 483 products to which a 12% tariff is applied to 
protect local industries and a 20% tariff is applied to infant industries. 
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negotiating position of the GCC Members, which would bring in better conditions 
with their trading partners in the field of trade and investment498. 
The CU is the most significant step taken by GCC states, through the UEA, 
towards realizing the economic integration which the Member States of the GCC 
aim for499. 
 
Boosting mutual trade is the main objective of any CU. Historically, continuous 
regulatory barriers contribute to low levels of intra-regional trade500. Several 
studies show that a CU of any economic bloc pushes up mutual trade501; intra-
regional trade in the case of the European Union (EU) accounts for 60% of total 
trade in the EU502.  
However, trade between the states of the GCC has proven to be limited and the 
markets for goods and services across the GCC countries are far from being 
integrated. In fact, between the years 1980 and 2008, the share of intra-GCC trade 
in total GCC trade with the rest of the world rose from only 3.8 percent to 6 
percent. This suggests that though there is a tendency for trade creation, the 
process of trade integration is very slow503.  That said, there is no dispute as to the 
importance of the CU in enhancing GCC-foreign trade, as it allows foreign goods 
to move freely within the GCC Member States after having paid a single common 
                                                 
498 See Rettab, (note 489 supra). 
499 The GCC Customs Union: Implementation Procedures of the Customs Union, the GCC 
website, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=84 [visited 1st of September 
2010].  
500 Id.   
501 AL Twaijiri, M. (2007) Customs Union: First Step towards GCC Integration, Article Published 
in The Arab Times Daily News Paper, Kuwait, 
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleId/142708/ren/r/Default.a
spx 
[visited 20/7/2007]. 
502 Fink, S. and Krapohl, S.(2010), Assessing the Impact of Regional Integration: Do Regional 
Trade Institutions Shape Trade Patterns?, Paper prepared for the PSA conference 2010, p. 5. 
503 Nechi, S. (2010), Assessing Economic and Financial Cooperation and Integration Among the 
GCC Countries, Jouranl of Buisness and Policy Research, Volume 5. Number 1. July 2010, p. 158. 
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duty levied on them at the first point of entry into any Member State. Although 
between 2006 and 2010 an annual growth of 20% has been achieved in intra-GCC 
flow of national and foreign goods504 there is reason to believe that the rise in the 
inter-GCC trade was not a result of implementing the Customs Union but due 
rather to the global economic downturn and a determination by the private sector 
in member states to expand regional co-operation505.  The reason why the CU has 
not yielded the level of growth expected, is that it was not initially fully 
implemented by the GCC Member States. When the CU was proposed to come 
into force in January 2003 in the 2001 UEA506, the GCC states agreed on a 
transitional period (1-3 years) covering the years from 2003 – 2006 for the partial 
application of the requirements of the CU507. During this transitional period 
certain customs procedures continued to be applied to intra-GCC movement of 
national and foreign goods. These procedures ceased to be applied from the end of 
the transitional period which was 2006. However, eight years from the launch of 
the CU in 2003, indecision between Member States over the distribution of tariff 
revenues, in addition to the persistent delays at border points are still hindering the 
full implementation of the CU508.  
Further, although the Customs Union is perceived to boost economic trade 
between GCC Member States, a final decision is yet to be made by the six 
                                                 
504 Al Mazrooie, M. (2010), The Process of the Customs Union of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf, A Paper Produced for the GCC, Analysing the Development of 
Implementing the Customs Union in the GCC States from 2002-2010, pp. 8-10. 
505 Kawach, N. (2010), Tariff Rift Delays Block Customs Union, Zawya, http://www.zawya.com,  
[visited 28/12/2010].    
506 Article 1 of the 2001 UEA, see p. 142. 
507 The Supreme Council, in its 23rd Session held in Qatar (21 - 22 December 2002), approved the 
launch of the Customs Union of the GCC States as of 1/1/ 2003. It also approved the procedures 
and steps recommended by the Financial and Economic Cooperation Committee (the GCC 
Ministers of Finance and Economy) for the establishment of the Customs Union of the GCC 
States.   
508 Kawach (note 505 supra). 
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Member States on the modality for the distribution of customs revenues or the 
mechanism of collection509.   
 
The GCC has achieved slow progress in its efforts to overcome regional barriers 
and coordination between its Member States through the UEA which aims to 
enhance and strengthen economic ties among Member States and harmonize their 
economic, financial and monetary policies. Also the GCC’s attempt to introduce a 
CU has not to this day been fully executed despite its launch in 2003510. 
 
5.4 How Far Can the UEA Influence Kuwait’s Tax Reform? 
 
The main objective of this chapter has been to examine whether or not the UEA 
imposes any restrictions upon Kuwait in reforming its fiscal system. To answer 
this question there is a need to differentiate between direct taxes and indirect 
taxes. 
 
5.4.1 The UEA has influence on Kuwait’s Taxes 
 
The UEA, which aims to achieve greater economic integration between the 
Member States of the GCC by unifying their Customs Duties, does not in its 
current form restrict Kuwait in reforming its domestic direct taxes such as income 
tax, Although Kuwait – and other Member States - cannot act in a way that is 
                                                 
509Shaheen, A. (2010), GCC Countries Postpone Customs Union Move, Gulfnews.com, p.1, 
http://gulfnews.com/business/general/gcc-countries-postpone-customs-union-move-1.678788, 
[visited 8/9/210].   
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contrary to the UEA when it comes to reforming their fiscal treatment of inter-
regional trade i.e. their Customs Duties, therefore, Kuwait does not have the 
freedom to reform the 5% rate Customs Duties imposed by the UEA’s CU as an 
obligation upon all the Member States to implement, however, Kuwait under the 
UEA must give national treatment to GCC owned enterprises i.e. exclude them 
from corporate income tax, see chapter 4511. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
511 See pp. 100-101 and pp.112-114. 
 170 
 
Chapter 6: International Tax Obligations II Kuwait’s Double 
Taxation Treaties [between the OECD and the U= Model 
Convention]: Finding an Approach to Attract Foreign Income        
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
When planning tax reform one cannot ignore the issue of double taxation and how 
it affects international commerce and a multinational’s decision making. As has 
been seen in chapter four,512 Kuwait’s fiscal system focuses mainly on the 
taxation of the corporate income of foreign enterprises, i.e. the current tax rate of 
15% is in practice only imposed on the net taxable income of foreign enterprises 
carrying on trade or business in Kuwait513.  
With taxation on foreign enterprise being the main source of tax returns in 
Kuwait, it is a concern of this thesis to consider reform of the Kuwaiti tax system 
in order to motivate FDI to enter Kuwait. This is precisely why it is important to 
study Kuwait’s Double Tax Treaties (DTTs) and to understand Kuwait’s fiscal 
attitude towards multinationals.  
 
DTTs play a key role in facilitating FDI through eliminating the double taxation 
of foreign earned income514 in addition to other purposes515 thus, Kuwait’s 
                                                 
512 See p. 99 - 103. 
513 Article 1 of the 2/2008 Amendments.  
514 Barthel, F. Busse, M. et al, (2010), The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence From Large Dyadic Panel Data, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 28, 
No. 3, pp. 366-377, July 2010.  
515 Other important purposes of DTTs include the exchange of information, helping combat tax 
evasion and tax avoidance, mitigating the uncertainty an investor faces when dealing with foreign 
fiscal systems, and finally DTTs may help to reduce harmful international tax competition from 
tax havens, even though DTTs are an insufficient measure (due to their bilateral character) to 
completely avoid harmful tax competition. See Toumi, M. (2006), Anti.avoidance and Harmful 
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approach to constructing and negotiating its DTTs with other states will play a 
crucial role in its magnetism to FDI.  
 
6.2 Relieving Double Taxation of Cross:border Investment Income 
 
When a business decides to invest abroad, it needs to consider double taxation 
issues, since its foreign earned profits may be subject to both home and host 
taxation which results in double taxation. A home state’s relief from double 
taxation may take one of three forms: deduction, credit, or exemption516.  
International investors have at their disposal numerous methods of structuring and 
financing their investments. These methods have important tax considerations 
which strongly influence the choices that firms make517 e.g. garment 
manufacturers are operating in highly competitive markets with very slim 
margins; they are also highly mobile and are likely to compare taxes across 
alternative locations518. Start-up companies, on the other hand, prefer incentives 
which reduce their initial expenses e.g. equipment and material exemption, while 
expanding companies prefer tax incentives that target profit e.g. reduced tax rates 
and repatriation schemes519. Manufacturing industries also prefer incentives 
                                                                                                                                     
Tax Competition: From Unilateral to Multilateral Strategies, in Lymer A., & Hasseldine, J. (eds.), 
(2006), The International Tax System, Kluwer, pp.83-105. 
516 Davies, R. (2004), Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential Versus Performance, 
International Tax and Public Finance, 11, p.777. 
517 Reuber G et al. (1973), Private Foreign Investment in Development, Clarendon Press for the 
OECD Development Centre, Oxford, pp. 112-116. 
518 Wells, L.T. (1986), Investment Incentives: An unnecessary Debate, CTC Reporter U.N. Centre 
on Transnational Corporations, New York, No 22, Autumn, pp. 58-60. 
519 Multinationals are often taxed on their worldwide income in their home state. When their 
income is repatriated as dividends the home state may eliminate double taxation through the 
implementation of the credit system which attenuates but often does not eliminate the tax burden, 
leading to the generation of a tax liability that could otherwise be deferred or potentially avoided 
altogether. This causes the paying of dividends between subsidiaries and the parent company - as 
opposed to reinvesting – to be a costly alternative for the parent company, especially when the 
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related to depreciable assets because they utilize more fixed assets than service 
industries520. Small investors have proven to be more responsive to tax incentives 
than large ones, since they may have the financial and human capacity to develop 
sophisticated tax avoidance strategies521.  
Kuwait aims to attract new, start-up foreign companies but it also aims to 
encourage existing foreign companies to expand their businesses. Thus one might 
expect Kuwait to focus on tax incentives which reduce companies’ initial 
expenses for start-up companies and tax incentives which target profits for larger 
expanding companies. Further information on the businesses that Kuwait aims to 
attract and businesses which have and have not responded to Kuwait’s fiscal 
system is provided in Chapter 7522.   
 
6.3 Methods to Eliminate Double Taxation  
 
There is no international consensus on the appropriate method for granting relief 
from international double taxation. The three common methods: deduction, 
exemption and credit are in common use; a country may use one of them or a 
combination of methods. 
 
1. Deduction:  
                                                                                                                                     
repatriations of dividends are subject to the home state’s higher tax rate. See Desai, M., et al., 
(2001), Repatriation Taxes and Dividends Distortion, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, p. 34. And, Altshuler, R. et al. (2000), Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation 
Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy,a paper prepared for the Trans-Atlantic Public 
Finance Seminar, Switzerland, p. 27. 
520
Rolfe R. J. et al. (1993), Determinants of FDI Incentive Preferences of MEs, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 24(2), pp. 335-355. 
521 Coyne E. J. (1994), An Articulated Analysis Model for FDI Attraction into developing 
Countries, Florida: Nova Southeastern University, pp. 234-246. 
522 See pp. 247-261. 
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Under the deduction method a state which taxes its residents on worldwide 
income allows its tax payers to take a deduction for foreign taxes paid in the 
computation of their taxable income. In effect, foreign taxes (income and profit 
taxes) are treated as current expenses of doing business or earning income in the 
foreign jurisdiction523. The effect of the deduction method is that residents earning 
foreign source income and paying foreign income taxes on that income are taxable 
at a higher combined tax rate than the rate applied to domestic-source income. As 
a result, the deduction method creates a bias in favour of domestic investment 
over foreign investment whenever the foreign investment is likely to attract a 
foreign income tax524. When only tax revenues and investors’ income are taken 
into account by a home state, a small open economy would encourage outbound 
investments as long as the return on those investments exceeds the return on 
domestic investments (excluding taxes paid to the foreign government and 
including taxes paid to the home state government)525. Under these circumstances 
the home state would encourage investment abroad by applying a personal 
taxation system (i.e. taxing residence/citizens on their world wide income) 
allowing taxpayers to deduct foreign taxes from their taxable income526.  
 
 
                                                 
523 Arnold, B., and McIntyre, M., (2002), International Tax Primer, Kluwer Law International, 
p.32. 
524 Id.  
525 Figueroa, A.H. (1992), Comprehensive Tax Treaties in Double Taxation Treaties between 
Industrial and Developing Countries: OECD and U Models – a Comparison. Seminar Held in 
Stockholm in 1990 during the 44 Congress of International Fiscal Association, Deventer: Kluwer, 
pp. 9-13. 
526 Id.  
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2. Credit:   
 
Under the credit method the home state allows its residents to offset the domestic 
tax on their foreign income by the foreign tax paid to the host state on that same 
income527 . This is also known as “Capital Export Neutrality”528. The home state 
indicates that it is willing to give up all of its tax revenues in order to achieve a 
moderate level of outbound investment; it does so when a moderate level of 
investment outweighs what it loses in tax revenues by granting the credit. A home 
state will only go for the credit system when it has secured a moderate amount of 
outbound investment with the host state as this compensates what it loses in tax 
revenues529.  
 
3. Exemption:   
 
Under the exemption method, residents of a country are taxed only on their 
domestic income, i.e. the home state does not tax foreign sourced income530. 
When a residence country adopts an exemption policy it indicates that it believes 
it would gain more from larger levels of outbound investment than from the 
                                                 
527 Lymer, A., and Hasseldine, J., (2002), The International Taxation System, Kluwer, p.139. 
528 The term Capital Export Neutrality was introduced in the 1960s to describe a situation in which 
the overall burden of taxation on capital owned by resident entities of a given country is the same 
whether that capital is invested abroad or at home. In tax terms Capital Export Neutrality requires 
the same proportionate tax wedge (a measure of a market’s inefficiency after a tax had been 
imposed which causes the market equilibrium to shift creating a wedge of dead weight loss) 
between the before and after tax return wherever the capital owned by the resident entities of a 
country is invested. If this condition is met, this tax system neither encourages nor discourages 
capital export, and the investor’s choice of investing in the domestic economy or in foreign 
economies will not be influenced by tax considerations. Cordes, J. J., et al, The Encyclopaedia of 
Taxation and Tax Policy, The Urban Institute  Press, p.45. 
529 Blonign, B.A. Davies, R.B. (2004), Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct 
Investment? U.S. FDI Activity, International Tax and Public Finance 11(5), pp. 601-622. 
530 Holmes, K. (2007), International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties, IBFD, p. 25. 
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revenues of tax levied on profits derived from outbound investment531. The 
exemption policy is also known as Capital Import Neutrality (CIN)532. If the host 
state imposes tax, this means low to moderate levels of outbound investment for 
the home state, also the home state will not collect the entire amount of tax 
revenue levied. All the home state can do is allow a moderate level of outbound 
investment while collecting no tax, or allow a low level of outbound investment 
while collecting some tax. If however the host state did not tax foreign 
investment, the choice will be in the hands of the home state, it can either tax and 
limit the level of outbound investment, or not tax and maximise the level of 
outbound investment533. Although the exemption method is relatively simple and 
effective in eliminating international double taxation, it offends against the tax 
policy objectives of fairness and economic efficiency, as the resident taxpayers 
with an exempt foreign source income are treated more favourably than other 
residents534.  
 
6.4 Choosing an Optimal Method for Double Taxation Relief  
 
Foreign-source income earned by residents of a country that uses the deduction 
method generally is taxable at a higher effective rate than it would be under either 
the credit method or the exemption method. The exemption method and the credit 
method typically give equivalent results whenever the effective foreign tax rate is 
                                                 
531 Dagan, T. (2000), The Tax Treaties Myth, Journal of International Law and Politics, 
Vol.32:939, p.974.  
532 A condition in which the same effective tax rate applies to all capital income earned within a 
given country, regardless of the investor’s country of residence. Cordes, J. J., et al, The 
Encyclopaedia of Taxation and Tax Policy, The Urban Institute Press, p.50. 
533 Dagan (note 531 supra).  
534 Arnold and McIntyre (note 523 supra). 
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equal to or greater than the domestic effective rate is equal or greater than the 
domestic effective rate. The exemption method generally is the most favourable to 
the tax payer when the foreign effective tax rate is less than the domestic effective 
tax rate535.  The deduction method as has been mentioned above536 is an 
unfavourable method for foreign investment. The full exemption method is also 
undesirable for the reasons mentioned above537, and also because it encourages 
resident tax payers to invest abroad in countries with lower tax rates, especially in 
tax havens and it encourages them to divert domestic-source income to such 
countries. A partial exemption system might be justified, however, if it is used as 
a convenient and simple proxy for the credit method. Under this system, a country 
exempts residents on income derived from foreign countries that are committed to 
imposing taxes at rates comparable to its own. The alleged virtue of this partial 
exemption system is that is minimizes compliance costs for taxpayers and 
administrative costs for tax authorities, as long as the exemption is limited to a 
foreign source income that is subject to foreign tax comparable to domestic tax. 
This system requires vigorous sourcing of income and expense rules, it also 
requires anti-avoidance rules to prevent low-taxed foreign source income from 
qualifying for exemption, and finally it requires anti-avoidance rules to prevent 
taxpayers from deducting against their domestic income the expenses incurred to 
earn exempt foreign source income538. The credit method avoids the shortcomings 
of the deduction method. Resident taxpayers are treated equally from the 
perspective of the total domestic and foreign tax burden, except if foreign taxes 
                                                 
535 See Arnold &McIntyre (note 523 supra).
  
536 See p.173. 
537 See pp.174 - 175. 
538 See Arnold & McIntyre (note 523 supra). 
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exceed domestic taxes. Also, subject to the same exception the credit method is 
neutral with respect to a resident taxpayer’s decision to invest domestically or 
abroad. On tax policy grounds, the credit method is generally recognized to be the 
best method for eliminating international double taxation. The operation of the 
credit system however is complex. Highly complicated legislative provisions are 
needed to resolve matters such as: what foreign taxes are creditable? How should 
the limitation on the credit be calculated? And what rules should be adopted to 
determine the source of income and deductions?539 
 
The method for relieving double taxation which two countries agree to adopt in 
their bilateral business activities is included within the double taxation treaty they 
sign with each other. Although there are several Model Conventions for Double 
Taxation Treaties, the two most popular ones are the UN and the OECD Double 
Taxation Model Conventions (the UN and the OECD Models respectively). 
 
6.5 Models for Double Taxation Treaties: U= or OECD Model Convention?  
 
An increasing number of governments compete to attract multinational companies 
through different fiscal incentives. Many African countries rely on tax holidays 
and import duty exemptions, while industrial countries allow investment 
allowances or accelerated depreciation540. This trend is mirrored in an explosion 
of economic research studying the forces driving the creation of multinational 
                                                 
539 Arnold & McIntyre (note 523 supra).  
540Morrisset, J. Pirnia, N. (2001), How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct Investment, 
(FIAS) Foreign Investment Advisory Service, a Joint Service of the International Finance 
Corporation and the World Bank, 2001, p. 3. 
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enterprises (MNEs). A subset of this literature considers the effect of government 
policies on FDI with a particular eye on the use of tax policy especially in regard 
to bilateral tax agreements. Given the variety of countries using tax treaties and 
the spectrum of FDI activities treaties cover, it is not surprising that tax treaties 
exhibit considerable heterogeneity. Most treaties loosely follow the 
recommendations of the model tax agreements provided by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations (UN). 
Although these model treaties have undergone several revisions, they continue to 
form the basis for most double tax treaties. These models have also provided the 
basis for much of the economic literature that has considered tax treaties as a 
means of reducing the double taxation of FDI541. There are other DTT models 
besides the OECD and the UN convention, these include The United States Model 
Income Tax Convention (1996). This convention ensures that the U.S. is the 
country that taxes its residents’ worldwide income. Other countries with their own 
DTT model include: Croatia (1999), Malaysia (2000), Mexico (2000), Peru 
(2001), and Sweden (1998)542.  
Although some theorists have naturally focused on the potential of tax treaties in 
relation to co-ordinating tax policies, reducing the combined level of taxation of 
home and host states and increasing FDI, it is important to remember that tax 
policies are capable of affecting the volume and location of FDI since tax rates 
reduce after-tax returns. Further, countries differ not only in their tax policies but 
also in their commercial and regulatory policies, market size, natural endowment 
and human capital all of which influence the desirability of an investment 
                                                 
541 OECD Double Tax Treaty Model Convention 2010, p. 1.  
542 Holmes (note 530 supra). 
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location543. Emphasis on such social, economic and political (non-tax) factors 
which foreign investors find attractive in a host country will be mentioned in the 
next chapter544.   
However, DTTs can also discourage FDI in as much as they reduce tax avoidance 
and other legal tax saving strategies such as transfer pricing by multinational 
companies545. So why do developing countries invest time and other resources to 
negotiate, conclude, sign and ratify DTTs especially when such DTTs can impose 
significant restrictions on developing states’ authority to tax corporate income 
from foreign investors546? It might be agreed that developing states resort to 
bilateral tax treaties to signal their commitment to stable, correct and often 
favourable treatment from foreign investors. By signing DTTs, developing 
countries provide foreign investors with security and stability as regards the issue 
of taxation in addition to relief from double taxation. This may also represent 
developing countries’ commitment to granting certain relative standards such as 
national treatment (foreign investors may not be treated any worse than national 
investors, but may be treated better) and most-favoured nation treatment 
(privileges granted to one foreign investor must be granted to all foreign 
investors).547 They also agree to guarantee certain treatment standards such as fair 
and equitable treatment for foreign investors in accordance with international 
standards after the investment has taken place. Multilateral organizations, namely 
the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
                                                 
543 Davies (note 516 supra). 
544 See pp. 252-262. 
545 Figlio, D. and Blonigen B. (2000), The Effects of Direct Foreign Investment on Local 
Communities, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol.48, Issue 2, pp. 338-363. 
546 Blonigen and Davies (note 529 supra). 
547 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD, (2004), World Investment 
Report The Shift towards Services, 2004, United Nations New York and Geneva, pp. 73-99. 
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Development, have promoted DTTs from an early stage548 through their model 
treaties, which are regularly updated and on which treaty partners can base their 
treaty if they wish to do so. Not surprisingly, the OECD Model favours residence 
taxation, which benefits developed countries especially OECD members since it is 
mainly developed countries that invest in developing countries. The UN Model, 
on the other hand, provides more room for source-based taxation, which is more 
beneficial to developing countries. Critics argue that the UN Model is not 
sufficiently different from the OECD Model and that it is still biased against 
developing country interests549. Also the vast majority of DTTs are based on the 
OECD Model550.  Article 5 of the UN Model is a good example of how the UN 
Model preserves the interest of developing states. Article 5 sets the requirements 
for when a “permanent establishment” exists in the host state allowing a wider 
definition of what constitutes a PE than that which appears in the OECD Model 
which in turn allows wider taxing jurisdiction for the host states.  Thus, while a 
“permanent establishment” according to the OECD Model is a building site or 
construction or installation project which must last more than 12 months551, the 
UN Model requires only 6 months for a building site, a construction or an 
installation project to continue in order to consider it a PE 552. The UN Model also 
considers “the furnishing of services, including consultancy services by an 
enterprise through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise553” as 
constituting a PE, allowing a host state to widen its jurisdiction to tax. Such 
                                                 
548 Degan (note 531 supra). 
549 Figueroa (note 525 supra). 
550 Arnold, B. et al., (2002), Summary of the Proceedings of an Invitational Seminar on Tax 
Treaties in the 21Century. Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, No. 56, pp.233-243. 
551 Article 5 (3) 2010 OECD Model.  
552 Article 5 (3) (a) 2001 UN Model.  
553 Article 5 (3) (b) 2001 UN Model.  
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provision does not exist in the OECD Model. Also the definition of agent, who in 
turn constitutes a PE, is wider in the UN Model than it is in the OECD Model554. 
In another example, the OECD Model restricts taxing royalties to the beneficiary 
state of residence i.e. home state555, while the UN Model allows royalties to be 
taxed in the state where the royalties arose i.e. the host state556.  
So the UN Model facilitates for the host state the collection of tax from foreign 
businesses, for example, by expanding the meaning of the “permanent 
establishment” and by widening the jurisdiction of the host state, allowing foreign 
capital and income to be taxed in it. The OECD Model has a higher threshold than 
the UN Model in many respects, as favoured by capital exporting countries557. 
Policy makers in developing countries often believe that the conclusion of DTTs 
increases inward FDI. However, as mentioned above, the vast majority of DTTs 
concluded between developed and developing countries limit home based 
taxation, which means that developing countries can only collect tax revenues 
from foreign investors to a limited extent.558   
It should be noted that DTTs are reciprocal. Thus the presumption that treaties 
eliminate tax competition559 is misleading since the terms of the treaty (and the 
distribution of the gain from treaty formation) must be bargained over. If 
countries differ in their preferences, then there remains unresolved conflict which 
                                                 
554 Article 5 (5) (b) UN Model, includes in the definition of PE the agent who has no authority to 
conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, but habitually maintains in the first-mentioned 
State a stock of goods or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on 
behalf of the enterprise. Article 5 (5) OECD Model restricts the agent who constitutes a PE only to 
the agent who has authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise.  
555 Article 12 (1) 2010 OECD Model. 
556 Article 12 (2) 2001 UN Model.  
557 Brooks, K. (2007), Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payment from Low.Income countries: A 
Comparison of Canada and Australia’s Policies, e-Journal of Tax Research, Vol.5, No.2, pp.169-
199. 
558 Arnold and McIntyre (note 523 supra). 
559 Toumi and Lymer (note 515 supra) . 
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will be played out through the negotiation process. Thus rather than eliminating 
tax competition, tax treaties change the nature of that competition. Recognizing 
the patterns of this bargaining has important implications for understanding the 
potential of tax treaties560 which is to coordinate tax policies, reduce the combined 
level of taxation and increase FDI561. Dagan562 shows that FDI efficiency gains 
from DTTs are a myth. Instead she argues that in U.S. tax treaty formation two 
other aspects dominate policy development: reduction in tax losses overseas and 
the alleviation of administration costs. Radaelli 563 also suggests that U.S. tax 
treaty policy is not driven by a desire to improve efficiency, but rather to reduce 
tax evasion through mechanisms such as transfer pricing. Davies564, on the other 
hand, argues that if the provisions addressing tax evasion which most DTTs 
contain were actually effective, they could reduce FDI; that is because FDI flows 
are highly asymmetric (as is common between developed and developing 
countries) so these anti-evasion provisions may be contentious and thus 
inadequately enforced. However, even if both signatories truly desire a reduction 
in tax evasion, this may be difficult to achieve bilaterally in a multilateral world. 
Other gains, however, can be derived from treaty formation including information 
sharing between governments, dispute resolution mechanisms for fiscal disputes, 
and co-ordinated policies on items such as transfer pricing and expense allocation.  
  
                                                 
560 Janeba, E. (1995), Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double Taxation Treaties and Foreign 
Direct Investment, Journal of Public Economics 56 (2), pp. 311-325.    
561 Davies (note 516 supra).    
562Degan (note 531 supra). 
563 Radaelli, C., (1997), The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European Union, Routledge 
Research in European Public Policy, London,  pp. 112-134. 
564 Davies (note 516 supra). 
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6.6 Kuwait’s double taxation treaties: How Kuwait negotiates its double 
taxation treaties 
 
Kuwait has signed 48 double taxation treaties (DTTs). In some treaties Kuwait 
applies the OECD Model convention rather than the UN Model; in other cases it 
does the opposite. One of the most important provisions in a double taxation 
treaty is Article 5 which determines what constitutes a Permanent Establishment 
(PE), as it is the definition of a PE which sets the tax base for the two states party 
to the double taxation treaty in relation to the taxation of business profits. What 
Kuwait and its double taxation treaty partners consider as a PE allows the host 
country to expand (or contract) its tax jurisdiction in relation to the taxation of 
business profits accordingly.   
 
6.6.1 The Definition of Permanent Establishment (PE) in Kuwait’s DTTs  
 
(i) Business Activity 
 
The definition of “permanent establishment” in Kuwait’s DTTs tends to be a 
blend of the definitions in the OECD and the UN Models. Usually, however, the 
basic business activity test in Article 5 (1) of the OECD Model is adopted. This 
provides:  
1. The term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of business through   
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. 
2. The term ‘permanent establishment’ includes: 
a. such as a place of management,  
b. a branch,  
c. an office,  
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d. a factory,  
e. a workshop,  
f. a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction or natural 
resources 
3. A building site or construction or installation project constitutes a permanent 
establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months565.  
 
When it comes to types of business activity that may constitute a permanent 
establishment, Kuwait’s DTTs tend to deviate from Article 5 (3) of the OECD 
Model and adopt a definition closer to that of the UN Model566, for example, most 
of Kuwait’s DTTs provide that the term “permanent establishment” includes:  
“(a) a building site or a construction assembly or installation project or a 
supervisory activity in connection therewith constitutes a permanent establishment 
only if such site project or activity continues for a period of more than six months; 
(b) the furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise of a 
contracting state through employees or other engaged personnel in the other 
contracting state constitutes a permanent establishment provided that such 
activities continue for the same project or a connected project for a period or 
periods aggregating more than nine months within any twelve-month period.”567  
 
It should be noted that seven of Kuwait’s DTTs568 do not include “the furnishing 
of services” within the definition of a permanent establishment.   
On the other hand, Kuwait takes the substance of the ‘business activity’ definition 
of a “permanent establishment” further when it includes “using substantial 
equipment”, in eighteen of it’s DTTs569 thereby deviating from both the OECD 
and the UN Model570. This extended provision provides: 
“An enterprise of a contracting state shall be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in the other contracting state if substantial equipment in that other 
                                                 
565 Article 5 (1),(2) and (3) OECD Model 2010.   
566 Article 5 (3) of the UN Model 2001 requires the furnishing service in provision to continue for 
at least 6 months. 
567 See, for example, Article (5) Kuwait and Pakistan DTT, 1998. 
568 Tunisia, Switzerland, Turkey, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy.  
569 These are with: The Netherlands, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Greece, The Czech Republic, Croatia, Malta, Mauritius, South 
Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt. 
570 In some of its DTTs Kuwait deviates from the standard provisions of the OECD and the UN 
Models, although there is no clear reason why this is so. 
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contracting state is being used or installed by the enterprise, or for the enterprise, 
or under contract with the enterprise and such contract continues for more than 
three months”.  
 
The broadest manifestations of the ‘business activity’ definition in Kuwait’s DTTs 
expands source jurisdiction in four main respects. First, the duration for a project, 
a building site, etc., to constitute a “permanent establishment” is 12 months in the 
OECD Model, but only 6 months in most of Kuwait’s DTTs571, in some cases 3 
months suffices in considering a project, etc. as a “permanent establishment”572. 
Secondly, the OECD Model does not mention “supervisory activities” in 
connection with a building site, construction, assembly or installation project, 
whereas Kuwait tends to treat supervisory activities relating to these activities as a 
basis for finding a “permanent establishment”. Thirdly, the OECD Model does not 
specify whether providing services may constitute a “permanent establishment”, 
whereas some of Kuwait’s DTTs, as seen above, provide that the “furnishing of 
services” constitutes a “permanent establishment” if the activity continues for 
more than 9 months in any 12 month period573; while most of Kuwait’s DTTs 
require only 6 months574, and in some cases 3 months suffices575. Fourthly, neither 
the OECD nor the UN Model mention ‘substantial equipment’ being used or 
installed for or under a contract with the enterprise and such contracts continuing 
for more than three months as a basis for a “permanent establishment”. As 
                                                 
571 See note 569 above. 
572 Such as Kuwait’s DTTs with Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mongolia, Indonesia, and 
Ethiopia. 
573 These include Kuwait’s treaty with Mauritius, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Pakistan. 
574 These include Kuwait’s treaties with Jordan, Egypt, Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Romania, 
Hungry, Canada, Singapore, China, Korea, Syria and Ukraine. 
575 As in Kuwait’s DTT with Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Mongolia, Indonesia, and Malta, Belarus, 
Russia, Venezuela, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Ethiopia. 
 186 
 
mentioned above,576 18 Kuwaiti DTTs provide for using ‘substantial equipment’ 
to constitute a “permanent establishment” in defined circumstances.  
It is concluded from this that Kuwait has in some instances expanded its 
jurisdiction to tax business profits by either going further than the standard UN 
and OECD business activity test for a PE, or by requiring shorter periods of 
existence for the relevant activities that constitute a PE in the host state. It should 
be noted here that Kuwait allows foreign enterprises to carry on business in its 
jurisdiction either through a 49% shareholding in nationally owned enterprises, or 
by allowing a foreign investor to carry on business in Kuwait through a national 
agent, as has been seen in Chapter 4577. 
In addition to founding a “permanent establishment” on a business activity test the 
OECD and the UN Models provide for a “permanent establishment” to be 
established through agency. The next section considers to what extent Kuwait’s 
DTTs make provision for an agency “permanent establishment”.  
 
6.6.2 When an Agent Constitutes a PE  
 
The definition of agent and what constitutes a taxable agency relationship 
between a national and foreign enterprise under Kuwait’s domestic tax system 
was discussed in length in chapter 4578. The following, however, discusses when 
an agent constitutes a ‘permanent establishment’ under Kuwait’s DTTs. 
 
 
                                                 
576 See note 569. 
577 See pp. 114-117. 
578 See pp. 122 – 136. 
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(i) Agency 
 
First, it is important to clarify when an agent may constitute a PE according to the 
OECD Model, Article 5 (5) provides:  
“... where a person - other than an agent of an independent status to whom 
paragraph 6 applies – is acting on behalf of the enterprise and has, and habitually 
exercises, in a Contracting State an authority to conclude contracts in the name of 
the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent establishment 
in that State in respect of any activities which that person undertakes for the 
enterprise, unless the activities of such person are limited to those mentioned in 
paragraph 4579 which, if exercised though a fixed place of business, would not 
make this fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the provisions 
of that paragraph.”  
 
 
Article 5 (6) then provides: 
 
“An enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in a 
Contracting State merely because it carries on business in that State through a 
broker, general commission agent or any other agent of an independent status, 
provided that such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their business”      
 
So according to the OECD Model, a person - other than an agent with an 
independent status - who acts on behalf of an enterprise and has and habitually 
exercises, in a Contracting State, an authority to conclude contracts in the name of 
the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a “permanent 
establishment” in that State in respect of any activities which that person 
undertakes for the enterprise, unless these activities are limited to those mentioned 
                                                 
579 Activities in Article 5 (4) include: a. the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, 
display or delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; b. the maintenance of a 
stock of goods and merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the purpose of storage, 
display or delivery; c. the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the 
enterprise solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise; d. the maintenance of a fixed 
place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or merchandise or of collecting 
information for the enterprise; e. the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the 
purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character; 
f. the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned 
in sub-paragraphs a. to e. provided that the overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting 
from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary character. 
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in Article 5(4)580. Also, according to the OECD Model, the enterprise that carries 
on business in a contracting state through a broker, general commission agent or 
any other agent of an independent status, - provided that such persons are acting 
in the ordinary course of their business - shall not be deemed to have a 
“permanent establishment” in that contracting state581. (whether or not there is a 
fixed place of business in the other contracting state) unless the activities of the 
agent are limited to activities which would not constitute a permanent 
establishment if they are carried on directly by the enterprise582. In this regard, 
Kuwait follows the OECD Model in eight of its DTTs583 when determining the 
circumstances in which a dependent agent’s actions constitute a “permanent 
establishment”.  
In some of its DTTs584, Kuwait follows the broader approach of the UN Model in 
determining when a dependent agent constitutes a “permanent establishment”, as 
the UN Model considers there to be a dependent agent acting on behalf of an 
enterprise in a contracting state as a “permanent establishment” in the following 
circumstances Article 5 (5) (b) of the UN Model provides:  
“.. where a person other than an agent of an independent status whom paragraph 7 
applies is acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in the first-mentioned Contracting State in respect of any activities 
which that person undertakes for the enterprise if such person: 
 
(b) has no such authority, but habitually maintains in the first-mentioned State a 
stock of goods or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or 
merchandise on behalf of the enterprise585” 
                                                 
580 See note 579. 
581 Article 5 (6) of the OECD Model 2010. 
582 Article 5 (5) of the OECD Model 2010. 
583 In its DTTs with Germany, UK, Switzerland, Greece, Croatia, Turkey, Sudan, and South 
Africa. 
584 In 14 of its DTTs, with Morocco, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czech 
Republic, Ukraine, Cyprus, Pakistan, Singapore, China, Korea, Sri Lanka.  
585 Article 5 (5) (b) UN Model 2001.  
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Unlike Article 5 (6) of the OECD Model, the UN Model includes in its definition 
of a “permanent establishment” an enterprise that carries on business in a 
contracting state through a broker, general commission agent or any other agent of 
an independent status when the activities of such an agent are devoted wholly or 
almost wholly on behalf of that enterprise. Article 5 (7) of the UN Model 
provides:  
“An enterprise of a Contracting State shall not be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in the other Contracting State merely because it carries on business 
in that other State through a broker, general commission agent or any other agent 
of an independent status, provided that such persons are acting in the ordinary 
course of their business. However, when the activities of such an agent are 
devoted wholly or almost wholly on behalf of that enterprise, and conditions are 
made or imposed between that enterprise and the agent in their commercial and 
financial relations which differ from those which would have been made between 
independent enterprises, he will not be considered an agent of an independent 
status within the meaning of this paragraph”.  
 
This broader concept of the UN Model for the agent who constitutes a “permanent 
establishment” is adopted in most of Kuwait’s DTTs mentioned above586. 
 
In addition, most of Kuwait’s DTTs587 also deviate from the UN Model by 
expanding the definition of agency which establishes a taxable “permanent 
establishment” as follows;  
“An agent who manufactures or processes in the contracting state for the 
enterprise goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise will also constitute a 
permanent establishment.588” 
 
In the above mentioned DTTs, it is obvious that Kuwait adopts a very broad 
definition of “permanent establishment”, especially where it deviates even from 
the UN Model. This will allow Kuwait a wider jurisdiction over the taxation of 
                                                 
586 See note 554. 
587 With these countries: Mauritius, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungry, Malta, 
Belarus, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.  
588 Article 5 (5) (c) of the DTT signed between Kuwait and Bulgaria in 2002, (still in force). 
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the profits of foreign enterprises. However, the broad definitions tend to be 
adopted in DTTs signed with less developed states (developing ones), whilst in 
DTTs with developed states such as Germany, the UK, Switzerland and Italy the 
definitions adopted are those of the OECD Model, thus narrowing Kuwait’s 
jurisdiction to tax, and thus limiting its tax revenue. This reinforced the argument 
mentioned earlier589 that the OECD Model tends to favour developed countries 
while the UN Model benefits developing countries.  
 
6.7 DTTs Treatment of Income  
 
6.7.1 Attribution of Business Profits to PEs   
 
Article 7 is arguably the most significant article in a DTT as it deals with business 
profits. Based on Article 7 of the OECD Model, Kuwait’s DTTs generally provide 
that where an enterprise has a permanent establishment in Kuwait the profits of 
the enterprise are taxable in Kuwait to the extent that the profits are attributable to 
that permanent establishment. Initially, Article 7 provides: 
“1. Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that 
State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State 
through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries 
business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable to the permanent 
establishment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 may be taxed in 
that other State. 
 
2. For the purpose of this Article and Article [23 A] [23 B] the profits that are 
attributable in each Contracting State to the permanent establishment referred to 
in paragraph 1 are the profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its 
dealings with other parts of  the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent 
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
                                                 
589 See pp.177-181. 
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conditions, taking into account the functions performed, assets used and risks 
assumed by the enterprise through the permanent establishment and through the 
other parts of the enterprise”   
 
Article 7 of the OECD Model allocates taxing rights with respect to the business 
profits of an enterprise of a contracting state to the extent that these profits are not 
subject to different rules under other Articles of the Model. It incorporates the 
basic principle that unless an enterprise of a contracting state has a permanent 
establishment situated in the other State, the business profits of the enterprise may 
not be taxed by that other State unless these profits fall into special categories of 
income under which other Articles of the Model give taxing rights to that other 
State590. The principles underlying Article 7, and in particular paragraph 2 of the 
Article, have a long history. When the OECD first examined what criteria should 
be used in attributing profits to a permanent establishment, this question had 
previously been addressed in a large number of tax conventions and in various 
models developed by the League of Nations. The separate entity and arm’s length 
principles, on which paragraph 2 is based, had already been incorporated in these 
conventions and models and the OECD considered that it was sufficient to restate 
these principles with some slight amendments and modifications for the main 
purpose of clarification591. Practical experience has shown, however, that there 
was considerable variation in the interpretation of these general principles and of 
other provisions of earlier versions of Article 7. This lack of a common 
interpretation created problems of double taxation and non-taxation. Despite the 
work of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs in trying to ensure more consistent 
                                                 
590 Kees Van Raad. edit, 2010/2011 Materials on International and EU Tax Law, OECD’s 
Commentary on the new Article 7, IBFD, p. 1343. 
591 Id. 
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interpretation and application of the Article, the practice of OECD and non-OECD 
countries regarding the attribution of profits to permanent establishments and 
these countries’ interpretation of Article 7 continued to vary considerably. The 
Committee acknowledged the need to provide more certainty to taxpayers in a 
2008 report entitled “Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments”. The 
report focused on how to formulate the most preferable approach to attributing 
profits to permanent establishments under Article 7. After the Committee had 
approved the report in 2008, it recognised that there are differences between some 
of the conclusions of the report and the interpretations of article 7 given 
previously in the Commentary. For that reason a new version of Article 7 was 
included in the latest Model Convention which was adopted in 2010.  
The first principle underlying Article 7 (1), i.e. that the profits of an enterprise of 
one contracting state shall not be taxed in the other State unless the enterprise 
carries on business in that other State through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, has a long history and reflects international consensus that, as a general 
rule, until an enterprise of State sets up a permanent establishment in another 
State, it should not be regarded as participating in the economic life of that other 
State to such an extent that the other State should have taxing rights on its 
profits592. 
The second principle, which is reflected in the second sentence of the paragraph, 
is that the right to tax of the State where the permanent establishment is situated 
does not extend to profits that the enterprise may derive from that State but are not 
attributable to the permanent establishment. This is a question on which there 
                                                 
592 Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra). 
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have been historically differences of view; some countries have pursued a general 
principle of “force of attraction” according to which income such as other 
business profits, dividends, interest and royalties arising from sources in their 
territory was fully taxable by them if the beneficiary had a permanent 
establishment therein even though such income was clearly not attributable to the 
permanent establishment. Whilst some bilateral tax conventions include a limited 
anti-avoidance rule based on a restricted ‘force of attraction’ approach that only 
applies to business profits derived from activities similar to those carried on by a 
permanent establishment, the general ‘force of attraction’ approach described 
above has now been rejected in international tax treaty practice. The principle that 
is now generally accepted in double taxation conventions is based on the view that 
in taxing the profits that a foreign enterprise derives from a particular country, the 
tax authorities of that country should look at the separate sources of profit that the 
enterprise derives from their country and should apply to each the permanent 
establishment test, subject to the possible application of other Articles of the 
convention. This solution allows simpler and more efficient tax administration 
and compliance, and is more closely adapted to the way in which business is 
commonly carried out593.   
 
Kuwait implements in some of its DTTs594the ‘force of attraction’ principle 
recommended in the UN Model595, allowing the income of a foreign enterprise to 
                                                 
593 See Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra).  
594 Sudan, Ethiopia, Belarus, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, and Syria. 
595 Article 7 (1) of the UN Model 2001, provides: “The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting 
State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on 
business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much 
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be taxed in the host country not only on profit directly attributable to the 
permanent establishment, but also on the profits made due to the sale of similar 
goods to those sold by the permanent establishment, and profits derived from 
business activities carried on in the host country that are the same as or similar to 
those carried on by the permanent establishment. For example Article 7 of 
Kuwait’s DTT with Indonesia provides: 
“The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that 
Contracting State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting 
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries 
on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State but only so much of them as is attributable to (a) that permanent 
establishment; (b) sales in that other Contracting State of goods or merchandise of 
the same or similar kind as those sold through that permanent establishment; or 
(c) other business activities carried on in that other Contracting State of the same 
or similar kind as those effected through that permanent establishment”596.   
 
 
However, the scope of the ‘force of attraction’ principle in Kuwait’s DTTs differs 
from one DTT to the other. Thus, in Kuwait’s DTTs with Mongolia, Sudan and 
Sri Lanka, the ‘force of attraction’ principle is limited. It allows a contracting state 
to tax the profits of an enterprise situated in it only if those profits were 
attributable to that permanent establishment and to tax the sales of goods and 
merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through the permanent 
establishment. The ‘force of attraction’ principle here excludes the third provision, 
outlined above, which allows the source state to tax other business activities of the 
same or similar kind as those carried on by the permanent establishment. Article 7 
of Kuwait’s DTT with Sri Lanka provides: 
                                                                                                                                     
of them as is attributable to (a) that permanent establishment; (b) sales in that other State of goods 
or merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through that permanent establishment; or 
(c) other business activities carried on in that other State of the same or similar kind as those 
effected through that permanent establishment.”    
596 Article 7 of the DTT between Kuwait and Indonesia signed April 23rd, 1997, (still in force). 
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“The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that 
Contracting State, unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated in that other 
Contracting State. If the enterprise carries on business in that manner, the profits 
of the enterprise may be taxed in the other Contracting State but only so much of 
them as attributable to that permanent establishment and to sales in that other 
Contracting State of goods or merchandise of the same or similar kind as those 
sold through that permanent establishment597.” 
 
Also in Kuwait’s DTTs with Ethiopia, Belarus, and Syria, the scope of the ‘force 
of attraction’ principle is narrowed to include only profits attributable to the 
permanent establishment and payments received as consideration for the use of 
the right to use, industrial, commercial and scientific equipment. Further, Article 7 
of the DTT between Kuwait and Ethiopia provides another variation: 
“...the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other Contracting State but 
only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment. However, 
payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, 
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment shall be deemed to be profits of an 
enterprise to which the provisions of the Article shall apply598.”    
 
The ‘force of attraction’ was a principle tailored by the UN to protect the interests 
of the developing countries that usually play the role of the host country in 
bilateral tax treaties by allowing those countries to extend their tax jurisdiction. 
However, such a clause in a bilateral DTT can have two disadvantages: a) the 
difficulty of implementing such a clause as it requires a very sophisticated tax 
administration system, and (b) the force of attraction principle discourages 
enterprises based in developed states from investing in developing countries. 
Kuwait’s objective is to try and attract revenues from FDI in an attempt to reduce 
its high dependency on oil revenues which resulted in Kuwait suffering from 
                                                 
597 Article 7 of Kuwait’s DTT with Sri Lanka, signed February 5th, 2002, (still in force). 
598 Article 7 of Kuwait’s DTT with Ethiopia, signed September 14th 1996 (still in force). 
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rentierism, a subject discussed in chapter 3599. Thus it may have to refrain from 
including such ‘force of attraction’ provisions in the majority of its DTTs, 
although in some of its treaties, as seen above, Kuwait does apply the ‘Force of 
Attraction’ principle thereby allowing a broader jurisdiction for taxing business 
profits arising through a permanent establishment.  
When it comes to attributing business profits to a foreign enterprise, there is a 
need to understand how this is undertaken in regards to the Kuwaiti fiscal 
system600 seeing that all foreign enterprises in Kuwait must carry on business in 
Kuwait either through a national agent or by holding 49% of a national company 
(while the national shareholder owns 51%); for details see chapter 4601. When it 
comes to calculating the business profits attributable to the foreign shareholder 
carrying on business in Kuwait i.e. the foreign profits raised in the state of Kuwait 
and thus taxable under its jurisdiction, the tax inspector disregards the fact that 
51% of the enterprise is owned by a national. The tax inspector will do a full 
inspection on all the income, profits and allowances of the company as if it were a 
100% foreign owned company; for details see chapter 4602. 
 
6.7.2 Dividends, Interest and Royalties 
 
When it comes to taxing dividends, interest and royalties, Kuwait has in general 
followed the OECD Model. Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD Model limit the 
                                                 
599 See pp. 88 - 94. 
600 See pp.111-118. 
601 See pp.111-118. 
602 See pp. 112- 120. 
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taxes imposed upon the recipient of cross-border dividends, interests and 
royalties.  
 
1. Dividends 
 
Under Article 10 (3) of the OECD Model, The term “dividends” means 
“Income from shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, 
founders’ shares or other rights, not being debt claims, participating in profits, as 
well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation 
treatment as income from shares by the laws of the state of which the company 
making the distribution is a resident.” 603  
 
Articles 10 (1) and (2) of the OECD Model provide: 
“1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a 
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.  
 
2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which 
the company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that 
State, but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other 
Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
 
a. 5% of the gross amount of dividends if the beneficial owner is a company 
(other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25% of the capital of 
the company paying dividends; 
b. 15% of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.604” 
 
  
Article 10 (1) does not give the right to tax dividends exclusively to either the 
home State or the host State. Taxation of dividends exclusively in the home State 
would not be acceptable as a general rule as it would be unrealistic to relinquish 
all prospects of taxing dividends in the host State. Nevertheless, Article 10 (2) 
imposes limitations on the right of the host state to tax dividends, normally 15% 
of the gross amount of dividends (see above). The Commentary to Article (2) 
                                                 
603 Article 10 (3) 2010 OECD Model. 
604 Article 10 (a) and (b) of the OECD Model, 2010.  
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provides that a higher rate than 15% could hardly be justified since the host State 
can already tax the company’s profits605.  On the other hand, when the recipient of 
the dividends is a parent company receiving dividends from a subsidiary, the rate 
of tax withheld is lowered to 5% of the gross amount of dividends when the 
beneficiary is a parent company which owns directly a holding of 25% of the 
subsidiary paying the dividends. The Commentary explains that it is reasonable 
that the payments of profits by the subsidiary to its foreign parent should be taxed 
less heavily in order to avoid recurrent taxation and to facilitate international 
investment606.   
 
The UN Model’s treatment of dividends does not deviate too far from that of the 
OECD Model. The difference is that the UN Model allows the state parties to 
decide the percentage of tax to be paid when the beneficiary is a resident of the 
other contracting state. Article 10 of the UN Model provides: 
1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a 
resident of the other Contracting State maybe taxed in that other State.  
2. However such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which 
the company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that 
State, but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other 
Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
a)___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner 
is a company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 10 per 
cent of the capital of the company paying the dividends; 
b)___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases. 
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting State shall by mutual agreement 
settle the mode of application of these limitations.   
 
 
                                                 
605 Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra). 
606 Id. 
 199 
 
When it comes to the tax treatment of dividends, some of Kuwait’s DTTs adopt 
the OECD Model, some adopt the UN Model and some deviate from both. In a 
number of Kuwait’s DTTs with countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, South Africa, Austria, Croatia, and Hungary, dividends are 
taxed only in the home State, without any allowance for taxing dividends in the 
host State. Limiting the taxation of dividends to the home State, Article 10 of the 
DTT between Kuwait and Singapore provides: 
Dividends arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident in the other 
Contracting State shall only be taxable in that other Contracting State if such 
resident is the beneficial owner of the dividends. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the taxation of the company in 
respect of the profits out of which the dividends are paid607.  
 
This is one of the examples where Kuwait’s DTTs with some contracting states 
deviate and vary from the standard provisions of the OECD and the UN 
Models608, although there is no clear reason why in some of Kuwait’s DTTs609 
such disparities from the provisions of the OECD and the UN Models. 
Despite the fact that the provisions of DTTs are reciprocal, limiting the right to 
tax dividends to the home State only, such as the case in Kuwait’s DTTs with the 
States mentioned above610 – does not constitute the optimal tax situation for 
Kuwait. In cases where Kuwait is serving as the host State, this prevents Kuwait 
from taxing dividends that are remitted to the other jurisdictions (home States) 
that are party to the DTTs.  Kuwait could negotiate with the above countries to 
                                                 
607 Article 10 (1) of the DTT between Kuwait and Singapore, signed on February 21st 2002, (in 
force).  
608 See p.179 for another example of Kuwaiti DTTs deviating from the standard provisions of the 
OECD and the UN Model in defining what constitutes a PE. 
609 Such as the DTTs signed with countries mentioned above, see p. 187. 
610 See p. 199. 
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implement the UN version of Article 10611 where the percentage of tax is agreed 
upon by both contracting States, reaching an optimal rate for both States can 
ensure that both receive a fair amount of taxes when dividends raised in their 
jurisdictions are remitted to the other State.   
 
Another example of the tax treatment of dividends arises in Kuwait’s DTTs with 
Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia. These DTTs allow 
dividends to be taxed in the host State. However, the host state in the above DTTs 
is limited to a single tax rate of 10%, and in some DTTs such as those with China, 
and the Czech Republic that single rate is limited to 5%. In Kuwait’s DTT with 
Switzerland, the host State is limited to the relatively higher single rate of 15% 
withholding tax. Other DTTs distinguish between government investing entities 
and other investors. In Kuwait’s DTTs with China, for example, while dividends 
earned by natural persons and corporate investors are subject to a withholding tax 
at a rate of 5%, other entities, owned directly or indirectly by government, and 
companies where the government owns, directly or indirectly 20% of the shares 
are exempt from tax in the host state. Other DTTs which include a similar 
provision are those entered into with Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Ukraine, Poland, The 
Russia Federation, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Belgium. A further modification arises 
in DTTs that do not exempt governmental entities but instead impose a reduced 
rate of withholding tax e.g. in the DTT between Kuwait and Morocco where 
dividends are subject to a rate of 2.5%.  
                                                 
611 See p. 198. 
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Other Kuwaiti DTTs which adopt the OECD Model in their tax treatment of 
dividends distinguish between income derived from direct and indirect 
investment. Here there is a clear diversity in the tax rates imposed on direct and 
portfolio investors in the host state. In such DTTs dividends are primarily taxed in 
the beneficiary’s home state (State of residence). However they can also be taxed 
in the host state (residence state of the dividend distributing company) but such 
taxes withholdings are limited and their extent depends on the type of investment 
yielding the dividends. For example, in Kuwait’s DTT with Germany, dividends 
raised by a company (not a partnership) holding at least 10% of the distributing 
company’s shares are taxed at a rate of 5%, while in all other cases dividends are 
taxed at 10%. A similar tax treatment is applied in Kuwait’s DTT with the UK, 
Yugoslavia, France, and Venezuela, whilst in Kuwait’s DTT with Canada 
dividends are subject to a withholding tax of 5% when the beneficiary entity owns 
10% or more of the issued and outstanding voting stock, or 25% or more of the 
value of all the issued and outstanding stock of the company paying the dividends, 
and at a rate of 15% in all other cases.  
In other cases such as Kuwait’s DTTs with The Netherlands and Romania 
respectively the former taxes beneficiary entities holding 10% of the distributing 
company’s capital at 0%, whilst the latter (Romania) exempts dividends earned by 
entities which own directly or indirectly 51% of distributing company’s capital.  
 
From the above it is clear that Kuwait’s DTTs vary in their treatment of 
dividends; some apply the OECD Model, and some the UN Model and some 
deviate from both standard Models. The DTTs carry obvious disparities when it 
 202 
 
comes to the rate of tax applied, and diversity in the incentives offered to direct 
investors and government owned entities.  
 
2. Interest612 
 
When it comes to Kuwait’s DTTs treatment of interest a wide range of policies 
are adopted. Some of Kuwait’s DTTs follow the OECD Model, and some follow 
the UN Model, while a significant number of Kuwait DTTs have deviated from 
both Models. 
On the taxation of interest, Article 11 of the OECD Model provides: 
 
1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
 
2. However, such interest may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which it 
arises and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of 
the interest is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax charged shall 
not exceed 10 percent of the gross amount of the interest. The competent 
authorities of the Contracting State shall by mutual agreement settle the mode 
of application of this limitation... 
 
Whilst in its tax treatment of interest, Article 11 of the UN Model provides: 
 
1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
2. However, such interest may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which it 
arises and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the 
interest is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not 
exceed____per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of interest. The competent authorities of the 
                                                 
612 Article 11 (3) of the OECD 2010 Model: “The term “interest” means income from debt claims 
of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to 
participate in the debtor’s profit, and in particular, income from government securities and income 
from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or 
debentures. Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the purpose of 
this Article”.  
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Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of application of 
this limitation613.  
 
Here the UN Model gives the contracting States the freedom to agree on the rate 
of withholding taxes that may be imposed on the interest arising in the host State 
to the benefit of the resident of the home State as it does with dividends614. 
Kuwait’s DTTs tax interest in a number of ways. Nine DTTs615 adopt the OECD 
Model, i.e. taxing interest in the home state; however, allowing the host state to 
impose tax on interest arising in its jurisdiction yet limiting the host State to a rate 
of 10% when the beneficiary is a resident of the other contracting state. Four 
DTTs616 adopt the UN Model by applying a limit to the tax rate allowed for the 
host State to impose on interest arising in its jurisdiction and paid to a beneficiary 
from the other contracting state. The rate of tax imposed is agreed upon by the 
competent authorities of both contracting States, in Kuwait’s DTTs that apply the 
UN Model, the tax rates vary between 5%, 7%, and 8%. 
In their treatment of interest many of Kuwait’s DTTs show a wide diversity; in 
fourteen DTTs617 interest is taxed only in the home state of the beneficiary. For 
example, Article 11 (1) of the DTT between Kuwait and Austria provides: 
“Any interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other 
Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State if such resident is the 
beneficial owner of the interest.” 
 
The OECD Commentary suggests that taxing interest exclusively in the home 
State can be a solution in some cases. It states: 
                                                 
613 Article 11 of the UN Double Taxation Model Convention, 2001. 
614 See pp 198-199. 
615 Those DTTs signed with Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Cyprus, Pakistan, Korea, Syria, 
Morocco, and Egypt. 
616 DTTs signed with Singapore, China, Uzbekistan, and Jordan. 
617 With Germany, UK, Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Croatia, 
Hungry, Malta, Russian Federation, Lebanon, Mauritius and South Africa.  
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“... The Contracting States may agree in bilateral negotiations upon a lower tax or 
even on exclusive taxation in the State of the beneficiary’s residence with respect 
to all interest payments... in certain cases, the approach adopted in Article 11 (2) 
which is to allow source taxation of payments of interest, can constitute an 
obstacle to international trade... for instance, when the beneficiary of the interest 
has borrowed in order to finance the operation which earns the interest, the profit 
realized by way of interest will be much smaller than the nominal amount of 
interest received; if the interest paid is equal to or exceeds the interest received, 
there will be either no profit at all or there will be a loss. The problem in that case 
cannot be solved in the State of residence, since little or no tax will be levied in 
that State where the beneficiary is taxed on the net profit derived from the 
transaction. That problem arises because that tax in that State of source is levied 
on the gross amount of interest regardless of the expenses incurred in order to earn 
such interest. In order to avoid that problem, creditors will shift to the debtor the 
burden of the tax levied by the State of source on the interest and therefore 
increase the rate of interest charged to the debtor, whose financial burden is then 
increased by an amount corresponding to the tax payable to the State of 
source618”. 
 
 
In other exceptions to the standard treatment of interest, some of Kuwait’s DTTs 
limit the host state to a tax rate when taxing interest paid to a beneficiary who is a 
resident of the other contracting state. However, these DTTs619 also allow 
exemptions for some beneficiaries; such as when the beneficiary is the 
government of the other contracting state, a government-owned enterprise, or 
when the interest arises from a loan guaranteed by a government. For example 
Article 11 (3) of Kuwait’s DTT with Poland provides: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 11(2), interest arising in a Contracting 
State shall be exempt from tax if derived by or on: 
 
a. The government of the other Contracting State or any governmental institution. 
b. A company which is a resident of the other Contracting State and at least 25% of 
its paid-up capital is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the 
Government on a governmental institution. 
c. Loans guaranteed by the Government of the other Contracting State or any 
governmental institution or other entity…”   
 
                                                 
618 Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra). 
619 DTTs signed with Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Belarus, Indonesia, Mongolia, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Romania, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia.  
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The governmental shareholding in the beneficiary company referred to in Article 
11 (3) (b) above620 may vary between 25% in DTTs with Poland, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Belarus, Romania, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, to 49% in the DTTs with 
Indonesia, Mongolia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tunisia.  
The OECD’s Commentary explains the rationale for exempting interest when it is 
paid to the government of a company owned by the government, or a government 
entity: 
“Where the payer of the interest happens to be the State itself, a political 
subdivision or a statutory body, the end result may well be that the tax levied at 
source may actually be borne by that State if the lender increases the interest rate 
to recoup the tax levied at source. In that case any benefits for the State taxing the 
interest at source will be offset by the increase of its borrowing costs621.”  
   
 
3. Royalties622  
 
When it comes to Kuwait’s DTTs’ treatment of royalties, all of them adopt the 
UN Model, i.e. allowing royalties to be taxed by the host state when the 
beneficiary is a resident of the other contracting state with a limited rate of the tax 
agreed upon through bilateral negotiations between both states. Article 12 of the 
UN Model provides: 
“1. Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.   
 
2. However, such royalties may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which 
they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the 
royalties is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not 
                                                 
620 See p.204. 
621 Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra). 
622 Article 12 (2) of the OECD 2010 Model provides: “The term “royalties” as used in this Article 
means payment of any kind received as a consideration of the use of, or the right to use any, copy 
right of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, trade mark, 
design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, 
commercial and scientific experience. 
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exceed___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) 
of the gross amount of royalties. The competent authorities of the Contracting 
States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of application of this limitation”. 
    
 
The OECD Model, on the other hand, leaves taxing royalties exclusively for the 
beneficiary’s state of residence623. 
In adopting the UN Model in its tax treatment of royalties, Kuwait’s DTTs vary as 
to rate of tax allowed for the host state to impose on royalties paid to a beneficiary 
resident of the other contracting state - twenty six DTTs624 adopt the standard 
10% rate of tax, whilst seven DTTs625  adopt a 20% rate of tax, five DTTs626 
adopt a 5% rate tax, three DTTs627 adopt a 30% rate of tax and in Kuwait’s DTT 
with Greece, the rate of tax adopted is 15%.  
   
6.7.3 Treatment of Capital Gains 
 
(i) Eliminating Double Taxation on Capital Gains 
  
In general, the initial tax treatment of capital gains under the OECD and the UN 
Model is very similar when it comes to taxing capital gains from the alienation of 
immovable property. Article 13 (1) of both the OECD and the UN provides: 
“Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of 
immovable property referred to in Article 6 income from immovable property and 
situated in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.” 
                                                 
623 Article 12 (1) OECD Model, 2010, provides: “Royalties arising in a Contracting State and 
beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State be taxed only in that other State.”   
624 With Germany, UK, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czech Republic, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey, Hungry, Malta, Belarus, Russia, Canada, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, China, Mongolia, Mauritius, Morocco, Sudan, South Africa, and Egypt.    
625 With Romania, Venezuela, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and Syria. 
626 With The Netherlands, Poland, Cyprus, Korea, and Tunisia.  
627 With Lebanon, Jordan, and Ethiopia. 
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When it comes to the taxation on capital gains from the alienation of movable 
property the UN Model offers a slightly wider jurisdiction for the host state.  
Both the OECD and the UN Models apply the same rule when it comes to capital 
gains from the alienation of movable property which forms a part of the business 
property of a permanent establishment which is an enterprise a contracting state 
has in the other contracting state. Article 13 (2) of the OECD Model provides: 
“Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of the business 
property of a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State 
has in the other Contracting State, including such gains from the alienation of 
such a permanent establishment (alone or with the whole enterprise), may be 
taxed in that other State.” 
 
The UN Model adopts the above paragraph in the first part of Article 13 (2) of the 
UN Model, but adds capital gains from alienating movable property belonging to 
a fixed base of an enterprise of one contracting state situated in the other 
contracting state for the purpose of performing independent personal services. 
This latter provision provides: 
“... or movable property pertaining to a fixed base available to a resident of a 
Contracting State in the other Contracting State for the purpose of performing 
independent personal  services.” 
 
Thus, Article 13 (2) of the UN Model allows a wider jurisdiction for the host State 
to tax capital gains by including the alienation of movable property belonging to 
an enterprise performing independent personal services in the host state, in 
addition to capital gains arising due to the alienation of movable property 
belonging to a permanent establishment which an enterprise has in the host state. 
The OECD and the UN Models similarly tax gains from the alienation of ships, 
aircraft and boats, or movable property pertaining to such transport vehicles, in 
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the contracting State in which the place of effective management of the enterprise 
is situated628.   
In its treatment of capital gains from the alienation of shares, the UN Model also 
allows a slightly wider jurisdiction for the host State to tax than the OECD Model.  
Article 13 (4) of the OECD Model provides: 
“Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of shares 
deriving more than 50% of their value directly or indirectly from immovable 
property situated in the other Contracting State  may be taxed in that other 
Contracting State.” 
 
 
The UN Model, on the other hand, expands the equivalent of Article 13 (4) to 
include capital gains from the alienation of interests in partnerships, trusts and 
estates in addition to the shares of companies. Article 13 (4) of the UN Model 
provides: 
“Gains from the alienation of shares of the capital stock of a company, or of an 
interest in a partnership, trust or estate, the property of which consists directly or 
indirectly principally of immovable property situated in a Contracting State may 
be taxed in that State. In particular: 
 
1. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall apply to a company, partnership, trust 
or estate , other than a company, partnership, trust, or estate engaged in the 
business of management of immovable properties, the property of which consists 
directly or indirectly principally of immovable property used by such company, 
partnership, trust or estate in its business activities.  
2. For the purpose of this paragraph, “principally” in relation to ownership of 
immovable property means the value of such immovable property exceeding fifty 
percent of the aggregate value of all assets owned by the company, partnership, 
trust or estate.”      
 
 
The UN Model goes further in Article 13 (5) by allowing the alienation of shares - 
other than those mentioned in Paragraph 4 – to be taxed in the host state where the 
                                                 
628 Special provision is made in the OECD and the UN Models for taxation of “capital gains from 
the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in international traffic, boats engaged in inland 
waterways transport or movable property pertaining to the operation of such ships, aircraft or 
boats, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State in which the place of effective management of 
the enterprise is situated”. Article 13 (3) of the OECD Model 2010, and the UN Model 2001. 
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company alienating the shares is a resident. The OECD Model has no equivalent 
of the UN Model of Article 13 (5) which provides: 
 
“Gains from the alienation of shares other than those mentioned in paragraph 4 
representing a participation of ___per cent (the percentage is to be established 
through bilateral negotiations) in a company which is a resident of a Contracting 
State may be taxed in that State.”  
 
The UN Model concludes with Article 13 (6) which is the equivalent of the 
OECD Model’s Article 13 (5), each of these paragraphs provides that the 
alienation of any property not included in the other Article 13 paragraphs will be 
taxable only in the contracting state of which the alienator is a resident.   
 
 
(ii)  Kuwait’s DTTs Treatment of Capital Gains 
 
 
 
Kuwait’s DTTs vary in their treatment of the taxation of capital gains. The most 
adopted version of Article 13 on the taxation of capital gains in Kuwait DTTs is a 
hybrid between the OECD and the UN Model. This appears in twenty eight of 
Kuwait’s DTTs629 and adopts in its first paragraph the standard treatment of gains 
on the alienation of immovable property found in both the OECD and the UN 
Models, which allows gains derived by a resident of a contracting state from the 
alienation of immovable property in the other contracting state to be taxed in that 
                                                 
629 DTTs signed with Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungry, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Montenegro, Poland, Turkey, Russia, Switzerland, 
Yugoslavia, China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Jordan. 
 210 
 
other state630. However, when it comes to Article 13 (2), in these 28 DTTs the UN 
Model  of provision for the taxation of gains on movable property is followed.  
The following Article 13 (2) taken from the Kuwaiti Austrian DTT is illustrative: 
“Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of the business 
property of a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State 
has in the other Contracting State or of movable property pertaining to a fixed 
base available to a resident of a Contracting State in the other Contracting State 
for the purpose of performing independent personal services, including such gains 
from the alienation of such a permanent establishment (alone or with the whole 
enterprise) or of such fixed base, maybe taxed in the other State.”  
 
The above paragraph allows a wider jurisdiction for the host state to tax gains 
from the alienation of movable property whether such movable property forms a 
part of the business property of a permanent establishment which an enterprise 
from a contracting state has in the other state, or gains from the alienation of 
movable property pertaining to a fixed base available to a resident of a contracting 
state in the other contracting state for the purpose of performing independent 
personal services. The OECD tax treatment of capital gains from movable 
property includes specifically only the first part of the above paragraph, i.e. gains 
from the alienation of movable property forming part of the business property of a 
permanent establishment, and does not expand the host’s jurisdiction to tax gains 
from movable property of a fixed base used for the purpose of providing 
independent personal services.  
Article 13 (3) in 28 of Kuwaiti DTTs631 provides for the standard treatment of 
gains from the alienation of ships and aircraft as applied in both the OECD and 
the UN Model632. 
                                                 
630 Article 13 (1) of the 2010 OECD Model  provides: “Gains derived by a resident of a 
Contracting State from the alienation of immovable property referred to in Article 6 and situated in 
the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other Contracting State.”  
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The 28 DTTs633 constitute the majority of Kuwait’s DTTs, conclude Article 13 
with a paragraph 4 which provides that any gains rising from the alienation of any 
property not mentioned in provision 1, 2 or 3 of the Article shall only be taxable 
in the contracting state of which the alienator is a resident634.  This provision 
replicates the standard last concluding paragraph of the OECD and the UN 
Models i.e. taxing gains derived from the alienation of any property not 
mentioned in earlier paragraphs in Articles 13 shall occur in the home state of the 
alienator. Thus Article 13 (5) of the OECD Model and Article 13 (6) of the UN 
Model provide: 
“Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the 
alienator is a resident”635.  
 
These Kuwaiti DTTs - unlike the OECD and UN Models (in Article 13 (4) and 
Article 13 (4) and (5)) – do not contain a provision in respect of capital gains on 
the alienation of shares. There is no clear reason why these DTTs fail to include a 
particular paragraph that deals with the taxation of gains derived from the 
alienation of company shares, and gains from the alienation of interests from 
partnerships, trusts and estate. However the answer may be found in the OECD’s 
Commentary on Article 13 (5) of the OECD Model. It provides: 
                                                                                                                                     
631 See note 629. 
632 Article 13 (3) OECD and UN Model provide: “Gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft 
operated in international traffic or movable property to the operation of such ships or aircraft shall 
be taxable only in the Contracting State in which the place of effective management of the 
enterprise is situated.”  
633 See note 629. 
634 Article 13 (5) of the OECD Model and Article 13 (6) of the UN Model provide: “Gains from 
the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraph 1, 2 and 3, shall be taxable 
only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident”. 
635 The UN Model’s version of Article 13 has 6 paragraphs, thus paragraph 6 provides that any 
gains from the alienation of property not referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5...” 
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“Paragraph 5 of Article 13 includes shares, bonds, and other securities, although 
the paragraph does not contain special rules for gains from the alienation of shares 
in a company (other than the shares dealt with in paragraph 4) or of securities, 
bonds, debentures and the like. Such gains are therefore taxable only in the State 
of which the alienator is a resident636”. 
 
Thus, the concluding paragraph of Article 13 of the OECD and the UN Model, 
whether it is paragraph 5 or 6, provides comprehensive treatment taxing the gains 
derived from shares, interests and other types of alienated property not mentioned 
previously in the Article. The OECD Commentary also provides: 
“Article 13 leaves it to the domestic law of each Contracting State to decide 
whether capital gains should be taxed and, if they are taxable, how they are taxed. 
The Article can in no way be construed as giving a State the right to tax capital 
gains if such right is not provided for in its domestic law...” 
 
 
Both of the above passages in the OECD Commentary may help to explain why 
these Kuwaiti DTTs do not include the specific paragraphs in the OECD and the 
UN Models which make a particular provision for taxation of gains on the 
alienation of certain property such as shares. This is the reason, therefore, why 
Kuwait is happy to rely on the general provision in Article 13 (4) of these DTTs. 
In addition to having 28 DTTs which deviate from the standard capital gains 
Article in the OECD and the UN Models, Kuwait’s other DTTs also include 
variations in their treatment of certain capital gains under Article 13. In eight of 
Kuwait’s DTTs637 the first and the second paragraph of Article 13 provide for a 
50% reduction when capital gains are taxed in the host state. For example, the 
DTT between Kuwait and Indonesia provides: 
 “1. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of 
immovable property referred to in Article 6 and situated in the other Contracting 
                                                 
636 Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra). 
637 DTTs signed with Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Venezuela, 
and Lebanon.  
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State maybe taxed in the other Contracting State, but the tax charged shall be 
reduced by an amount equal to 50% of such tax. 
 
2.Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of the business 
property of the permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting 
State has in the other Contracting State or of movable property pertaining to a 
fixed base available to a resident of a Contracting State in the other Contracting 
State for the purpose of performing independent personal services, including such 
gains from the alienation of such a permanent establishment (alone or with the 
whole enterprise) or of such fixed base, may be taxed in the other Contracting 
State, but the tax so charged shall be reduced by an amount equal to 50% of such 
tax.”  
 
In Kuwait’s DTTs with Belarus and Ukraine, Article 13 (1) on gains from 
immovable property concludes with a condition which provides that in the case of 
the liquidation of an enterprise the tax so charged shall be reduced by an amount 
equal to 50% of such tax: 
“1. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of 
immovable property... in the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other 
State. However, in the case of liquidation of an enterprise the tax so charged shall 
be reduced by an amount equal to 50% of such tax638.”   
 
Only in Kuwait’s DTTs with Canada and India does Article 13 appear in its most 
comprehensive form639.  Interestingly in these two DTTs Article 13 (4) is in its 
most expansion form in comparison with Kuwait’s other DTTs.  Both DTTs 
provide, as follows, in Article 13 (4) for the taxation of gains arising from the 
alienation of company shares, interest in partnerships trust or estate. In particular 
the DTT between Kuwait and Canada provides: 
 
“4.Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from alienation of: 
a) shares of the capital stock of a company the property of which consists 
wholly or principally of immovable property situated in the other 
Contracting State, and 
                                                 
638 Article 13 (1) of Kuwait’s DTT with Ukraine, signed January 20th, 2003, (in force). 
639 See p. 107 for full wording of Article 13 (2) of the UN Model. 
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b) an interest in a partnership, trust or estate, the property of which consists 
wholly or principally of immovable property situated in the other 
Contracting State640”. 
 
Kuwait’s DTT with France adopts a slightly different version of treatment of 
capital gains derived from the alienation of shares. It provides in Article 13 (3) as 
follows: 
 
“3.gains from the alienation of shares representing a substantial shareholding in 
the capital of a company are taxable in the State of which the company is a 
resident. A substantial shareholding is deemed to exist when the seller holds, 
directly or indirectly, shares which, in their entirety give right to 25% or more of 
the company’s profits.”   
 
 
Finally, the most unusual treatment of the taxation of capital gains is in Kuwait’s 
DTTs with The Netherlands and the UK which not only deviate from the OECD 
and the UN Models, but also contain provisions not mentioned in any of Kuwait’s 
other DTTs. For example, in the UK DTT Article 13 (4) provides:  
“Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraph 
1, 2, and 3 of this article shall be taxable only in the contracting state of which the 
alienator is a resident”.  
 
Article 13 (5) then continues: 
“The provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article shall not affect the right of a 
Contracting State to levy according to its law a tax on capital gains from the 
alienation of any property derived by an individual who is a resident of the other 
Contracting State and has been a resident of the first-mentioned Contracting State 
at any time during the five years immediately preceding the alienation of the 
property.”641 
  
The above paragraph extends the jurisdiction of the host state, where the property 
alienated is situated, whenever a resident of a contracting state who is also the 
alienator has resided in the host state any time during the first five years 
                                                 
 
641 Article 13 (5) of Kuwait’s DTT with the UK, signed in February 23rd, 1999, (still in force). 
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consequent to the alienation. Under these circumstances the host state is allowed 
to tax the gains. The purpose of this Article may well be to recognize the host 
state’s equal entitlement to impose taxation on capital gains from the alienation of 
any property once the alienator has resided in the host state following the 
alienation, when the beneficiary is alienating property with an intention to depart 
the state where the property was alienated, there is reasonable rational in 
providing the host state - where the alienation took place – with the right to tax the 
resulting gains.     
  
In Kuwait’s DTT with The Netherlands, a novel Article 13 (5) allows the host 
state to tax gains from the alienation of shares in its jurisdiction by an alienator 
residing in the other contracting state under defined circumstances, Article 13 (5) 
provides: 
“... A Contracting State may levy tax on gains derived by an individual who is a 
resident of the other Contracting State from the alienation of shares of a company 
and which under the laws of the first mentioned Contracting State, is a resident of 
that State, and from the alienation of part of the rights attached to that said shares, 
if that individual, either alone or with his or her spouse, or one of their relations 
by blood or marriage in the direct line directly or indirectly holds at least 5% of 
the issued capital of a particular class of shares in that company. This provision 
shall apply only if the individual who derives the gains has been a resident of the 
first mentioned State in the course of the last ten years preceding the year in 
which the gains are derived and provided that, at the time he became a resident of 
the other Contracting State, the above mentioned conditions regarding share 
ownership in the said company were satisfied.”   
  
The above paragraph requires the satisfying of a number of conditions before 
allowing the host state to tax gains from the alienation of shares (and other rights 
linked to the shares alienated) yielded by a resident of the other contracting state, 
from the shares of a company resident in the first mentioned State. Indeed, the 
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purpose of this Article may well be as mentioned above642  to recognize the host 
state’s equal entitlement to levy taxation on capital gains from the alienation of 
shares once the alienator has satisfied one or all of the conditions mentioned in the 
Article 13 (5), i.e. residency or holding 5% of the distributing company’s issued 
capital. It is a plausible argument that the host state should have the equal right to 
tax gains under the circumstances mentioned in the Article above since the 
beneficiary has shown considerable signs of residing in the host state for a 
significant amount of time after his/her alienation of the said shares or by 
holding643 a substantial amount of shares in the distributing company either alone 
or with a spouse or a relative (directly or indirectly). 
  
This provision is a complex and restricting one as it requires many conditions to 
be satisfied before allowing the host state to tax gains alienated by a resident of 
the other contracting state even when the gains are derived from the alienation of 
shares of a company residing in the host State.  
From the above it is clear that Kuwait’s DTTs with other states adopt a wide 
variation of treatments when it comes to taxing capital gains derived from the 
alienation of movable and/or immovable property. As has been explained 
earlier644, there is no clear reason why such deviations exist, as the provisions and 
the wording of each DTT depends on the mutual negotiations of the contracting 
states, in each instance.  
 
 
                                                 
642 See p. 201 Article 13 (5) of Kuwait’s DTT with The UK. 
643 Either alone or with his/her spouse or blood relative, directly or indirectly.  
644 See p. 199. 
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6.7.4 Administration Provisions in DTTs  
 
1) The =on:Discrimination Provision 
 
Discrimination in tax can be regarded as the unfavourable treatment of a taxpayer 
in comparison with another taxpayer or category of taxpayers in respect of the 
same taxable item(s) and in the same circumstances645. The non-discrimination 
provision included in both the OECD and the UN Models seeks to provide 
fairness in the tax treatment of: (1) a national of the other state in similar 
circumstances; (2) stateless persons who are residents of either state; (3) a 
permanent establishment located in a state carrying on the same activities as 
domestic enterprises of the state; (4) the tax deductibility of otherwise deductible 
business expense when paid to a non-resident; and (5) foreign owned and 
controlled domestic enterprises646.  
   
When it comes to eliminating discriminatory tax treatment, a state’s right of 
regulation in this area is tempered by bilateral international tax treaties which 
contain Paragraphs that are usually based on Article 24 of the OECD Model. 
Consideration of sovereignty and jurisdiction are of fundamental relevance to the 
application of Article 24. The OECD Model is not the only place where the 
problem of discrimination is dealt with, there are also non-discrimination 
Paragraphs in the UN and the US Models and in commercial trading treaties from 
which the OECD Paragraphs are derived. However the reason why attention has 
                                                 
645 Holmes (note 530 supra) 
646 See p. 220 for Article 24 of the OECD Model 2010. 
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been focused on Article 24 of the OECD Model, is that as previously indicated647, 
the OECD Model is the more influential model treaty. This is especially true with 
respect to the non-discrimination Article, since the UN Model non-discrimination 
Paragraphs of the OECD and the US treaty conform to it for the most part. The 
first point to note in regard to Article 24 of the OECD Model is that it applies to 
taxes of every kind and description, unlike the other provisions which only apply 
to taxes on capital and income648. 
In this following analysis, emphasis will be directed to paragraph 1 of Article 25 
of the OECD Model concerning nationals from the other state in similar 
circumstances.  
 
a) The scope of the non:discrimination obligation in the OECD model 
 
Under the OECD: the non-discrimination obligations under the OECD Model 
convention broadly obligate contracting states to; 
“provide no less favourable taxation (1) of a national of the other state in similar 
circumstances, recognizing that the residents and non-residents are not in the same 
circumstances; (2) of stateless persons who are residents of either state; (3) of a 
permanent establishment located in a state carrying on the same activities as 
domestic enterprises of the state; (4) as to the tax deductibility of otherwise 
deductable business expenses when paid to a non-resident; and (5) of foreign 
owned and controlled domestic enterprises649”.  
 
These obligations apply to taxes of every kind and description (i.e. to all direct 
and indirect taxes) levied by, or on behalf of the state, its political subdivisions or 
                                                 
647 See pp. 177-181. 
648 Jeffery R., (1999), The Impact on State Sovereignty on Global Trade and International 
Taxation, Kluwer, p. 63. 
649 The OECD Negotiation Group on the Multinational on Investment (MAI), (2010), on.
Discrimination in Bilateral Tax Conventions, http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf  
[visited 13/7/2011]. 
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local authorities. Thus the non-discrimination provision under the OECD Model 
provides for national treatment covering all types of taxes to enterprises with a 
significant presence, i.e. through a local subsidiary or PE in a contracting state. 
The provision also provides national treatment regarding the deductibility of 
payments made to foreign persons, thereby indirectly protecting non-resident 
investors650. However, it is important to explain what kinds of non-discrimination 
the OECD Model does not provide for under Article 24. The OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs has concluded651 that under the various Paragraphs of Article 24 
non-discrimination can only arise when all factors are equal and the different 
treatment is solely based on the difference that is prohibited by the relevant 
paragraph. Article 24 does not seek to ensure Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
and is not intended to provide foreign nationals or non-residents with a tax 
treatment that is better than that of nationals or resident enterprises. The Article 
does not cover covert or indirect discrimination, and the non-discrimination 
provisions of the Article are precisely drafted and do not introduce an all 
encompassing non-discrimination rule652. 
 
There is a need to look closely at how the OECD non-discrimination provision is 
applied, and how Kuwait tackles the discrimination issue when it comes to its 
DTTs. 
 
                                                 
650 Non-Discrimination in Bilateral Tax Conventions, OECD, Negotiating Group on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), (1996), (document  issued during the MAI 
negotiations which took place between 1995 and 1998), p.3-5 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/eg2/eg2rd961e.pdf [visited 4/8/2009]. 
651 Id. 
652 Id. 
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b) Application of Article 24 (1) of the OECD 2010 Model 
 
(i) =ationality and Residency 
 
Article 24 (1) of the OECD Model prevents discrimination based on nationality 
but only with respect to companies which are in the same circumstances: 
“1. Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting 
State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or 
more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which 
nationals of that other State in the same circumstances, in particular with respect 
to residence, are or maybe subjected. This provision shall, notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of one or both 
of the Contracting States.” 653  
 
Under the domestic laws of many states, incorporation or registration constitutes 
the criterion or one of the criteria to determine the residence of the companies for 
the purpose of Article 4 of the OECD Model. Under the definition of the term 
‘national’ in Article 3 (1) (g) of that Model, however, registration or incorporation 
will also be the criterion to determine the ‘nationality’ of a company since a 
company will usually derive its status from the laws of the state in which it has 
been incorporated or registered. It is not always clear how the residence of a 
company can be distinguished from its nationality for the purpose of Article 24 
(1). The OECD Working Group654 has clarified, recently, that resident and non-
resident companies are not in the same circumstances for the purpose of paragraph 
1. The group accepted that different treatment of resident and non-resident 
companies is allowed by Article 24 (1), even when residence and nationality are 
                                                 
653 Article 24 (1) of the OECD Model, 2010.  
654 The Working Party is the sub-group of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs which is 
responsible for updating the OECD Model Tax Convention. (2007), Application and 
Interpretation of Article 24 on.Discrimination, p.10. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/30/38516170.pdf [visited 1/9/2010]. 
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linked through the criterion of incorporation or registration. Thus, paragraph 1 
only prohibits a different tax treatment that is based exclusively on the fact that 
the entity derives its status from the domestic law of another state and requires 
that all other relevant factors including the residence of the entity be the same655. 
 
(ii) Interpretation of ‘In the same circumstances’  
  
There is some uncertainty as to the relevant factors for determining whether 
taxpayers are ‘in the same circumstances’ for the purpose of Article 24 (1). 
Paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Article 24 states that the phrase refers to 
taxpayers who are placed from the point of view of the application of the ordinary 
taxation laws and regulation in “substantially similar circumstances”. However 
the term ‘substantially’ requires clarification. The above Working Group656 
indicated that taxpayers with limited tax liability are usually not in the same 
circumstances as taxpayers with unlimited tax liability. The Working Group 
added that ‘in the same circumstances’ might include, for example, the situation 
when a state subjects its nationals or some of them to a more comprehensive tax 
liability than non-nationals, as long as the treatment is not itself a violation of 
Article 24 (1).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
655 Jeffery (note 648 supra). 
656 Negotiation Group (note 649 supra).  
 222 
 
c) The Principle of =ational Treatment and Most Favoured =ation   
 
A further question that arises is whether Article 24 (1) allows a national of one 
contracting state to obtain benefits granted by the other contracting state to a 
national of a third state. Here, the Working Group agreed that the wording of 
paragraph 1 was restricted to national treatment so that it was impossible to argue 
that the tax treatment, in one contracting state, of a national in the other 
contracting state should not be other or more burdensome than the taxation of 
nationals of third states in the same circumstances to which benefits may have 
been granted by reason of their nationality. The group has indicated that in its 
opinion, a national of state (A) cannot according to Article 24 (1) of a treaty based 
on the OECD Model between states (A) and (B) require that state (B) treat him for 
tax purposes, in the same way as another resident of state (A) who is a national of 
state (C).657 
 
2) Kuwait’s Application of Article 24 in its DTTs 
 
Kuwait’s “discrimination” against foreign enterprises carrying on business in 
Kuwait’s jurisdiction is evident in both the scope of business activities permitted 
to foreign investors in Kuwait and in the taxation of their profits. The 
“discrimination” exercised in terms of the scope of business activity is evident in 
the Kuwaiti Company Law No. 15/1960, which restricts foreign participation in 
Kuwaiti companies to 49% shareholding and requires a national to hold at least 
                                                 
657 OECD, (2007), Application and Interpretation of Article 24 of the OECD’s on.
Discrimination, pp.1-4, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/30/38516170.pdf [visited 22/5/2010].  
 223 
 
51% of the company’s shares658, this is discussed in length in chapter 4659. Also 
Article 23 of  Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980 states that non-Kuwaitis are 
not permitted to carry on trade in Kuwait unless they have a Kuwaiti partner who 
is required to own 51% of the business660. Moreover, Article 24 of the same law 
states that foreign enterprises are not allowed to either establish a branch or 
conduct a commercial transaction in Kuwait unless through an Kuwaiti agent661. 
Kuwait also ‘discriminates’ against foreign enterprises in terms of the taxation of 
their profits662. Both the Tax Decree No. 3/1955, and the 2008 tax amendments 
apply to national and foreign companies, however, in practice, taxation is only 
imposed on the profits of foreign enterprises. Even in the case where a foreign 
entity holds shares in a national company, taxes will only fall on the profits 
attributable to the foreign enterprise663. 
 
This said, Kuwait adopts Article 24 of the OECD Model664 in all of its DTTs665, 
thus, less favourable treatment of foreign enterprises does not constitute a 
violation of Article 24 of the OECD Model for the reasons mentioned above666; 
that according to the OECD Working Group667 resident and non-resident 
                                                 
658 Article 47 of the Kuwait Company Law No. 15/1960. 
659 See pp. 115 – 123. 
660 See pp. 116-117. 
661Al Hayan, A. (2003), The Kuwaiti Foreign Investment Law: Comments and Suggestions, Arab 
Quarterly, pp.327-328.  
662 See pp. 112-114.  
663 See p. 110-112. 
664 “1.Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any 
taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the 
taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same 
circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or maybe subjected. This provision shall, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of one or 
both of the Contracting States.” 
665 Except those with Germany, France and Canada. 
666 See note 664. 
667 See note 654. 
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companies are not in the same circumstances for the purpose of Article 24 (1), and 
that the different treatment of resident and non-resident companies is allowed by 
Article 24 (1). 
 
 
6.7.5 Exchange of information under the OECD and the U= Models 
 
The wording of Article 26 concerning the exchange of information in both the 
OECD and the UN is very similar. Article 26 of the OECD Model provides: 
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is foreseeable relevant for carrying out the provisions of this 
Convention or to the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws 
concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf of the 
Contracting States, or of their political subdivision or local authorities, insofar as 
the taxation there under is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of 
information is not restricted by Article 1 and 2. 
 
2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State shall be 
treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic 
laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including 
courts and administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment and collection 
of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the administration of appeals in 
relation to the tax referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such 
persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may 
disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions. 
 
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 be construed so as to impose 
on a Contracting State the obligation: 
a. to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative 
practice of that or of the other Contracting State; 
b. to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal 
course of the administration of that or  of the other Contracting State; 
c. to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial,  
commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information, the disclosure 
of which would be contrary to public policy. 
 
4. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, 
the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain 
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the requested information, even though that other State may not need such 
information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the proceeding 
sentence is subject to the limitation of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such 
limitation be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply 
information solely because it has no domestic interest in such information.” 
 
The above Article underlines the importance and the limitation of exchanging 
information between the two contracting states. The UN Model version of Article 
26 does not differ significantly from the OECD Model: however there is no 
equivalent to Article 26 (4) of the OECD Model in Article 26 of the UN Model, 
and the UN Model runs together paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 26 in the OECD 
Model, combining them in Article 26 (1) of the UN Model. Further, Article 26 of 
the UN Model allows the contracting states more freedom in terms of developing 
the methods by which the exchange of information is undertaken, so the ending of 
Article 26 (1) of the UN Model provides: 
“... the competent authorities shall, through consultation, develop appropriate 
conditions, methods and techniques concerning the matter in respect of which 
such exchange of information shall be made, including, where appropriate, 
exchanges of information regarding tax avoidance.” 
 
 
 
(i) Kuwait’s DTTs policy on the Exchange of Information  
 
 
All of Kuwait’s DTTs include an exchange of information clause. The paragraphs 
adopted in Kuwait’s DTTs are closer to the UN Model as they do not include an 
equivalent to paragraph 4 of the OECD Model.  
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6.7.6 Article 27 of the OECD Model: Assistance in the Collection of Taxes 
 
In the absence of inter-governmental agreements to the contrary, generally, tax 
judgements of the courts in one country cannot be enforced in another country. 
Therefore, judgements in favour of a tax administration, which permit recovery of 
assets from a non-resident taxpayer to meet its tax liability, are ineffective in 
practice in the absence of a specific article in a DTT that provides for assistance in 
the recovery of taxes.  Where such provision is made, assistance in the collection 
and recovery of tax can take many forms, including assistance in serving 
documents (such as tax returns and assessment notices), exchanging information 
relevant to collection, preservation of assets, issuing demands for payment, 
prosecution, and seizure of assets668. The new Article 27 of the OECD Model is 
concerned with assistance in the collection of tax. However, this Article does not 
exist in any of Kuwait’s current DTTs. According to the OECD Commentary this 
is intended to achieve the following: 
“This article provides the rules under which Contracting States may agree to 
provide each other assistance in the collection of taxes. In some States national 
law or policy may prevent this form of assistance or set limitations to it. Also, in 
some cases, administrative considerations may not justify providing assistance in 
the collection of taxes to another State or may similarly limit it. During the 
negotiations, each Contracting State will therefore need to decide whether and to 
what extent assistance should be given to the other State669.” 
 
Although Kuwait’s DTTs do not implement this Article, some of Kuwait’s 
DTTs670 implement an Article 27 that deals with different subject matter and is 
                                                 
668  Holmes (note 530 supra). 
669 Kees Van Raad (note 590 supra). 
670 Signed with Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Belarus, Russia, Canada, 
Venezuela, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Indonesia, 
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entitled “Miscellaneous”671. This Article provides that the authorities of both 
contracting states shall arrange the manner in which the limitation and exemptions 
of the Articles in the DTT are implemented. It also protects the rights of residents 
of a contracting state to benefit from incentives and allowances provided for in the 
domestic laws of the other contracting state. For example, the DTT between 
Kuwait and Austria provides: 
“1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall mutually agree on 
arrangements concerning the manner in which the limitations and exemptions 
contained in the foregoing Articles are to be implemented. 
 
2. This Agreement shall not affect the right of the residents of a Contracting State 
to benefit from tax and investment incentives, exemptions and allowances 
provided for by the other Contracting state in accordance with its domestic laws, 
regulations and administrative practices672.”  
 
Such an Article is very important in terms of the two party states agreeing on the 
manner of implementation, but it also provides important protection for the 
beneficiary of one contracting state who benefits from tax incentives provided in 
the domestic law of the other contracting state.  
 
6.7.7 Methods for Eliminating Double Taxation 
 
The manner by which double taxation may be eliminated can vary as has been 
mentioned earlier in this chapter.673 There are three methods: exemption, 
                                                                                                                                     
Singapore, China, Malaysia, Pakistan, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and 
Egypt. 
671 Other Kuwaiti DTTs signed with the UK, Switzerland, Greece, Ukraine, Croatia, Turkey, 
Romania, Cyprus, Hungry, Malta and Korea do not have the “Miscellaneous” clause in them. 
672 Article 27 of the DTT between Kuwait and Austria, signed June 13th 2002, (in force). 
673 See pp. 172-175.  
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deduction and the credit system. As will be seen, Kuwait’s DTTs are not 
consistent in the application of these methods.  
 
a) Eliminating double Taxation under the OECD and the UN Model 
 
Article 23 of the OECD and UN Models state the methods by which double 
taxation may be eliminated. Thus, Article 23 of the OECD Model provides for 
two methods : 
“Article 23 A. Exemption Method 
 
1.Where a resident of a Contracting State derives income or owns capital which, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State, the first mentioned State shall, subject to the provisions of 
paragraphs 2 and 3, exempt such income or capital from tax. 
 
2.Where a resident of a Contracting State derives items of income which, in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State, the first mentioned State shall allow as a deduction from the tax 
on the income of that resident an amount equal to the tax paid in that other State. 
Such deduction shall not, however, exceed that part of the tax, as computed before 
the deduction is given, which is attributable to such items of income derived from 
that other State. 
 
3.Where in accordance with any provision of the Convention income derived or 
capital owned by a resident of a Contracting State is exempt from tax in that State, 
such State may nevertheless, in calculating the amount of tax on the remaining 
income of capital of such resident, take into account the exempted income or 
capital. 
 
4.The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to income derived or capital 
owned by a resident of a Contracting State where the other Contracting State 
applies the provisions of this Convention to exempt such income or capital from 
tax or applies the provisions for paragraph 2 of Article 10 or 11 to such income. 
  
   
Article 23 b. Credit Method 
1. Where a resident of a Contracting State derives income or owns capital which, 
in accordance with the provision of this Convention, may be taxed in the other 
Contracting State, the first-mentioned State shall allow: 
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a. as a deduction from the tax on the income of that resident, an amount equal to 
the income tax paid in that other State; 
b. as a deduction from the tax on the capital of that resident, an amount equal to 
the capital tax paid in the other State. 
Such deduction in either case shall not, however, exceed that part of the income 
tax or capital tax, as computed before the deduction is given, which is attributable, 
as the case may be, to the income or the capital which may be taxed in that other 
State. 
 
2.Where in accordance with any provision of the Convention income derived or 
capital owned by a resident of a Contracting State is exempt from tax in that State, 
such State may nevertheless, in calculating the amount of tax on the remaining 
income or capital of such resident, take into account the exempted income or 
capital”.  
 
The only difference between Article 23 in the OECD and the UN Models is that 
Article 23 in the UN Model does not include an equivalent to paragraph 4 of the 
OECD Model. As mentioned above,674 Kuwait’s DTTs adopt various ways to 
eliminate double taxation: 
 
b) The Methods for Eliminating Double Taxation in Kuwait’s DTTs 
 
In three of Kuwait’s DTTs signed with Germany, the UK and France675, the latter 
contracting states apply two methods credit and exemption, whilst Kuwait applies 
the deduction method. Thus, in the DTT between Kuwait and Germany it is 
provided: 
“1. In the case of Germany: 
 
a)unless the provisions of subparagraph (b) apply, there shall be excluded from 
the basis upon which German tax is imposed, any income arising in the State of 
Kuwait and any item of capital situated in the State of Kuwait...  
 
...the foregoing provisions shall apply only to such dividends as are paid to a company 
(not including partnerships) being a resident of Germany by a company being a resident 
                                                 
674 See p. 227. 
675 Kuwait’s DTT with UK and France are more or less fashioned very similarly to Kuwait’s DTT 
with Germany in their approach to their elimination of double taxation. 
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of the State of Kuwait at least 10% of the capital of which is owed directly by the German 
company. 
 
For the purposes of taxes on capital there shall also be excluded from the basis upon 
which German tax is imposed any shareholding, the dividends of which are excluded or if 
paid, would be excluded according to the immediately foregoing sentence, from the basis 
upon which German tax is imposed.  
 
b)subject to the provisions of German tax law regarding credit for foreign tax, there shall 
be allowed as a credit against German income and corporation tax payable in respect of 
the following items of income arising in the State of Kuwait the tax paid under the laws 
of the State of Kuwait and in accordance with this agreement on: 
 
(1) Dividends not dealt with in sub-paragraph (a); 
(2) Royalties to which Article 12 applies; 
(3) Remuneration to which Article 16 applies; 
(4) Income to which Article 17 applies; 
(5) Income from immovable property to which Article 6 applies. 
 
 
2.In the case of Kuwait:  
 
Where a resident of Kuwait derives income or owns capital which in accordance 
with this agreement may be taxed in both Germany and Kuwait, Kuwait shall 
allow as a deduction from the tax on the income or on the capital of that resident 
an amount equal to the tax paid on the income or on the capital in Germany676.”   
 
 
In 3 of Kuwait’s DTTs677  both contracting States implement the credit system: 
“(a) where a resident of Mauritius derives profits or income from sources within 
Kuwait... Mauritius shall allow the Kuwaiti tax payable as a credit against any 
Mauritius tax computed by reference to the same profits or income by reference to 
which the Kuwaiti tax payable is computed. 
 
(b) If a resident of Kuwait derives profit or income from sources within 
Mauritius...Kuwait shall allow the Mauritius tax payable as a credit against any 
Kuwaiti tax computed by reference to the same profit or income by which the 
Mauritius tax payable is computed.678” 
 
                                                 
676 Article 24 of the DTT between Kuwait and Germany signed December 4th 1987, (in force). 
677 Signed with Lebanon, Mauritius, and Morocco.  
678 Article 24 (a) and (b) of the DTT between Kuwait and Mauritius, signed in March 24th 1997. 
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Within other Kuwaiti DTTs there are contracting States which adopt two methods 
for eliminating double taxation in the DTT, treating particular income and profits 
differently when eliminating double taxation; 
In 8 of Kuwait’s DTTs679 the other contracting State adopts two different methods 
i.e. exemption and deduction to eliminate double taxation whilst Kuwait 
implements the deduction method only. In Kuwait’s DTT with The 
Netherlands680, the latter exempts income from immovable property, business 
profits, dividends, interest, royalties and capital gains, while it adopts the 
deduction method for other dividends, interest, royalties and capital gains. Article 
28 (1) of the DTT between Kuwait and The Netherlands provides 
b) when a resident of the Netherlands derives income which according to Article 
6, Article 7, paragraph 5 of Article 10, paragraph 3 of Article 11, paragraph 4 of 
Article 12, paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 13, Article 14, paragraph 1 of Article 15, 
paragraph  1 (subparagraph) and 2 (subparagraph) of Article 19, and paragraph 2 
of Article 22 of this agreement may be taxed in Kuwait... The Netherlands shall 
exempt such items of income... 
 
c) Further, the Netherlands shall allow a deduction from the Netherlands tax as 
computed for the item of income which according to paragraph 2 of Article 10, 
paragraph 2 of Article 12, paragraph 5 of Article 13, Article 16, Article 17, 
paragraph 2 and 3 of Article 18 of this agreement...the amount of the deduction 
shall be equal to the tax paid in Kuwait on these items of income... 
 
2)... Kuwait shall allow as a deduction from the tax on the income of that resident, 
an amount equal to the tax on income paid in the Netherlands. Such deduction 
shall not, however, exceed the part of the tax on income as computed before the 
deduction is given.681”      
 
                                                 
679 Signed with Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungry, Malaysia, Poland and the 
Netherlands. 
680Other DTTs Kuwait has signed with Switzerland, Austria, Hungry, Malaysia, and Poland, 
implement more or less the same strategy as the Netherlands in differentiating between different 
income/profit when it comes to eliminating double taxation. However, the type of income and 
profit which the treaties mentioned here might exempt or deduct differs from one DTT to the 
other. 
681 Article 23 paragraph 1 (b) and (c) and paragraph 2 of the DTT between Kuwait and the 
Netherlands signed May 29th 2001, (in force). 
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In 22 of Kuwait’s DTTs682 both contracting states apply the deduction method. 
For example, in the DTT between Kuwait and Romania it is provided: 
“2. It is agreed that double taxation shall be avoided in accordance with the 
following sub-paragraphs: 
 
a) In the case of Romania:  
 
taxes paid by Romanian residents in respect of income or capital taxable in 
Kuwait, in accordance with the provisions of this agreement , shall be deducted 
from the Romanian taxes due according to the Romanian fiscal laws. 
 
Such deduction shall not, however, exceed that part of the income tax or capital 
tax, as computed before the deduction is given, which is attributable to the 
income on the capital which may be taxed in Kuwait 
 
b) Where a resident of Kuwait : 
 
… Kuwait shall allow as a deduction from the tax on income of that resident, an 
amount equal to the income tax paid in Romania. 
 
Such deductions shall not, however, exceed that part of the income tax computed 
before the deduction is given, which is attributable to the income which may be 
taxed in Romania683.” 
 
 
The second most popular method of eliminating double taxation adopted in 
Kuwait’s DTTs is when Kuwait adopts a deduction method whilst the other 
contracting State implements DTT between the credit method. In 7 of Kuwait’s 
DTTs684 this practice has been followed for example in the DTT between Kuwait 
and Pakistan: 
“a) in the case of Pakistan: 
 
                                                 
682 Signed with Yugoslavia, Czech, Italy, Ukraine, Greece, Croatia, Turkey, Romania, Cyprus, 
Malta, Belarus, Canada, Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Jordan, Syria, South Africa, Tunisia, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, and Zimbabwe.   
683 See Article 24 (1) and (2) of the DTT between Kuwait and Romania, signed in July 26th 1992, 
(in force). 
684 Signed with Russia, Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, China, and Korea. 
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Subject to the provisions of the law of Pakistan... the amount of Kuwaiti tax and 
in accordance with the provisions of this agreement... in respect of income from 
sources within Kuwait which has been subjected to tax both in Pakistan and 
Kuwait, shall be allowed as a credit against the Pakistan tax payable in respect of 
such income but in an amount not exceeding that proportion of Pakistan Tax 
which such income bears to the entire income chargeable to Pakistan tax.  
 
b) in the case of Kuwait: 
 
... Kuwait shall deduct from the taxes so calculated the tax paid in Pakistan but in 
an amount not exceeding that proportion of the aforesaid Kuwaiti tax which such 
item of income bear to the entire income685.”  
 
 
 
 
6.7.8 Dispute Settlement: Mutual Agreement Procedure 
 
Finally, Kuwait adopts in all of its DTTs Article 25 of the OECD and the UN 
Models; this article provides the procedure of settling any arising disputes, 
difficulties or doubts.  
 
There is no difference between Article 25 in the OCED and the UN Models. 
Article 25 of the OECD Model 2010 provides: 
 
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting 
States results or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the 
provisions of this convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies 
provided by the domestic laws of those States, present his case to the 
competent authority of the Contracting State of which he is a resident or, if 
his case comes under paragraph 1 of Article 24, to that of the Contracting 
State of which he is a national. The case must be presented within three 
years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in 
accordance with the provisions of the convention. 
2. The competent authority shall endeavour, if the objection appears to it to 
be justified and of it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, to 
resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the 
                                                 
685 Article 22 (a) and (b) of the DTT between Kuwait and Pakistan, signed June 30th 1998, (in 
force). 
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Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in 
accordance with the convention. Any agreement reached shall be 
implemented notwithstanding anytime limits in the domestic law of the 
Contracting State.  
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting State shall endeavour to 
resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the 
interpretation of application of the convention. They may also consult 
together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in 
the Convention. 
4. The competent authorities of the Contracting States may communicate 
with each other directly, including through a joint commission for the 
purpose of reaching an agreement.  
 
 
 
   
6.8 Conclusion  
 
Kuwait being a country that aims to attract FDI to its jurisdiction has entered into 
DTTs which, as has been seen, are in some cases beneficial to its fiscal interest 
and in some cases are not. The various DTTs which Kuwait has entered into with 
other states show on many occasions deviation from the standard OECD and the 
UN Model Convention. However, in the present era of global economic 
integration and interdependence of countries, states cannot shape their attitudes 
towards international investment without carefully considering external fiscal 
relations with other states. In some instances, a constraint on a country’s freedom 
of fiscal action may be market led, for example a developing country may offer 
tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment not because it necessarily wishes 
to do so (as it is likely to lose tax revenue) but in order to compete with other 
countries which also offer incentives686.  
                                                 
686 Salter, D. (2010) Tax Constraints on Developing Countries and the Global Economic 
Recession, cited in Faundez, J., and Tan, C., (2010) International Economic Law, Globalization 
and Developing Countries, Edward Elgar, pp.132-142.  
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In some cases Kuwait might be sacrificing tax revenues when allowing incomes 
arising in its jurisdiction to be taxed in the home state in return for the job 
opportunities or the technical experience and know-how which an enterprise 
brings to Kuwait. There is no single or accepted template for a tax system, every 
state endeavours to design a tax system which is a reflection of its needs and 
requirements set against its projected need for resources687. As to why Kuwait 
enters into DTTs and what does it benefit or lose from doing so? The simple 
answer may be to attract more FDI, an assumption supported by the argument 
provided earlier in this chapter688, but since Kuwait is looking to attract FDI this 
means it is potentially serving as a host state, thus entering into DTTs can also be 
restricting to a host state’s authority to tax corporate income from foreign 
investors689 but to potential investors a state entering into DTTs is signalling its 
commitment to stable, correct and often favourable treatment towards foreign 
investors690. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
687 Id. 
688 See pp. 177-181.  
689 See pp. 179- 181. 
690 See pp. 179 -182. 
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Chapter 7: An Empirical Survey of Aspects of Kuwait’s Tax 
System 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the product of various interviews and questionnaires carried out 
with tax experts working in Kuwaiti tax audit firms, financial directors of foreign 
enterprises doing business in Kuwait, and tax inspectors (employees) in Kuwait’s 
Department of Income Tax. All such persons work closely with Kuwait’s tax law 
and have witnessed the transition from the old Tax Decree 3/1955 to the new Tax 
Law Amendments 2/2008 and have a clear idea of the advantages and 
disadvantages of both tax provisions and they can assess the effects which Tax 
Law Amendments 2/2008 have on foreign enterprises working in Kuwait.  
 
7.2 Field Work 
 
Between February and May 2009 the following empirical data was collected. This 
empirical research includes quantitative and qualitative methodology, through 
personal interviews with the financial controllers of foreign taxable entities 
operating in Kuwait. Interviews were also conducted with tax auditors; these 
interviews are useful in understanding how Kuwait’s tax policy can be improved 
in order to attract more FDI. Their opinions also indicate, indirectly, whether or 
not the Tax Department is effective in collecting tax revenue. Questionnaires were 
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also distributed to the employees of the Tax Department in the Ministry of 
Finance.  
In practice, arguably, no research method is entirely qualitative or quantitative691; 
for example, a survey may collect qualitative data using open ended questions as 
well as closed questions. The selection of an appropriate research method is 
critical to the success of any research project, and must be driven by the research 
question and the state of knowledge in the area being studied. In general, a 
combination of research methods may be the most effective in achieving a 
particular research objective. Mixing qualitative and quantitative research 
methods is called triangulation of method. While most researchers develop 
expertise in one style, the two types of methods have different complementary 
strengths and when used together can lead to a more comprehensive 
understanding of a phenomenon692.  
 
The samples in this survey were selected carefully; all 11 auditing firms operating 
in Kuwait are included, this insignificant number of auditing firms in Kuwait is 
not surprising since the size of the Kuwaiti economy is quite small and taxation is 
only implemented on foreign enterprises. In addition to local Kuwaiti auditing 
firms, some of the auditing firms operating in Kuwait - included in this sample - 
are branches for international auditing firms; these are Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Rödl & Partners. The 
financial controllers of foreign enterprises interviewed were also carefully 
                                                 
691 Yin, R.K. (1994), Case Study, Design and Methods, 2nd edition Newbury Park, Sage 
Publications, p.84. 
692
 Moody, D. (2002), Empirical Research Methods, Monarch University, p.2, 
http://www.idi.ntnu.no  
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selected to represent various businesses from small caterers such as Caesar 
(Indian Cuisine) restaurant, telecommunication providers such as okia and 
Siemens to Global Oil field service providers such as Schlumberger. Finally the 
employees of the Kuwaiti Tax Department - for this sample, copies of the 
questionnaire were given to the head of each of the three divisions in the Tax 
Department: The Inspection and Tax Claim Division, The Tax Liability and 
Planning Division, and The International Tax Treaty Division, more on the work 
description of each division below693, the questionnaires were distributed to the 
employees of each division according to the head’s discretion.  
 
7.2.1 Research Samples  
 
A research sample is a portion or subset of a larger group (called a population). 
The criteria for inclusion in a survey are that the characteristic respondents have to 
be eligible for participation in a survey and the exclusion criteria consist of 
characteristics that rule out certain people. The inclusion and exclusion criteria are 
applied to the target population. Once all those who fail to meet the inclusion 
criteria are excluded, a study population consisting of people who are eligible to 
participate remains694. 
For the purpose of this thesis, interviews and questionnaires were distributed to 
three main research groups:  
                                                 
693 See p. 239. 
694 Fink, A. 2003, The Survey Hand Book, 2nd edition, SAGE Publications, p.35   
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1. The Auditing Firms - they manage tax assessments for foreign enterprises liable 
to tax in Kuwait, and also file and follow up the tax objections and appeals at the 
Tax Department.  
2. The Taxpayers - these included foreign enterprises operating in Kuwait either 
through a Kuwaiti agent or by holding 49% of a national enterprise, while a 
Kuwaiti national holds 51%.  
3. The Tax Department: this is divided into three divisions: 
1. The Inspection and Tax Claims Division (Tax inspectors) – it conducts 
inspection procedures; issues tax assessments and also constitutes the 
panels deciding the outcome of tax objections and appeals. 
2. The Tax Liability and Planning Division - it informs liable entities of their 
tax liability and also conducts various researches on taxation.  
3. The International Tax Treaty Division - it studies future DTTs and mutual 
tax agreements which Kuwait plans on entering into and suggests 
amendments. It looks into disputes resulting from DTTs and international 
trade agreements before transferring them to the courts. Lastly, it conducts 
research on international tax treaties and international tax issues.  
 
 
1. Sample size (of main research groups): 
 
- 11 Auditing Firms;  
- 30 Taxable Foreign Enterprises; 
- 22 Employees in the Kuwaiti Tax Department  
  
2. Objectives: 
- Assessment of the 2/2008 amendments against the Tax Decree 3/1955. 
- Assessment of the Kuwaiti Tax Department performance in the Ministry of 
Finance 
- Understanding what foreign companies want in terms of tax reform. 
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- Possible proposals to improve the tax system, whether in tax policy or in the 
Tax Department. 
- Possible recommendations on how Kuwait can attract more FDI. 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Constructing Questions: Open vs. Closed questions 
 
The issue of questions and how to ask them comes down to how the responses are 
to be analyzed. There are two kinds of questions; those where the answer is left 
‘open’ and those where the answer is ‘closed’. An open question might be: which 
of the following newspapers do you read most often? A closed equivalent might 
be: which of the following daily news papers do you read most often? Followed 
by a list of tick boxes and probably an ‘other’ category. The closed question with 
its simple tick response is a more efficient way of posing the question and less 
trouble to answer. It also prompts people, reminding them of the elements they 
might overlook. With specific ‘factual’ questions about behaviour (what people 
do) there is not much of a problem: the closed question works well. However, 
when you are dealing with opinions, the choice is not so clear-cut, for example if 
you want to survey attitudes to the war in Iraq an open question would be: what 
were your views at the time on the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003? That is a 
complicated question which requires an extended answer695. In this survey closed 
questions were used more frequently for the reasons mentioned above i.e. they are 
efficient, easy to answer and can prompt the persons surveyed, reminding them of 
answers and elements they may have overlooked, although open question were 
also used to allow respondents give a free opinion, questions such as: Can you say 
                                                 
695 Gillham, B. (2008), Small Scale Social Survey Methods, Continuum, p.8. 
  
that Kuwait is an attractive environ
are used towards the end of the survey.
 
7.3 Assessment of Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 as against the Tax Decree 
3/1955 
 
The first question posed to research samples in this respect was:
♦ How would you rate the
3/1955? Would you say it is:
 
Better than the old tax decree (   )
Worse than the old tax decree (   )
The same (   )  
Other, please specify (   )
 
  
Figure 7.1 
 
 
All eleven Tax Auditors 
better than Tax Decree 3/1955. T
 
1. The old Tax Decree was outdated, the new one is better; it addresses many 
issues that are current, especially that the old tax dec
negative reasons (to benefit foreign oil companies concessions).
2. The reduction in the tax rate has had a very positive effect on foreign 
investment. 
                                        
696 See pp. 292-293. 
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3. The new tax law is a lot clearer; it clarifies many issues that were 
ambiguous. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 
 
Although there was a general consensus from the Tax Auditors and the employees 
of the Tax Department that the new amendments are better, not all Taxpayers 
agreed. Almost all taxpaying foreign enterprises explained that it was mainly the 
decrease in the tax rate that has made them in favour of the new amendments. 
Smaller foreign enterprises which used to pay 5% or 10% corporate income tax 
under the Tax Decree 3/1955 had a d
amendments are worse, causing their tax liability to rise dramatically by 5% to 
10% more than they used to pay. They added the following:
- These amendments were made to save the big fish in the market, we are now 
paying more than we used to although we are smaller enterprises.
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- The new law discriminates against small businesses; we used to pay a lot less 
than 15%. 
- The progressive tax rate is fairer than a flat rate tax. 
 
The employees of the Tax Department had the same consensus using the 
reduction in tax rates as a reason why the amendments are better than Tax Decree 
3/1955. A few employees had a different opinion: 
- The Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 are a step forward towards coherent tax 
legislation modern enough to address modern economic and financial 
challenges. However the new amendments have not achieved that yet. 
- The Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 should have included national companies 
as well as foreign companies, and they should have covered all taxing 
matters. However in some respects they are better than the Tax Decree 
3/1955. 
 
After a general agreement that Tax Amendments 2/2008 are better than the Tax 
Decree 3/1955, a series of tax law assessment questions followed: 
 
♦ Would you say that the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 eliminated the 
shortcomings of the Tax Decree 3/1955? 
 
   
Figure 7.4 
 
The Tax Auditors who answered ‘Yes’ to this question based their answer on the 
sole factor that the tax rate has been reduced to a single flat rate. Some of the 
8
3
Tax Auditors
Yes No
  
auditors mentioned the disadvantages which the new law has not eliminated: One 
of the main advantages was: 
“foreign enterprises suffer from the broad authority of the tax department. If we 
want to object to a tax assessment the person dealing with 
same tax inspector who made the assessment, and when we appeal his decision, 
the appeal is carried out by his superior”.
 
This question also raised interesting results in terms of the answers of taxpayers 
and the employees of the Tax D
    
Figure 7.5 
 
  
Figure 7.6 
 
Most Taxpayers found that the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 did not in fact 
eliminate any shortcomings of Tax Decree 3/1955. Some of the reasons 
mentioned were: 
 
- Apart from the tax rate being reduced, no shortcomings have been 
eliminated. 
- Although they have reduced the general tax rate, they have also reduced 
allowable head office expenses and allowable agent fees.
- The law is still a primitive one and one of
existence of DTTs with many important countries.
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Taxpayers who took more than just the lower tax rate into consideration agreed 
that the new law does not in fact eliminate previous shortcomings. The response 
of the employees of the Tax Department showed some employees agreed that 
shortcomings have been eliminated, and some did not. The former based their 
decision wholly on the lower tax rate, while some of those who disagreed stated:
- The new law has not improved anything 
limiting forwarding losses to three years;
- The new law still contains a lot of inefficiencies, ambiguity and injustice.
  
 
♦ Have the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008, in your opinion, clarified the most 
debated issues in the 
the definition of agent?
 
Figure 7.7 
 
 
This question was important due to the somewhat ambiguous definition
taxpayer and agent in both
2/2008. This has been discussed in length in chapter 4
interesting results in terms of the attitudes of the survey samples. Although it is 
very similar to the prior question in regar
Law Amendments 2/2008, it offers more detail in terms of its focus on the 
                                        
697 See pp. 104 – 137. 
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meaning of taxpayer and agent. Although most Tax
amendments did in fact clarify the debated issues of taxpayer and a
based their opinion wholly on the fact that the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 
unlike Tax Decree 3/1955 
an agent for the purpose of the 2008 Amendments. 
On the whole, taxpayers believed th
most debated issues in terms of defining taxpayers and agents, although the 
difference between foreign enterprises which answered ‘No’ and those which 
answered ‘Not applicable’ to this question is marginal. The r
taxpayers believed that this question did not apply to them may be attributed to 
one of the following reasons; first, many foreign enterprises were still unfamiliar 
with some details of the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008, such as definitions of 
terms. The Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 have not been widely distributed; also 
there exists poor correspondence between taxpayers and the Tax Department. 
Second, a good number of the foreign enterprises interviewed are not operating in 
Kuwait through an agent 
and thus have no practical knowledge of what constitutes an agent.
 
Figure 7. 8 
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Figure 7. 9 
 
 
In the Tax Department, the difference 
‘Yes’ and those who answered ‘No’ is very marginal, also three employees said 
they did not know the answer to this question, and one employee answered ‘Yes’ 
and added that Article 3 of Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 deals wi
It is in fact Article 2 of the 2008 amendments that deals with definitions.
 
♦ In your opinion, is the 15% rate of tax imposed by Tax Law Amendments 
2/2008? 
 
Too high (   ) 
Too low (   ) 
Reasonable (   ) 
Other, please specify (   )
 
Figure 7.10 
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Figure 7. 11 
 
 
There is a general consensus amongst Tax Auditors that the new tax rate is 
reasonable. Attitudes of the employees of the Tax Department were similar. Some 
respondents from the Tax Department who answered with ‘Other’ were supp
of a progressive tax, and made the following comments:
- A progressive tax is fairer and allows the state to collect more tax revenue 
from bigger companies, I think it should have been a progressive tax 
between 25% - 35%
- To have a progressive tax allo
international systems it should have been progressive 10% 
 
 
Figure 7. 12 
 
 
Figure 7.12 shows a significant number of foreign enterprises believe that the new 
flat tax rate is too high. Small companies 
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decrease in the tax rate, other allowable expenses were also reduced which
their tax costs698.  
This question is effective in showing how the different survey samples had 
different views on an appropriate tax rate, or more importantly in the case of this 
thesis on its impact on foreign investment. It is certainly important
underestimate start up companies and small and medium sized companies since 
these are the companies that are more likely to create new job opportunities and 
bring the latest technology and the knowhow to the State. The following question 
which was an extension to the prior question showed even more interesting 
results: 
 
♦ Would you say that a single flat tax rate can be discouraging for a start up 
businesses (small size businesses) and that a reasonable progressive tax is better, 
more attractive for FDI? and why? 
 
 
Figure 7. 13 
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Figure 7. 14 
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Figure 7. 15 
 
 
Although the Tax Auditors agreed in response to previous questions that the tax 
rate was reasonable, they confirmed in their response to this question that a 
progressive tax may 
reservation. Their answers included the following:
- Although a progressive tax can offer more fairness, we must acknowledge 
the fact that small businesses who used to pay 5% 
more than 1% - 
saving. 
- Theoretically yes, a gradual tax is fairer, however in practical terms foreign 
businesses factor taxes into their pricing, thus if they want to end up with an 
after tax profit of K.D
105, they would price it at K.D 115.
 
On the other hand, most employees of the Tax Department defended the reduced 
flat tax rate and claimed that it is lower than the rate applied in many developed 
and industrial countries. 
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This argument defeats the objective of the question as comparing Kuwait’s tax 
rate with other developed countries is not the point, especially because other 
countries with higher tax rates than that of Kuwait might be offering other 
facilities for FDI which Kuwait does not. However it was the significant number 
of respondents who answered ‘I don’t know’ that was unexpected. Such 
employees may be expected to have an opinion on this subject, not least because 
of their contact with smaller companies which have suffered from a tax rise. 
Finally in the case of the taxpayers, a number of foreign enterprises said “Yes, it 
is discouraging for smaller businesses” but a similar number stated ‘No, it’s not 
discouraging’. Those enterprises which did not say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ indicated: 
- Even though the rate can be a bit damaging, the state puts the interest of the 
bigger companies first which is the right thing to do, the state will not favour 
small businesses unless they provide a vital service. 
- Someone will have to pay more, if the smaller companies paid less, then the 
state has to raise taxes on the bigger companies and the state will not do that 
since it needs the larger businesses more. 
 
 
Although foreign enterprises here are confirming that the increase in the tax rate 
may be discouraging for smaller businesses, they are also confirming that the 
State’s strategy in attracting foreign businesses is likely to foresee larger 
businesses. There are 5 additional answers in this survey as 5 respondents 
answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ then added an opinion to the ‘other’ category; some 
respondents provided: 
- It is a slight change, but I wouldn’t say it will damage the smaller companies  
- As flat rate can have advantages and disadvantages for smaller and larger 
companies.   
 
  
♦ How has the recent tax rate of 15%, in your opinion, affected foreign 
enterprises’ behaviour in Kuwait? Would you say they will:
 
Continue doing business in Kuwait ( 
Expand the business (   )
Contract the business (   )
Do business elsewhere (   )
Other, please specify 
 
 
Figure 7. 16 
 
Figure 7. 17 
 
Figure 7. 18 
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investing in Kuwait. Figure 7.16 shows that the employees of the Tax Department 
believe that reducing taxes should work as an incentive for foreign enterprises to 
not only stay but expand their business activities in Kuwait, while this view was 
not shared by all the foreign enterprises. Also two Tax Auditors chose two 
answers for this question when they said that due to the tax reduction foreign 
enterprises: ‘will continue to do business abroad’ and will ‘expand their 
businesses’. This, however, was not necessarily what others believed; Tax 
Auditors who did not agree that the reduction in the tax rate would encourage 
foreign business to continue doing business in Kuwait or expand their existent 
business stated: 
- I don’t think the change in the tax rate will change the behaviour of foreign 
enterprises in Kuwait, every company will accommodate according to its 
own benefit and interest since through a feasibility study all companies know 
in advance how much tax they will be liable to in the host country and thus 
include it in their costs. 
- As for bigger corporations, the tax reduction has served as an incentive for 
them to expand their business in Kuwait; however the smaller business 
which used to pay less than 15% will suffer. 
 
 
♦ Would you say that taxation is an important aspect which foreign investors 
consider when deciding to do business in Kuwait? If so, please provide 
explanation? 
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Figure 7.19 shows that the Tax Auditors agreed that taxation is ‘an important 
aspect’ and that taxation is a priority for foreign businesses when deciding 
whether to invest in Kuwait; only one Tax Auditor disagreed with this. Although 
the majority of Taxpayers agreed 
- Taxes are not our main concern; to us other issues such as infrastructure and 
business opportunity come first.
- I need to think about my business first then think about how much tax I have 
to pay, as an eleva
free state) and fit elevators in Kuwait, I need to be here in Kuwait. I need my 
company to be based here.
 
 
Figure 7.21 reveals that the employees of the Tax Department agreed that taxation 
is ‘an important aspect’. Some commented that other aspects such as political 
stability and judicial fairness can be more important for foreign investment.  
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♦ When making a decision to do business abroad which of the following do you 
think a company considers the most, please prioritize by number 1-7, with (1) 
being the most important and (7) being the least important:  
 
Business opportunities 
Low/High taxes 
Labour 
Infrastructure 
Political stability 
Tax incentives  
Compliance costs  
Other, please specify 
 
 
 
 
Tax Auditors 
 
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Business 
Opportunities 
10       
2 Political Stability 
 
 3 2 2    
3 Infrastructure  2 5     
4 Low/High taxes  2 2 4    
5 Tax Incentives  3   2 2  
6 Labour     3 4 2 
7 Compliance Costs      2 7 
Figure 7. 22 
 
In response to this question, Figure 7.22 shows that Tax Auditors put Business 
opportunities in the first place with ten votes, then came Political Stability with 3 
votes as having the secondary importance. Infrastructure was placed in third place 
with five votes for its rating. Low and High Taxes, Tax Incentives, Labour and 
Compliance Costs followed, ‘Other’ priorities which some Tax Auditors said their 
corporate clients often mention included:  
- Profitability, in addition to convenience and stability of business. 
- The ability to carry business on directly without the need for a national 
agent. 
- Economic development. 
- Clarity of double tax treaties. 
- Reducing corruption and bureaucracy. 
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                                                                 Tax Department (employees) 
 
 
 
The employees of the Tax Department rated Political Stability as the number one 
priority for foreign business investors with 11 votes. Low and High Taxes came in 
second with 10 votes recorded, for greater importance by the employees of the 
Tax Department than by the Tax Auditors. Business Opportunities were voted 
third. Tax incentives, Infrastructure, Compliance Costs and Labour were not 
regarded as primary factors. Other factors which is was felt foreign investors 
usually look for, were: 
- Easier requirements to start up a business 
- Easier requirements for moving capital and labour across the country.  
 
                                                       
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises)  
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Business 
Opportunities 
22 7      
2 Political Stability  25      
3 Infrastructure  9 21     
4 Low & High Taxes    19 9   
5 Tax Incentives     18 12  
6 Labour      21 7 
7 Compliance Costs       23 
Figure 7. 24 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Political 
Stability 
11 4 4     
2 Low & High 
Taxes 
 10 2 2    
3 Business 
Opportunities  
  9 3 3   
4 Tax Incentives    10 4   
6 Infrastructure      7 4 
7 Compliance 
Costs 
     5 6 
7 Labour        8 
Figure 7. 23 
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Figure 7.24 shows that Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) were in agreement with the 
Tax Auditors in that Business Opportunities were the most important 
consideration when it comes to investing abroad. A significant number of these 
enterprises also place it as the second most important priority which emphasizes 
its importance. Political Stability was recorded by 25 votes as of secondary 
importance. Infrastructure which the employees of the Tax Department rated 
relatively lowly was an important priority for Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) as 
table 7.24 shows 9 companies voting it as the second most important 
consideration. Low and High Taxes for a good number of Taxpayers (foreign 
enterprises) played a relatively insignificant role. Further, the fact that compliance 
costs were accorded little significance suggests that Taxpayers (foreign 
enterprises) are not discouraged by high costs if business opportunities, stability 
and infrastructure exist. ‘Other’ priorities mentioned were: 
- The bureaucracy slows down business and decision making; the 
requirements to start up a business should be easier. 
- The abolition of agency rules. 
- Bank loans should be facilitated for foreign investors. 
- The culture should be welcoming for foreign businesses. 
 
 
♦ If Kuwait was to give foreign investors an incentive to do business in Kuwait 
what should this incentive be in your opinion (please prioritize by numbers 1-3, 
with (1) being the most attractive incentive and (3) being the least attractive: 
 
Tax holiday (    ) 
Applying national treatment (    ) 
Easier requirements for starting up a business (    ) 
Other, please explain (    ) 
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                            Tax Auditors  
incentives: 1 2 3 
Easier Requirements for starting 
up a business 
9 2  
Applying National Treatment  5 6 
Tax Holiday 2 4 5 
Figure 7. 25 
 
 
As seen above, most Tax Auditors regarded ‘Easier requirements to start up a 
business’ as the number one incentive. However, they were relatively evenly 
divided in their respective assessments of ‘Applying National Treatment’ and 
‘Tax holiday’.  
When Tax Auditors were asked to give ‘Other’ suggestions on incentives for 
encouraging foreign investors to carry on business in Kuwait, their responses 
included: 
- 100% ownership of foreign business. 
- To create and allow more business opportunities. 
- To sign more double tax treaties with more countries. 
- Easier and faster procedures when it comes to work visas. 
- Comprehensive tax laws. 
- Abolishing agency rules. 
- Nationalization of labour. A new requirement has been imposed by the 
Kuwaiti government to nationalize foreign companies’ labour. It has caused 
more strain for those companies as Kuwaiti labour is more expensive, and 
not as productive.  
 
 
                    Tax Department (employees) 
Incentives: 1 2 3 
Easier Requirements for Starting 
up a business  
9 8 5 
Tax Holiday 7 8 6 
Applying National Treatment 6 5 11 
Figure 7. 26 
 
As Figure 7.26 shows employees of the Tax Department believed that ‘Easier 
requirements to start up a business’ is the first incentive - following the opinions 
expressed by the Tax Auditors. However, some prominence was also given to the 
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provision of Tax Holidays and the introduction of National Treatment, with the 
latter generally less favoured. 
 
                 Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) 
Incentives:  1 2 3 
Easier requirements for starting up 
a business  
17 8 5 
Tax Holiday 10 14 6 
Applying National Treatment 6 9 15 
Figure 7. 27 
  
 
As the above figure shows, the Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) closely followed 
the priorities identified by the Tax Auditors and the employees of the Tax 
Department, with ‘Easier requirement to start a business’ securing primary 
importance with 17 votes. A more marked preference for ‘Tax holiday’ rather than 
National Treatment was exhibited. ‘Other’ suggestions for incentives included: 
- Eliminating the agency rules and the 51% national ownership of a foreign 
business. 
- Easier work visa procedures. 
- Eliminating the new offset programme which the Kuwaiti government has 
recently imposed on foreign businesses, obliging them to invest a percentage 
of their business value in Kuwait. 
 
 
The following is a more open question which helps reveal attitudes towards the 
Tax Law Amendments 2/2008699:  
 
♦ What changes - if any- would you suggest be made to Tax Law Amendments 
2/2008? 
 
                                                 
699
 The purpose of this question was to allow each person to express their views and attitudes 
towards the amendments and how they can be improved.  Such a survey as defined by Fink, is a 
system for collecting information from or about people to describe, compare, or explain their 
knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour. See Fink (note 694 supra). 
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Responses to this question varied and as the following Figures (7.28 – 7.30) 
included a range of suggestions. However, there was some consensus on the 
Amendments shortcomings with regards to the issue of clarity: 
 
Tax Auditors 
 
Answers: 
Number of 
responses that 
match that answer 
General clarity in the provisions of the Amendments, especially in definition of taxable income, tax 
payer, and agent 
10 
Eliminating the concept of deemed profits 2 
Eliminating the tax department’s arbitration system on tax assessments objections and appeals, and 
referring tax objections and appeals to an independent judicial body.   
2 
Further reduction in the tax rates 2 
Taxing national companies and individuals to achieve national treatment and fairness. 2 
Figure 7. 28 
 
Figure 7.28 shows that there is a clear expression for demanding greater clarity by 
the Tax Auditors.  
 
 
Tax Department (employees)  
 
Answers: 
Number of 
responses that 
that match that 
answer 
A more complete and comprehensive tax law which is applicable to national companies and 
individuals as well as foreign enterprises.  
6 
More clarity in terms of  the meaning of the provisions 2 
A wider tax base  1 
To have a pre-tax period for foreign investors  1 
More tax exemptions  1 
A clear parameter for the companies compliance  1 
Eliminating agency rules  1 
None 6 
I don’t know  3 
Figure 7. 29 
 
Figure 7.29 shows that greater clarity is supported to some extent, but there is 
greater support for a more comprehensive tax code that includes national 
companies and individuals.  
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Taxpayers (foreign enterprises)  
 
Answers:  
 
Number of responses 
that that match that 
answer 
 
Eliminating the agency rule and  the 51% national ownership rule 15 
Clarify the ambiguity in the Amendment’s provisions 8 
The tax rates should be progressive in order to achieve more fairness  7 
A further tax decrease  2 
A panel independent from the tax department to look into objections and appeals on tax 
assessments   
2 
A tax exemption for the first five years for foreign investors  2 
The law should be more specific and should treat different industries differently  2 
Clearer allowances and disallowances  1 
An increase in the agent commission allowance, and the home office expenses allowance 1 
Figure 7. 30 
 
Figure 7.30 reveals the strongest support was expressed by Taxpayers (foreign 
enterprises) for eliminating the agency and the 51% national ownership rules. 
However, there was also significant support for clarifying ambiguity in the 
Amendments and for progressive tax rates.   
 
This next question was to test whether Adam Smith’s four requirements for a 
good tax system: fairness, certainty, efficiency and convenience700 were met by 
the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008701. 
  
♦ In regard to the Kuwaiti tax law, how would you describe it in terms of702: 
 
1. Fairness 
  
                                                 
700 See pp. 19-22. 
701
  ‘Clarity’ was added as a fifth parameter due to the comments in relation to the previous 
question indicating a perceived lack of clarity in the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008.  
702
 The meaning of some questions addressed to the survey sample may not always be direct or 
easy to understand and thus providing an explanation written or verbal is important in some cases. 
On meaning of questions Nuckols (1953) asked respondents to use their own words to describe 
what a question was asking. He also concluded that standardization of words does not 
automatically imply standardization of meaning. Belson (1981) did further work along this line by 
asking people in interviews what specific phrases meant in the context of survey questions. Ferber 
(1956) did the same thing for all respondents on an attitudinal question and found people readily 
expressing opinions about issues which they could not define. See Tanur, J. (1992), Questions 
about Questions: Inquiries in the Cognitive Bases of a Survey, Russell Sage Foundation, p. 50. 
   
  
Fair (   )     Unfair (   )    In some aspects it is unfair (   )
 
2. Clarity 
  
Clear (   )    Unclear (   )   In some aspects it is unclear (   )   I don’t know (   )
 
3. Convenience (in regards to time and manner of payments):
 
Convenient (   )  Inconvenient (   ) 
 
4. Certainty (taxes should not be arbitrary, the time, manner, and quantity of taxes 
to be paid must be clear and plain for the taxpayer):
 
Certain (   )    Uncertain (   )   In some aspects it is uncertain (   )   I don’t know (   ) 
 
5. Efficiency (the calculation of tax is simple and compliance is not costly):
 
Efficient (   )   Inefficient (   )   In some aspects it is inefficient (   )   I don’t know (   )
 
 
 
Tax Auditors 
 
Figure 7. 31 
   
Figure 7. 32 
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Figure 7. 33 
 
 
Figure 7. 34 
 
 
Figure 7. 35 
 
 
From Figures 7.31 – 
the law is ‘in some aspects’ fair, clear, and certain. The majority of Tax Auditors 
confirmed that the law is convenient and efficient.
 
Tax Auditors who indicated that Kuwait’s tax law was ‘in some aspects unfair’ 
provided the following explanations:
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7.35 it shows that the majority of Tax Auditors agreed that 
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- Three respondents said that the law discriminates against foreign companies.
- Three respondents said that the law discriminates against smaller foreign 
companies. 
- A respondent said that articles of the Amendments allow a wide 
interpretation which the Tax Department takes advantage of. Many of the 
articles are interpreted in favour of the Department not the taxpayer.
- Circular No. 43/2002 on deemed profits,
not convinced with the accounts, or whenever we declare losses, we are 
assumed to have made a profit of 15% according to the ‘Deemed Profits’ 
Circular703. 
 
 
On ‘Uncertainty’ a number of Tax Auditors indicated specifically that
Law Amendments 2/2008 are not certain in terms of allowances and 
disallowances. Some Tax Auditors also said that there was uncertainty in the 
following respects: 
- The double tax treaties are not clear in their treatment of some aspects of 
taxation. 
- The English translation of the law is vague.
- 25% of the tax issues are covered by the provisions of the Tax Law 
Amendments 2/2008 while 75% are dealt with by mere practice.
 
 
 
The Tax Department 
 
Figure 7. 36 
                                        
703 For more on ‘Deemed Profits’ see pp. 106
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 the Tax 
 
  
Figure 7. 37 
 
Figure 7. 38 
 
Figure 7. 39 
 
Figure 7. 40 
 
 
The Figures show that there is a degree of uniformity in the employees of the Tax 
Department’s responses. Half of the employees believed that Kuwait’s Tax Law 
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was ‘not in all cases fair’, and only six of them thought it was ‘fair’. In
clarity again the vast majority thought that the law was ‘not in all cases clear’ 
while just a small number thought it was clear. Thirteen employees said the law 
was ‘convenient’, and the same number of employees thought the law was ‘not in 
all cases certain’. Ten employees believed that the law is ‘efficient’; however the 
same number thought it was ‘not efficient in all cases’. 
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) 
 
 
Figure7.41 
 
Figure 7. 42 
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Figure 7. 43 
 
Figure 7. 44 
 
Figure 7. 45 
 
 
 
The Figures above (7.41 
enterprises) believe that the law is ‘in some cases’ fair, clear and efficient. 
However, they also believe that the law is convenient and certain.  
 
Further, the taxpayers (forei
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– 7.45) show that the majority of taxpayers (foreign 
gn enterprises) who believed that the law was ‘not 
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1. The objection and appeal process is unfair. There should be an 
independent judicial body. Such objections and appeals should not be 
decided by the Tax Department which is the current practice. 
2. Discrimination against foreign companies. 
3. Discriminating against smaller size companies 
4. Allowable expenses for home office costs is only 1.5% which is 
considered too low. 
 
The respondents who believed that the law was ‘not always clear’ provided the 
following explanations: 
1. The 2008 Amendments are not clear on matters such as what constitutes 
an agent. 
2. Lack of clarity in terms of allowances and disallowances. 
 
 
The respondents who believed that the law was ‘not always certain’ provided the 
following: 
  
1. The matter of arbitration causes uncertainty. 
2. There is room for more improvement. The way the law is constructed causes 
uncertainty. 
3. Our uncertainty arises when our auditors tell us that our costs will be allowed 
than when the tax inspector comes he disallows them. 
 
 
The following questions consider the work of the Tax Department. 
 
7.4 Assessment of the Kuwaiti Tax Department [in the Ministry of Finance] 
 
The next set of questions assesses the Tax Department’s performance in terms of 
tax collection, its efficiency and its attitudes toward towards taxpayers.  
 
♦ Do you think that the Tax Department is efficient in collecting taxes?  
 
  
Tax Auditors  
Figure 7. 46 
 
 
Most Tax Auditors agreed that the Tax Department is not always
collecting taxes. A couple of Tax Auditors gave the following reasons for this 
view: 
- The Tax Department in Kuwait is relatively small. There aren’t enough 
employees and the management is poor.
- All the procedures are very slow and usually post
requested a tax clearance four months ago and we are still waiting.
 
   Tax Department (employees)
Figure 7. 47 
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As Figure 7.47 shows, the number of employees who thought that the Tax 
Department is efficient in collecting taxes is marginally higher than those who 
thought that the Department was not in all cases efficient, which indicates that not 
all employees believe that the Department is efficient in collecting taxes. 
Because the questionnaire was distributed to the employees by their department’s 
supervisor they were not asked specifically to write a justification for their 
response. 
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterpris
Figure 7.48 
 
A majority of taxpayers (foreign enterprises) felt that the Department was in fact 
efficient in collecting taxes. However a significant minority believed that the 
Department was not always efficient. The following opinions were 
- We are in constant disagreement with the Tax Department. Whenever we 
submit our records and they are unsure about our costs we are taxed upon 
deemed profits; it is not a fair procedure.
- The inspection procedures are very long and time consuming.
- It’s 2009 and we are still waiting for the tax assessment of 2006. The 
inspectors are very slow.
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expressed: 
 
  
♦ Do you feel that the Tax Department is fair in its tax assessments?
 
Tax Auditors 
 
Figure 7. 49 
 
 
A majority of Tax Auditors believed that the Tax 
their tax assessments. Some of the reasons given were:
- A number of Tax Auditors said that the decision making is arbitrary in the 
Tax Department.
- On various occasions the Tax Department would overlook our deductible 
expenses simply because they are unfamiliar with international accounting 
standards. 
- The law is vague and allows broad interpretation and that is when the Tax 
Department takes advantage and interpretation is made in their favour.
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The employees in the Tax Department were more or less evenly split in their 
responses; ten employees thought that the Tax Department is ‘fair’ in its 
assessment, and nine employees thought that the department is ‘not always fair’.
 
Taxpayer (foreign enterp
Figure 7. 51 
 
The number of Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) who found that the Tax 
Department is fair in its assessments and those who felt it was ‘not fair in all 
cases’ was similarly evenly divided. Some taxpayers believe that the Tax 
Department might not always be fair in its tax assessments for a variety of 
reasons: 
- We were subjected to unfair tax assessments many times before and were not 
given the opportunity to discuss them with the inspector.
- They add back depreciation, they don’t accept ac
expenses which in their own arbitrary opinion they decide are not deductible.
- They exaggerate when it comes to paperwork and documents. They ask us to 
submit irrelevant things and justify this by saying that they are ‘supporting 
documents, 
- Most of our expenses are not allowed.
- Deductible expenses differ from one inspector to another.
- Last year we had losses due to the drop in the US $ because the Kuwaiti 
Dinar was pegged to the US $ but the Tax Department refused to take our 
losses into consideration and taxed us upon deemed profits.
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 Too broad (   ) Reasonable (    ) In some cases broader than others (    ) I don’t 
know (    ) 
 
Tax Auditors 
Figure 7. 52 
 
 
Figure 7.52 shows that a significant number of Tax Auditors believed that the tax 
inspectors’ authorities are too broad. The following reasons were cited in support 
of this: 
- Because the law is vague and there are not fixed rules on their authority. This 
causes the authority issue to differ from one inspector to the other.
- They are given more powers than the law allows.
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Tax Department (employees)
 
Figure 7. 53 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly the majority of the Tax Department employees agreed 
that their powers are reasonable. A very small number of employees said that their 
powers were ‘in some cases broader than others’.
 
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) 
 
Figure 7. 54 
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broader than others. A few taxpayers felt that their positions might be explained 
by the following704: 
- Vagueness in the law allows broad interpretation of an inspector’s authority, 
and misuse of such authorities can occur.
- Connections have a strong influence; the stronger/bigger the company, the 
more willing the inspector is to bend the rules.
- They can decide what is deductible and what is not; this is not fair.
- Their authorities are not regulated or specified clearly.
 
 
 
 
♦ Are tax inspectors: 
 
Well trained and educated (     )
Not well trained and educated (     )
Trained and educated to an exten
I don’t know (     ) 
 
 
 
Tax Auditors 
 
Figure 7. 55 
 
Few Tax Auditors felt that tax inspectors were ‘well trained and educated’. Whilst 
a clear majority believed that the tax inspectors were ‘trained and educated to an 
extent’ from which it might be intended that a better service could be provided 
with further training and education. 
                                        
704
 It should be noted here that two respondents gave two answers to the same question, adding 
more answers to the total of 30.
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Tax Department 
 
Figure 7. 56 
 
It is not surprising, perhaps, to find more tax inspectors felt they are ‘well trained 
and educated’ than not, but it is interesting to note a significant number thought 
that they were ‘trained 
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprise)
 
Figure 7. 57 
 
Figure 7.57 shows that a clear majority of taxpayers (foreign enterprises) thought 
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know
2
I don't 
know
3
  
educated to a certain extent’. Two taxpayers (foreign enterprises) added the 
following comments:
- When we started paying taxes it took the inspector we were working with a 
whole year to do our assessment. We had no idea what were the allowances and 
disallowances, all the procedures were vague to us as taxpayers.
- Inspectors don’t take their job seriously. Unexpectedly during the end of the 
financial year when our company tax records are due for tax assessments they are 
absent and there is never anyone else to take o
do is wait. 
 
The following two questions were addressed to Tax Auditors and Taxpayers 
(foreign enterprises) only.
 
♦ Have you ever experienced an unfair/unjust decision from tax inspectors?
 
Yes (     )      No (     )    In some cases (     )   I don’t know (      ) 
 
 
Tax Auditors  
 
Figure 7. 58 
 
A majority of Tax Auditors provided that they have ‘in some cases’ experienced 
unfair decisions from tax inspectors. However, no more specificati
on why or how this happens.
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Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) 
Figure 7. 59 
 
A clear majority of taxpayers, perhaps not unexpectedly indicated that they have 
in their opinion experienced unjust decisions from tax inspectors. 
 
♦ Has your objection to an inappropriate decision made by the inspector been:
Taken into consideration (    )  
consideration (    ) I don’t know (    )
 
 
Figure 7. 60 
 
 
The majority of Tax Auditors believed that the
objection into account on some occasions. One Auditor provided: “even if they do 
listen to our objections I know that they will eventually do what they want”. 
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It should be noted here that two auditors provided two answers 
question thus adding to the number of responses.
 
 
Figure 7.61 
 
Most taxpayer respondents believed that their objections to the Tax Department 
were ‘in some cases regarded’. A few believed that objections are ‘disregarded’, 
and a good number said their objections were ‘taken into consideration’. An 
apparent oddity is the significant number of ‘I don’t knows’ in this category, this 
may be explained by the fact that foreign enterprises rely on their auditors in tax 
matters, and thus are not directly involved in objections.  
 
When this question was addressed to the employ
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made by the Tax Department, would the Department:
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Figure 7.62 
 
The findings in Figure 7.62 show the vast majority of the employees indicating 
that objections were ‘taken into consideration’.  
 
It should be noted that employees of the Tax Department were not asked to 
answer the following question.
 
♦ Would you say tax inspectors sometimes make ‘arbitrary’ allowances and 
disallowances? 
Yes (      )    No (      )    Sometimes (      )   I don’t know (      )
Figure 7. 63 
 
 
Most auditors believe that tax inspectors sometimes mak
and disallowances, one auditor commented: 
“Connections play a big role, there is corruption, if you are an important big 
company your allowances will be different than that of a smaller trivial 
company”. 
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Figure 7. 64 
 
Taxpayers confirmed that inspectors do sometimes make arbitrary allowances and 
disallowances.  
 
  
♦ In terms of assessment, would you say that inspectors follow certain uniform 
rules and procedures according to the circulars of the law?
 
Uniform assessment (    ) Assessments vary from one payer to the other (    ) 
In some cases inspectors are arbitrary (    )    I don’t know (    )
 
 
Figure 7. 65 
 
Few Tax Auditors felt that tax inspectors followed uniform assessment practices 
when making an assessment. One auditor commented: 
“I have worked with different inspectors and each has a different method. There 
are no uniform rules”.
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Figure 7. 66 
 
Not surprisingly, Figure 7.66 shows that the Tax Department tax inspectors’ carry 
out tax assessments in a uniform manner
Figure 7. 67 
 
Most taxpayers (foreign enterprises) agreed that tax inspectors are in some cases 
arbitrary. Also a significant number 
one taxpayer to the other when it comes to tax assessments, but this is not 
unexpected in view of the different nature of taxpayers’ positions.
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♦ Would you say that tax inspection procedures are efficient?
 
Yes (    )     No (    )    Not always (     )    I don’t know (     )
 
 
Figure 7. 68 
 
A majority of Tax Auditors confirmed that inspection procedures are ‘not always 
efficient’. The following observations were made:
- If a company does not have a 
always assessed according to a deemed profit rate which constitutes a 
problem for us. 
- Although our 2007 inspection started in September we didn’t hear from our 
inspector again until November that year. 
- We have to change our accountancy standards to accommodate them, 
because they are not familiar with international accountancy standards.
 
 
Figure 7. 69 
 
The significant number of Tax Department employees who felt that their 
inspection procedures were ‘efficient’, was matched by those who recognized that 
tax inspection procedures are ‘not always efficient’. 
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Figure 7.70 
 
Figure 7.70 shows a fair spread o
taxpayers said that tax inspection procedures are ‘not always efficient’. The 
following comments were made by the taxpayers:
- Most inspectors take long leaves, especially during Ramadan, and all the 
work is postponed.
- We deal with an inspector, who suddenly disappears. We later find out from 
the Tax Department that he is on a two month leave. We are not allocated 
another inspector, so our file just stays pending.
 
 
The following question was only addressed to Tax Auditors and Taxpayers 
(foreign enterprises). 
 
 
♦ In your opinion, are compliance costs too high for the taxpayer?
 
High costs (   ) Reasonable Costs (   ) Low costs (   ) I don’t know (   ) 
 
Figure 7. 71 
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A substantial majority of Tax Auditors believe that compliance costs are 
reasonable. One of the minority, who felt that compliance costs are high, added: 
- Many companies complain that compliance costs are higher in Kuwait 
compared to other GCC countrie
of living in Kuwait is also the highest in the GCC.
 
 
Figure 7. 72 
 
Interestingly figure 7.72 shows that most taxpayers are in agreement with the 
substantial majority of Tax Auditors, with the majority respond
compliance costs are reasonable.  
 
♦ How would you describe the objection and appeal process in the Tax 
Department? 
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Figure 7. 73 
 
The vast majority of Tax Auditors said that the objection and appeal process is 
‘not always independent and objective’. Some explained their reasons for taking 
this view: 
- The arbitration panel looking into the objections and a
the inspector whose assessment was challenged, and his superior, they can 
never be impartial.
- The appeal and objection is being looked at by the people who made the 
decisions themselves.
- In many complicated issues such as disputes on 
Tax Department is not confident enough to make a decision so they refer it 
to the court. 
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Figure 7.74 shows again an interesting division of opinion with the employees of 
the Tax Department, with only a marginal di
the objection and appeal process was ‘independent and objective’ and those who 
believed it was not always so.
 
Figure 7. 75 
 
Figure 7.75 reveals that there was amongst the taxpayers (foreign enterprises) 
strong support for the view that the objection and appeal process is ‘Not always 
independent and objective’. Justifications for this view were similar to those 
expressed by the Tax Auditors, that there was a belief that the panel which looks 
into their objections 
assessment (which they are appealing) and his superior and that for this reason the 
decision can never be neutral.
 
♦ When rejecting an objection or an appeal, does the tax department provide good 
reasoning for such a decision? 
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Figure 7. 76 
 
The majority of Tax Auditors believed that the department ‘doesn’t always 
provide good reasoning’ when rejecting an objection or an appeal. Some 
observations were as follows:
- They don’t distinguish between one case and the other and they hold on to 
very trivial issues.
- They never provide reasoning. In one case we challenged why they 
allow labourers salaries (to be deducted) just because the salaries were paid 
by cash. 
 
 
Figure 7.77 
  
Figure 7.77 shows that employees of the Tax Department, as expected, believed 
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did not 
  
ejected. It is 
  
conceivable that the four employees who didn’t know the answer to this question 
may not be involved in determining objections and appeals. 
 
Figure 7. 78 
 
Almost 50% of the taxpayers (foreign enterprises) responded that the Tax 
Department ‘Does not always provide good reasoning’ when rejecting an 
objection or an appeal. Some of the respondents who provided that the Tax 
Department ‘Does not provide reasoning’ added:
- They make ridiculous decisions without giving an explanation 
- In all our appeals and objections they have never provided us with good 
reasoning. 
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Figure 7. 79 
 
Encouragingly, the vast majority of Tax Auditors felt they had an excellent or 
good relationship with the Tax Department. 
 
By way of conclusion to the questions relating to the workshops of the Tax 
Department this question was addressed to each sample.
 
♦ How in your opinion can the Tax Department improve its services?
 
 Tax Auditors: 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises)
1- We want the Department to interact more closely with companies. We 
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they never comply).
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5- There is a language barrier. They don’t speak English, and we don’t speak 
Arabic. 
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Tax Department (employees): 
1- Developing the staff by offering courses and better training. 
2- Increasing tax awareness in the country. 
3- A more comprehensive tax law. 
4- Independence of the Tax Department from the Ministry of Finance and 
less bureaucracy. 
5- Better communication and correspondence with taxpayers and tax auditors 
by listening to their concerns and recommendations. 
6- A tax magazine for the employees which provides the latest news on 
amendments, and changes on tax locally and internationally to improve 
their tax awareness. 
 
  
It is interesting to see that all samples agree on very similar recommendations 
to improve the Tax Department’s performance in Kuwait. 
 
 
After assessing the tax department performance in collecting taxes and dealing 
with auditors and taxpayers, it is time to shed some light on how Kuwait can 
improve its taxing policies in order to attract more FDI. 
 
7.5 Recommendations on how Kuwait can attract more Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 
The third and last objective of this field study was to explore how the sample 
groups think the tax system could be improved in order for Kuwait to attract more 
FDI. 
 
♦ What changes, if any, would you suggest be made to Tax Law Amendments 
2/2008? 
 
Tax Auditors: 
1- More clarity to the law. It is very limited in its scope and should cover all 
issues related to taxation in Kuwait. 
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2- Clearer definitions in the law such as the definition of a taxpayer. 
3- Abolishing deemed profits. 
4- A more complete, coherent tax system and also proposing VAT. 
5- A progressive tax rate is fairer generally, and for smaller businesses 
specifically. 
6- Taxing national companies to avoid discrimination against foreign 
companies. 
 
Tax Department (employees):  
1- This tax law is very limited. There is a need for a more comprehensive, 
coherent law that covers all issues regarding taxation in Kuwait. 
2- Eliminating discrimination against foreign companies by taxing national 
companies. 
3- The tax base should be made wider, but there should also be a pre-tax 
period to encourage start-up companies. 
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises): 
1- The law is ambiguous, more clarity is crucial. 
2- There needs to be periodical reviews on the law and its clauses and 
amendments in order to improve the law and the system as a whole. 
3- Increase allowances for agent commission and head office expenses. 
4- A progressive tax rate is fairer than a flat rate tax. 
5- An independent panel to rule in tax objections and appeals, rather than the 
tax inspector in the Tax Department. 
6- Giving start-up companies a tax holiday e.g. first five years of their 
business as an encouragement. 
 
From the answers above, all samples call for very similar and in some cases 
identical reforms in order to improve Tax Law Amendments 2/2008.  
 
♦ Can you say that Kuwait is an attractive environment for foreign investment? 
Why? 
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Figure 7. 80 
 
This was a mixed response, but those who answered ‘Yes’ tended to stress that the 
new tax rate is very encouraging for foreign investment. Within those who 
answered ‘No’ the following non-tax related reasons were suggested: 
- Kuwait’s economy is in need of adequate infrastructure to grow, not just 
roads and buildings but also power centres, fully equipped facilitated 
harbours, and developed free trade zone areas.  
- Due to the huge bureaucracy in the country the public sector which you must 
come in contact with when doing business in Kuwait (issuing trade permit, 
visa purposes, etc.) is very slow. This makes Kuwait unattractive for FDI. 
- Too many long routine procedures to start up a business. 
 
 
 
 
Tax Department (employees) 
 
 
Figure 7. 81 
 
5
6
Auditors
Yes
No 
7
15
Tax Department
Yes
No
 294 
 
Those who answered ‘Yes’ tended to draw attention to the reduced tax rate and 
also to Kuwait’s strategic position on the world map which allows it to be a 
financial centre. Within the responses of those who answered ‘No’ the following 
observations were made: 
- Commercial, investment, and tax laws need to be improved. 
- Investment opportunities in Kuwait are strictly in oil sector. 
- Due to the discrimination against foreign investment since national 
companies are exempt from tax. 
- All development projects needed to attract FDI are put on hold. 
- Poor infrastructure. 
- Long complicated procedures and endless requirements. 
 
 
 
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) 
 
 
Figure 7. 82 
 
 
Disturbingly, perhaps, almost 70% of taxpayers (foreign enterprise) felt that 
Kuwait is not an attractive environment for investment. Some of the reasons cited 
were as follows: 
- Kuwait’s business regulations are very restricting (agency and sponsorship 
rules), while other GCC countries are opening up for investment and 
abolishing barriers. 
- It is supposed to be attractive but it is not due to the endless disputes between 
the government and Parliament. All development projects are shelved, and 
the continuous re-shuffling of the government is a hindrance to decision 
making. 
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- There are business opportunities but the requirement that a national must 
own 51% of the project makes these opportunities unattractive. 
- The bureaucracy is huge, too many rules, and requirements and very long 
procedures. 
- It is only attractive for oil companies. 
 
Those who said ‘Yes’ mainly linked their answers to the new reduced tax rate. 
 
 
♦ Foreign Direct Investment Law 8/2001 was found to encourage FDI in Kuwait 
by allowing foreign enterprises to own 100% of their businesses. What is in your 
opinion the most important shortfalls of the Kuwaiti Direct Foreign Investment 
Law 8/2001? And is it effective in encouraging FDI? 
 
1. Tax Auditors 
- The law imposes (almost) impossible requirements for foreign businesses to 
satisfy in order to enjoy the benefits and incentives it provides. 
- The process of getting a license according to this law is long, and 
bureaucratic.   
- The activities which this law allows foreign businesses to undertake are very 
limited. 
- It’s very vague in terms of what businesses are available for foreign 
investment and those that are not open for foreign investors to carry on in 
Kuwait. 
- This law is effective in theory but not in practice, it has too many 
restrictions, with very complicated procedures and gives wide discretion for 
the Minister of Commerce, where no decision can be made without his (the 
Minister’s) approval, and with the constant reshuffling of the government, 
decision making is shelved indefinitely. Some licenses take more than a year 
to be issued. 
 
2. Tax Department (employees) 
It should be mentioned here that 8 employees said they did not know this law, 
although the law has been in force since 2001. Also four employees answered 
‘No’ it’s not attractive without stating any reasons why they hold such views. 
Some employees did provide an opinion, some of these opinions were as 
follows: 
 
- The Law states that there are specific business opportunities which are open 
for 100% foreign ownership; however, these restricted opportunities are not 
clarified in the law. 
- There’s a huge bureaucracy and very long procedures to get a license. 
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- Some tax employees said that the law is in fact encouraging and provided the 
following reasons: 
- It gives tax exemptions up to ten years if the foreign company satisfies the 
requirements 
- It provides some tax incentives. 
 
3. Tax Payers (foreign enterprises) 
Not all taxpayers in this sample knew about this law which can also indicate that 
the Foreign Direct Investment Bureau is not doing its best to promote the law and 
its objective of attracting more FDI, those tax payers who have heard of the law, 
or had experience trying to apply for incentives it offers provided the following 
opinions:  
- It’s useless it poses too many restrictions on foreign investors. 
- The business activities which it allows 100% foreign ownership for are 
restricted to a few sectors. 
- Too many conditions to satisfy. 
 
 
♦ Can you confirm that foreign businesses entering Kuwait to invest usually have 
a common misconception that there are not any corporate income taxes in Kuwait, 
especially that national companies are not taxed? If yes, how can this be avoided? 
 
 
1. Tax Auditors 
All Tax Auditors provided that foreign entities do know about the tax imposed on 
foreign investment in Kuwait, so the first thing they enquire about before coming 
to invest in Kuwait is the tax rate and how the tax system works. 
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2. Tax Department (employees) 
 
Figure 7. 83 
 
As Figure 7.83 shows a majority of employees in the Tax Department felt that 
there was no misconception and added that most companies do research before 
embarking on an investment in another country. The minority of employees 
recognised that there might be a misconception and that there is no taxation upon 
companies possibly caused by non-taxing regimes of neighbouring countries Gulf 
countries such as Dubai.  
 
Taxpayers (foreign enterprises)  
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A significant majority of taxpayers (foreign enterprises) said that there is no 
misconception and that foreign businesses are actually aware of the tax law and 
justified this by saying that all companies do feasibility tests before entering a 
new host country. Those who felt that there is a misconception, also indicated, in 
some cases, that it is the Tax Department’s responsibility to increase the tax 
awareness. Some taxpayers said that tax regulations were referred to, and 
amendments on the Tax Department’s web page were visited, however the web 
page is not updated and does not always have all the information they need. 
 
The objective of the following questions was to understand from the 
taxpayer’s point of view what problems foreign investors face when working 
in Kuwait and what are their recommendations to make Kuwait more 
attractive for foreign investment, thus the following questions were addressed 
to the taxpayers only:  
 
♦ Kuwaiti Commercial Law states that a foreign business can only enter Kuwait 
through a Kuwaiti agent or to have a Kuwaiti own 51% of the business, how does 
this affect foreign businesses in Kuwait? Why? 
 
Amongst the taxpayers (foreign enterprises) there was a consensus that such a rule 
is discouraging for foreign investment, with respondents commonly citing the 
following: 
- I don’t want a national agent to control my company. I want to be able to 
have full control over my business. 
- Having an individual partner can cause many disputes. 
- The rule can be very restricting, as the agent can be very controlling  
- Because as a foreign company we pay agent commissions, our costs are 
always higher than national companies. Thus when we apply for a 
government bid, we are never really the lowest price so we never win the bid 
because our costs are higher. 
- The agent doesn’t help us (the foreign company) at all but we still have to 
pay him a commission. 
- As an international company we have never seen this rule anywhere else 
other than in the Gulf. 
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- It can really be a barrier especially when the agent wants to get involved in 
the day to day decision making. 
- When the agent is profit driven and unreliable it can really affect the 
company. 
- We bring the business from abroad, we do everything to get off the ground 
and then a national who has contributed nothing comes and as soon as you 
start making profit they want to take over the business. 
 
♦ What is your opinion on allowable expenses according to the Kuwaiti tax law 
e.g. head office expenses used to be (under the Tax Decree 3/1955) 3% now they 
are only 1.5%, would you say this is fair? 
 
 
Figure 7. 85 
  
70% of taxpayers indicated that a 1.5% allowance for head office expenses is not 
enough. Some of the reasons for this view were as follows: 
- The amount of work we do at our home office is huge, even the previous 3% 
wasn’t enough. 
- It is not fair at all. An international company like us with 30% of our GP of 
general head office costs. If our GP was K.D 30,000 then our home office 
expenses are K.D 10,000 and we can only deduct from that 1.5%. In our 
opinion it should be at least 10%. 
- The larger the company the higher their home office expenses. 
- Sometimes when our contract is with the government we are asked to bring 
consultants and material from our home office. However, what I pay for this 
is not deducted from my home office expenses. 
 
However, one of the taxpayers indicated that the decrease is fair and added the 
following: 
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- Even under the previous decree not all companies qualified for 3% home 
office allowance, we used to be given 2% only. However now, under the 
new tax rate we are saving 33% on our Corporate Income Tax, that’s why we 
are not complaining about the decrease in home office allowance. 
 
 
♦ If you as a foreign business can only own 49% of the company, while the other 
51% is owned by a Kuwaiti national this means that the Kuwaiti owns the 
majority and thus can make business decisions. How has this affected your 
business? 
 
 
Figure 7. 86 
 
The number of respondents to this question was restricted because not all foreign 
enterprises in the sample have Kuwaiti partners who hold 51% of the company’s 
shares; some of them do business in Kuwait through an agent. Of those who 
responded, the following observations were made: 
- 10 foreign enterprises said that their Kuwaiti partners are ‘sleeping/ silent 
partners’ and thus don’t really interfere in the day-to-day decision making. 
- 7 companies confirmed that they do ‘struggle’ with their national partners 
whose presence was regarded as inconvenient.  
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
 
The results of this empirical study are most important, as foreign enterprises 
carrying on business in Kuwait specify the shortcomings of their experience of 
doing business in Kuwait and propose possible solutions to improve the fiscal and 
economic environment in the country. The expert advice of Tax Auditors and the 
opinions of the Tax Department employees and their suggestions are also 
extremely crucial for understanding the point of views of those who work closely 
with the Kuwaiti Tax Law and foreign investors in Kuwait.  
The common problems which foreign enterprises face whilst doing business in 
Kuwait such as the restricting agency rules (and 51% national ownership), the 
bureaucracy, the shortcomings of services provided by the Tax Department, 
especially when it comes to addressing objections and appeals were stressed and 
emphasized repeatedly, not only by Taxpayers (foreign enterprises), but also by 
Tax Auditors and Tax Department employees who were aware of the struggles 
foreign enterprises face. The study also helped stress that contrary to what the Tax 
Department employees may believe, tax incentives and tax holidays are not as a 
highly prioritized by foreign investment when it comes to investing abroad as 
other elements such as the availability of business opportunities,  political 
stability, infrastructure, judicial fairness, eliminating discrimination against 
foreign enterprises and national treatment. These common aspirations expressed 
by foreign enterprises especially and agreed upon by Tax Auditors and Tax 
Employees are helpful in terms of proposing possible tax reform that is suitable 
for Kuwait’s fiscal and economic status, and useful for potential foreign investors 
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looking to do business in Kuwait, which is what the next concluding chapter of 
this thesis suggests.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
 
 
 
 
Kuwait is a country with a population of 3.5 million and an annual population 
growth of 2.4%705; it has self-reported crude oil reserves of about 96 billion 
barrels; there are, however, claims that these reserves are over estimated and that 
the Kuwaiti oil reserves do not exceed half of the reported amount706. Kuwait’s 
petroleum accounts for almost half of its GDP, 95% of export revenues, and 80% 
of government income. Kuwait’s climate limits agricultural development707, 
leaving it completely dependent on food imports which are in turn financed by oil 
exports. GDP of industry is 47.90% which consists primarily of petroleum and 
petrochemicals, plus FDI inflows that constitute no more than 0.1% of the 
country’s GDP708. Kuwait does not implement taxes on individual income and 
only taxes foreign enterprises carrying on business within its jurisdiction. 
As has been discussed in chapter one709, this thesis aims to address the need for a 
second source of income for an oil dependant Kuwait and, with taxation being an 
infinite source of revenue, this thesis sets out to explore whether or not a reformed 
Kuwaiti tax system can serve as a possible solution, with a view that an improved, 
more welcoming fiscal system can assist Kuwait in becoming more attractive for 
                                                 
705 UN data, Country profile, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=KUWAIT, [visited 
8/3/2010]. 
706 Howden, D. (2007), World Oil Supplies are Set to Run out Faster than Expected, The 
Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/world-oil-supplies-are-set-to-run-out-
faster-than-expected-warn-scientists-453068.html [visited 8/3/2011]. 
707 GDP of agriculture is 0.40%. 
708 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kuwait Fact Sheet, February 1st 2011, 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1197782704&Country=Kuwait&topic=Summary&su
btopic=Fact+sheet&subsubtopic=Fact+sheet [visited 7/3/2011]. 
709 See p. 1. 
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foreign investment and thus yield more tax revenues from FDI. However, there 
are a number of reservations and queries to attend to before engaging in a 
discussion on the status of the current Kuwaiti tax system, its shortfalls and how it 
can be improved.  
 
Kuwait being a predominantly religious country, there would naturally be certain 
attitudes rooted in religious principles that can be in some cases problematic if 
such religious ideologies are fixed and intolerant to change.   
The fact that Kuwait is an Islamic country where the majority of people pay Zakat 
has formed a strong belief amongst the Kuwaiti society that Zakat is a fairer 
system of redistribution than taxation simply because of its religious nature; this, 
coupled with the fact that the Kuwaiti people have not been taxed since the 
discovery of oil in 1938710 led to poor awareness amongst Kuwaitis on the 
importance of the redistribution of wealth, and social responsibility. Due to this 
there was a need to assess Zakat and taxation from a theoretical point of view in 
order to reach the conclusion that Zakat - despite its many advantages - also has 
many limitations including its eight exclusive groups of beneficiaries711 
mentioned in the Qur’an. Its marginalizing of non-Muslims as Zakat is only 
known in the Sunny jurisprudence, thus non Muslims and Muslims following the 
Shi’a jurisprudence do not pay Zakat or receive its revenue, causing much 
discrepancy. Also such groups will reject paying Zakat if it were to be made 
obligatory in Kuwait since Zakat does not constitute a part of their religious 
                                                 
710 See pp. 7-8. 
711 See pp. 15-17. 
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belief, and the fact that Zakat is still to this day voluntary in Kuwait for those who 
pay it allows a wide scope for avoidance and non-compliance.  
Other shortcomings are also discussed in detail in Chapter 2712 such as the non 
flexibility of Zakat, the progressivity of Zakat, and the wide discretion Zakat 
donors have when choosing their beneficiaries which can lead to the failure of 
Zakat revenues reaching the people who need them most. Thus Zakat alone is not 
a sufficient system of redistribution of wealth if it only aims at narrowing the gap 
between the rich and the poor as it currently does. A country such as Kuwait 
needs to secure a reliable source of income to finance the government’s 
expenditure and the provision of public goods and services which Zakat does not 
cover. 
However, an assessment of the theoretical background for taxation as a system of 
redistribution was not without its shortcomings. Although Western theories which 
call on taxation are convincing, such as Adam Smith’s argument that as 
individuals we must contribute (in proportion to our abilities) towards the state in 
proportion to the revenue we as individuals could not have enjoyed or earned if it 
weren’t for the protection of the state. Smith’s theory, that there exists a contract 
between the people and the state, whereby the state provides us with services and 
we in turn pay for them is a plausible one, especially if we as people took into 
account that without roads and the infrastructure provided by the state we cannot 
practice our professions, work or business and without health services we would 
not be well enough to work or have healthy clients and consumers. However, 
implementing a fair tax system is not as straight-forward as the theory. When it 
                                                 
712 See pp. 22-28. 
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comes to measuring the proportion which individuals are capable of contributing 
towards the state and whether this contribution should differ according to 
individual capability, taxation becomes more problematic in achieving social 
justice. Rawls’s social primary goods approach is criticised for suggesting that fair 
redistribution is merely taking from the better off and giving such resources to the 
worse off without actually assessing whether the worse off have the ability to turn 
such resources into functionings. Rawls’s theory is rivalled by Sen’s capability 
approach which does not only look closely at individuals’ resources but also to 
their opportunities and their freedom to achieve functionings. However, Sen’s 
approach is also criticised as one that is not easy to monitor publically713 as 
Norman Daniels puts it:  
 
“countries pursue development, and external agencies assist or hinder them in this 
pursuit, they need to consider what policies to adopt; some policies will enhance 
the wellbeing of some people and some will enhance the wellbeing of others and 
some will enhance no one. Both the social primary goods approach and the 
capabilities approach complement each other and have advantages over each other 
and a redistribution scheme can be beneficial when it is drawn from both 
approaches"714. 
 
 
Another crucial question arises when suggesting tax reform in Kuwait is why is a 
country such as Kuwait so abundant in oil needing to consider a second source of 
income and should it consider tax reform?  
Oil revenues became the main source of income in Kuwait since its discovery in  
1938 to the extent that the Kuwaiti government saw no need for any further tax 
extraction. This significant change has had social, economic and political 
                                                 
713 See pp. 41-47. 
714 Daniels, N. (2003) Democratic Equality: Rawl’s complex Eglittarianisim, in Samuel Freeman 
(eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge Press), pp.241 -277. 
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consequences. Socially it has shifted the Kuwaiti peoples’ mentality completely 
from the necessity of tax. The feeling of social responsibility that had once existed 
between the Kuwaiti people to contribute to the state’s expenditure has 
disappeared and the people of Kuwait have become completely dependent upon 
their government in terms of jobs and wages, housing, utility, health, and 
education. 
Economically, depending on a highly volatile source of income such as oil also 
meant that Kuwait’s economy fluctuated considerably; from an oil boom and 
revenue surplus throughout the 1970s to a severe economic stagnation in the 
1980s where the price of oil fell by 51% and had significant effects upon the 
Kuwaiti economy causing a deficit in the Kuwaiti budget due to government’s 
over spending. Poor social responsibility that had resulted from an extravagant 
welfare system stimulated the government of Kuwait to rethink about the 
possibility of introducing taxes back into the state. 
Politically, the abundance of oil has led the ruling family in Kuwait to diminish 
tax extraction, however providing for the people also meant securing their 
alliance, and it leads to peoples’ inability to hold their government accountable, 
when people cannot withdraw their financial support for their governments they 
cannot disapprove their governments’ actions, unpopular policies or poor 
provision of goods and services.   
Chapter 3 of this thesis, in addition to providing a historical background on 
Kuwait’s economy prior to oil discovery715 also sheds light on the economic, 
political and social downsides of oil dependency in general and oil dependency in 
                                                 
715 See pp. 52-64. 
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Kuwait especially.716 The Chapter also looks closely at the economic 
phenomenon, namely the ‘Rentier State’, an economic occurrence found in almost 
all oil dependent states including Kuwait717 reaching a final conclusion on how 
crucial it is for Kuwait to move away from oil dependency718.  
 
Chapter 4 can be regarded as the heart of this thesis answering the following 
crucial questions; what is the current Kuwaiti tax system? And what are its 
shortfalls and its inefficiencies? This Chapter examines closely the previous 
Income Tax Decree 3/1955 and the 2008 Amendments.  
The Kuwaiti government seems to have realized that in order to attract more FDI 
to the state the Income Tax Decree of 3/1955 needed to be amended; what the 
Kuwaiti government failed to do, however, is produce a comprehensive reform to 
its 1955 Decree. Thus in 2008 an amendment was introduced, however, only four 
amendments brought in 2008 can be considered significant; first, the explicit 
exemption of the national sole distributor who buys and transfers goods to his 
own account; secondly, the reduction of the tax rate imposed; thirdly, the 
reduction of some allowances; and finally the withholding of a 15% tax on foreign 
earned dividends whilst excluding trading profits. Also the decrease to the tax 
rate; from a progressive tax rate (ranging from 5% - 55%)719 to a single flat 15% 
in the 2008 Amendments. Many of the 1955 Decree’s shortcomings were left 
untreated, in terms of poor wording, discrimination against foreign enterprises, 
                                                 
716 See pp. 76-88. 
717 See pp. 88-95. 
718 See pp. 94-97. 
719 See p. 109. 
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inefficiency and vagueness, unreformed and without improvement in the articles 
of the 2008 Amendments720.  
 
 
 
There is an opposition towards taxation from domestic Kuwaiti enterprises and 
especially from national distributing companies - sole agents for foreign goods - 
and franchisees. These enterprises are excluded from taxation under the current 
system. Both national distributors and franchisees lead profitable businesses, 
however, their initial reaction to the proposition of taxation is met with strong 
opposition explaining that the Kuwaiti government has adequate resources and 
must not extract taxes from national businesses, also claiming that national 
enterprises should be treated more favourably than foreign enterprises.  
Although national distributors and franchisees continue to be excluded from tax in 
Kuwait, there is, however, a capacity within the current Kuwait tax system to 
include them in the tax base.  
Sufficient connection must exist between the tax jurisdiction and (a) taxable 
person (tax subject) and (b) a taxable event (tax object) in order for tax liability to 
arise. The connecting factors are generally based on residency, nationality or the 
domicile of the tax payer for the tax subject, and on the source rules over income 
or gain for the tax object721. According to this a national distributor is connected 
to the state of Kuwait via nationality and source of income which constitutes him 
as a tax subject (due to nationality/domicile). Although this argument is outside 
the scope of this study, it is a crucial issue to address in future research. 
                                                 
720 See pp. 136- 142. 
721 Rohatgi, R. (2005), Basic International Taxation, Second Edition, Vol. I: Principles, 
Richmond, p. 196.  
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Chapter 4 discusses at length when tax liability arises if a foreign enterprise 
carries on trade or business in Kuwait through a national agent722. However, the 
foreign principal gaining profits from selling goods in Kuwait through a national 
agent is to this day excluded. There exists, however, a capacity to tax the foreign 
principal gaining profits from selling his products in Kuwait through a national 
agent in the current tax law; Kuwait’s fiscal system adopts the source of income 
connection rule, where an income or a gain is taxable in Kuwait as long as it has 
resulted from an activity that took place in Kuwait, this includes work carried out 
outside Kuwait (offshore activity) under a contract that involves an activity in 
Kuwait (onshore activity)723. Accordingly profits, fees, and incomes received by 
overseas foreign corporations due to an activity that took place in Kuwait should 
be taxed in Kuwait. Although this argument is outside the scope of this study, it is 
a crucial issue to address in future research. 
 
Proposing tax reform in Kuwait as mentioned earlier724 requires attending to some 
reservations and answering a number of queries. A crucial question to ask before 
undertaking fiscal reform is: does Kuwait have the freedom to reform its fiscal 
system or is it under any regional or international constraints? Chapter 5 argues 
that although Kuwait is a member of the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) 
established in 1981 and amended in 2001 to which other Gulf countries are party, 
the UEA has imposed a Customs Union (CU)725 upon its member states, to which 
                                                 
722 See pp. 122-136. 
723 See pp. 101-102. 
724 See p. 304. 
725 See p. 165. 
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all member states have now complied, although Kuwait and other members states 
cannot reform their customs duties in a manner that contradicts with the UEA, 
Kuwait and other member states still have the freedom to reform other domestic 
taxes. 
Kuwait has also been a member of the WTO since 1995 and although Kuwait 
abide by the WTO principles of Most Favourite Nation (MFN) or National 
Treatment (NT)726 by excluding national enterprise and taxing foreign ones, 
however, this breach of the WTO obligations has not been challenged. 
 
Clearing the ambiguity surrounding Kuwait’s freedom to reform its domestic 
fiscal system in Chapter 5 yielded another question in regards to Double Taxation 
Treaties (DTTs). DTTs are international tax obligations Kuwait has with other 
states and when planning tax reform one cannot ignore the issue of double 
taxation and how it affects international commerce and its importance on 
multinationals’ decision making. There is a particularly important reason to 
discuss Kuwait’s approach in signing its DTTs in this thesis due to its objective in 
finding an initiative to attract more FDI to Kuwait. Kuwait’s fiscal system focuses 
mainly on the taxation of the corporate income of foreign enterprises carrying on 
trade or business in Kuwait and with taxation on foreign enterprises being the 
main source of tax return in Kuwait, it is vital to shed light on how Kuwait 
relieves cross-border investment from double taxation. 
                                                 
726 See pp. 159-160. 
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Chapter 6 looks in depth and compares the different methods available for 
eliminating double taxation: deduction, credit and exemption727, and how to 
choose the optimal method of double taxation relief.  
Although there are several Model Conventions for DTTs, the most popular ones 
referred to with much emphasis in Chapter 6 are the OECD and the UN Model 
Conventions and as an increasing number of countries compete to attract 
multinational companies through different fiscal incentives it is not surprising that 
tax treaties exhibit considerable heterogeneity, however, most treaties loosely 
follow the OECD or the UN Models.  
With 48 DTTs Kuwait sometimes applies the OECD Model convention and 
sometimes the UN Model convention and in some cases deviates from both. A 
very close analysis is presented of how Kuwait’s DTTs with other states treat 
crucial elements of international commerce i.e. Permanent Establishment (PE), 
when an Agent is considered a PE and thus raises tax liability, its treatment of 
business profits, dividends, interests and royalties, capital gains, non-
discrimination provisions, exchange of information provisions, method of 
eliminating double taxation, and finally dispute settlement and mutual agreement 
procedures. Kuwait being a country that aims at attracting FDI has entered into 
some DTTs that are beneficial for its fiscal interest and some that are not. 
However, in the present era of global economic integration and interdependence 
of countries, states cannot shape their attitudes towards international investment 
without carefully considering external fiscal relations with other states. In some 
instances, a constraint on a country’s freedom  of fiscal action may be market led, 
                                                 
727 See pp. 172-175. 
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for example a developing country may offer tax incentives to attract foreign direct 
investment not because it necessarily wishes to do so (as it is likely to lose tax 
revenue) but in order to compete with other countries which also offer 
incentives728. 
 
Understanding the behaviour of multinationals is key when aiming to attract more 
FDI. In order to transform the Kuwaiti fiscal system and make it more attractive 
for foreign investments there is a need to understand why companies invest? How 
they invest? And why they don’t invest?  
 
a. Why do Companies Invest? 
  
The most important reasons for investing are: (1) maintenance of markets for 
companies in the manufacturing field; (2) Availability of raw material for 
companies in the extractive field; (3) Expansion of existing operations within a 
particular county to meet greater need; (4) Development of foreign markets for 
present product lines; (5) Instigation of others desiring the company to operate 
within particular country; (6) Possibilities of unusually large profits729. 
 
 
1. Maintenance of Market: 
 
                                                 
728 See Salter (note 686 supra). 
729 Barlow, E. R. and Wender, I. T. (1955), Foreign Investment and Taxation, Harvard Law 
School, pp.146 – 245. 
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The usual reason for beginning an assembly or manufacturing operations is to 
hold onto or maintain a market within the country that had already been 
established through exports. If a company starts selling in a particular country 
through export, then gradually increases the scope of the sales activity until it has 
a considerable marketing organization within the country, the natural progression 
would be next to manufacture, or at least local assembly, in the majority of cases 
however the shift from exports and local marketing to assembly or manufacture is 
not a result of a smooth transition; usually something, an outside factor or a crisis, 
makes it necessary for management to decide whether it is willing to assemble or 
manufacture. Among other factors that could make the decision to assemble or 
manufacture necessary are: (1) government activity730; (2) local competition; (3) 
inadequacy of local distribution; (4) marketing of related products731.  
 
2. Availability of Raw Materials  
 
In the extractive field companies invest in those countries where the raw materials 
are available. A petroleum company will sink a large sum of money in exploration 
and development if there is some indication that oil is plentiful732.  
 
3. Expansion of Existing Operations 
 
                                                 
730 This activity may take the form of import restrictions, tariffs, or exchange controls. 
731 When a country decides to assemble or manufacture a product in a country due to another 
relative product which the same company assembles of manufactures in that same country. 
732 See Barlow & Wender (note 729 supra). 
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It is common to begin an assembly or manufacturing operation in a country as a 
result of a decision to maintain a market after some outside factor has intervened, 
subsequent investment in that country is largely the result of expansion of existing 
operations733. 
 
4. Development of Foreign Markets for Present Product Lines 
 
A few companies actually make a deliberate policy-level decision to embark on 
foreign operations. When companies develop products and services to the point 
where they experience a slow rate of growth by a marginal return from increasing 
pressure on their taxing lines, they must choose between developing new products 
and services or exploiting their products and services outside their residence state.  
 
5. Instigation of Others 
 
When restrictions are imposed within a particular country (i.e. the occasion of 
government activity), either the company’s regular distributor or customers within 
the country may request that they be given permission to establish local 
manufacture or assembly operations on a licensing basis.  
 
6. Possibilities of Unusually Large Profits 
 
                                                 
733 Id. 
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A company typically does not consider various areas of the world in which 
investment might take place, find an opportunity for a product and make an 
investment. The high profit will be one of the factors involved in the decision, but 
not necessarily the compelling one734.   
 
b. How do Companies Invest? 
 
In the field of manufacturing, companies make small initial investments in a 
country and expand subsequently from foreign earnings. Countries where large 
initial investments are not required in order to start operations for overseas 
companies are most likely to contain the greatest percentage of foreign 
investment. The question how foreign corporation invest is linked closely to the 
questions why companies invest; with three important considerations: (1) How are 
investment opportunities brought before management? (2) How are investment 
opportunities investigated? (3) How are investment decisions made? 
 
1. How investment opportunities are brought before management  
 
Due to a particular problem arising in the host country i.e. government restrictions 
have affected export operations, or the plant may have become too small in terms 
of the existing market, that the market can no longer be supplied, or a distributor 
may have failed to do an adequate job. Such problems or similar ones would be 
brought to the attention of the company’s management; the management would 
                                                 
734 See Barlow & Wender (note 729 supra). 
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then weigh investment propositions in terms of costs and profits and decide in 
favour of the most promising investment735.  
 
2. How investment opportunities are investigated 
In most cases a formal report is prepared for management where projected 
operational costs are worked out in considerable detail, and estimated profits are 
calculated. 
 
3. How investment decisions are made 
These are made by the top-operating executive of the company, either the 
chairman of the board or the president. The company considers the overall 
situation when deciding on an investment, e.g. a decision on building a refinery in 
a particular place is tied in directly with the production and marketing operations. 
It may be worthwhile to build a refinery with a low rate return because it will 
favourably affect the marketing operations or will provide a greater outlet for the 
company’s crude oil. In such a situation, it is difficult to decide just how profits 
should be divided between different parts of the business. In other words, it would 
be possible to price crude oil high into the refinery and low out of the refinery, so 
that the refinery makes little money, or by pricing crude oil low, take a large profit 
in the refinery. The profit could be realized on the crude end of the business, on 
the refinery or in the marketing736.   
    
c. Why Companies Do =ot Invest 
                                                 
735 See Barlow & Wender (note 729 supra). 
736 See Barlow & Wender (note 729 supra). 
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The lack of interest and knowledge in foreign investment is the top reason why 
companies do not invest abroad, although other factors can hinder foreign 
investment: (1) the company does little exporting and therefore has not been 
brought into contact with foreign situation; (2) the products made by the company 
are so specialized that foreign countries do not provide a large enough market for 
a manufacturing investment; (3) management, money, and the technical personnel 
are needed for the resident state expansion; (4) the nature of the industry is such 
that a very large initial investment is required; (5) governments discourage private 
investment by foreigners in a particular industry737.   
Applying all the above knowledge of why and how corporations invest to the 
situation in Kuwait, did Kuwait provide foreign investors with enough incentive 
to enter its jurisdiction? 
 
Does Kuwait Attract FDI?  
 
Chapter 6 of this thesis discusses extensively Double Tax Treaties, their 
objectives and importance, it also looks in detail at Kuwait’s DTTs with other 
countries, how such treaties treat foreign profits/incomes raised in Kuwait, and the 
incentives which these DTTs may provide for both parties. Chapter 7 also 
discusses the reduction in the tax rate which the Kuwait Tax Law Amendments 
2/2008 offers to foreign enterprises doing business in Kuwait738; however, the 
question which remains to be answered here is how successful were such 
                                                 
737 Id. 
738 See p.247. 
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concessions in attracting foreign investors? And how do they correspond with 
Kuwait’s domestic tax policy, since it differs from that of other states. 
 
1. Kuwait’s treatment of dividends  
 
Tax Law Amendments 2/2008 withhold a tax of 15% on dividends paid to foreign 
enterprises by national companies listed in KSE. The same Article in Tax Law 
Amendment 2/2008 exempts undistributed profits from tax; Article 2 (g) states:  
“The term “income” means gains and profits of a body corporate derived from 
carrying on trade or business in Kuwait”.739 
 
“The profits of the incorporated entity resulting from trading operations within 
Kuwait Stock Exchange shall herby be exempted from the tax already imposed 
under this law, whether it has been executed directly or via portfolios and 
investment funds.”740 
 
Chapter 2 of the Tax Law Amendment bylaws also provides (exempts): 
1. The incorporated body’s profit resulting only from trades in Kuwait Stock 
Exchange Market, whether directly made or through investment portfolios 
or funds 
2. The incomes realized by a natural person from practicing a trade or 
business in the state of Kuwait unless he proves that he is representing the 
share of an incorporated body  
 
The legislator intended for the tax dividends paid to foreign companies by 
national companies to be liable for a 15% withholding tax whilst exempting 
trading profits; this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4741. However, since 
Kuwait exempts individual income from taxation, the problem of the double 
taxing dividends, once at the company level, and another time in the hands of the 
beneficiary, will not occur here. Other issues will however rise: the first and most 
                                                 
739 Article 2 (g) of the Tax Law Amendments  2/2008. 
740 Article 1 of the Tax Law Amendments 2/2008.  
741 See pp. 152 - 154. 
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obvious is the discrimination between national and foreign companies investing in 
KSE, where national companies are exempt on the dividends they receive when 
investing in KSE, causing a natural disincentive for foreign companies to invest. 
Second, foreign individuals (natural persons) receiving dividends in Kuwait are 
also exempt, which can cause avoidance if such foreign persons were trading in 
KSE for the interest of a foreign enterprise. And finally, how does withholding 
taxes upon dividends paid to foreign enterprises fit with the dividends treatment at 
the state of residence of the foreign beneficiary? Kuwait requires the national 
distributing company to withhold a 15% tax on the dividends it pays out to its 
foreign shareholders; this means that it’s the shareholder (foreign company) that 
bears the tax burden on the dividends, not the distributing company. Also as has 
been discussed in chapter 6742, Kuwait adopts the OECD treatment for dividends 
in most of its DTTs where the dividends are taxed in the beneficiary state of 
residence; the dividends can also be taxed in the host state with a limited tax rate 
provided in the treaty, which in Kuwait’s cases varies between 5%, 10%, and 
15%743. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
a. If the home state imposes a 15% tax on the dividends the beneficiary 
earned in Kuwait, the taxes liability will be offset against the 15% tax 
withheld in Kuwait. However, in regards to home states that impose 
less on dividends e.g. 10% or 5% the difference is credited at the 
                                                 
742 See pp. 197-201.  
743 See p. 200. 
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beneficiary’s home state. The optimal situation would be to withhold a 
tax equal to that imposed in the home state or lower to create an 
incentive. 
b. In its treaties with countries that retain the sole right to tax dividends 
paid out to their resident companies, Kuwait needs to re-negotiate its 
right to withhold tax on dividends at the source in order not to lose tax 
money to the state of residence. There is also the argument that 
companies don’t necessarily need to pay dividends, even if firms 
needed to distribute profits, they could effectively do so by re-
purchasing shares, however there is a view that there is an intrinsic 
value to dividends; through distribution of profits the firm proves to 
the shareholder who may not have full information about the profit 
ability of a firm that the firm is doing well.744 Thus the source country 
where the distributing company is located should be entitled to tax 
such dividends. 
c. In the case where Kuwait exempts foreign natural persons from 
withholding tax on dividends they earn in Kuwait, there is not much 
effect to this incentive if the resident state of the beneficiary (foreign 
natural person) taxes its residence on their foreign income, which is 
usually the case. The only way Kuwait can give effect to such 
incentive is to sign a “Tax-sparing” agreement with other member 
states. The proposed agreement will state that for the purpose of the 
resident state tax credit, the foreign natural person who had earned 
                                                 
744 Slemrod, J. (1999) Tax Policy in the Real World, Cambridge University Press, pp.17-20. 
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dividends in the state of Kuwait and was exempted from tax in Kuwait, 
shall be treated in his state of residence as if he had in fact paid the tax 
that was “spared”, or in other words be given a credit for the tax he had 
not paid745.  
d. The above recommendation should apply for trading profits earned by 
foreign companies investing in Kuwait, when foreign companies buy 
and sell shares in KSE their profits of such trading are exempt, such an 
incentive will not have effect unless met with a tax-sparing agreement 
between Kuwait and other foreign states. 
 
 
2. Kuwait’s Treatment of Interest   
 
In Kuwait’s DTTs with most Asian countries interest is taxed at home state. 
Interest can also be taxed at host state, however, host state tax in this case does not 
exceed 10%; other state’s rates varied between 5%, 7% and 8% but none are 
higher than 10%746.  
 
1. Recommendations 
 
a. Kuwait could renegotiate its treaties with countries that restrict the 
right to tax interests at the beneficiary state of residence, prohibiting 
Kuwait from the right to tax interest arising in its jurisdiction with a 
                                                 
745 Richamn, P. (1963) Taxation of Foreign Investment: An Economic Analysis, Hopkins, p.55. 
746 See p. 203. 
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tax lower than that of the beneficiary state of residence e.g. 5% which 
can serve as an incentive for those companies and be credited in their 
state of residence.   
b. In its’ treaties with countries which allow interest taxing at host state, 
with a limit of 5% or 8% tax, Kuwait can renegotiate this rate, 
however keep it lower than the state of residence’s rate in order for the 
beneficiary to be credited the difference.  
 
 
3. Kuwait’s Treatment of Royalties 
 
Kuwait adopts the UN Model in most of its DTTs; taxing the payee of the royalties at the 
home state, however allowing the host state to tax with a limited rate747. Kuwait’s DTTs 
with most states limit host state taxation on royalties with rates between 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, and 30%748.  
 
Recommendation 
 
Since Kuwait does not tax national companies and natural persons, the taxes paid for 
royalties arising in the above states will not be offset against anything, thus it is in 
Kuwait’s best interest to renegotiate the royalty clause with countries that allow the 
source state to tax royalties up to 30% by bringing the rate down to 15%, this will serve 
as an incentive to invest for both contractors.  
 
                                                 
747 See p.206. 
748 See p.206.  
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4. Suggesting Amendments to Kuwaiti Laws  
 
The main focus of this thesis - from the beginning - was to reform the Kuwaiti tax policy 
in order to attract more foreign investment to Kuwait, however the empirical research749 
has shown that there’s a lot that needs to be done, and foreign enterprises doing business 
in Kuwait have highlighted many issues which have slowed down and stood in the way of 
taking their enterprises further. The recommendations provided by foreign enterprises 
doing business in Kuwait on how to improve the existent legislation constitute much 
needed guidance on how to attract FDI750. 
 
 
4.1 The Kuwaiti Laws 
       
1. Tax Law Amendments 2/2002 
 
a. Discriminating Between National and Foreign Enterprises:  
 
The discrimination between national and foreign enterprises was one of the main 
points raised by almost all of the foreign enterprises and Tax Auditors 
interviewed751. The Non-discrimination clause included in the OECD and UN 
Model Convention is one of the fundamental rules of international investment752. 
Although the Kuwaiti tax law does not explicitly exclude national companies 
from taxation, in practice it’s only foreign enterprises that are liable to pay taxes 
                                                 
749 See Chapter 7. 
750 See p. 291-292. 
751 See pp. 255-261 and 291-300. 
752 See pp. 217-223. 
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in Kuwait753, for many investors this constitutes a disincentive to invest, and in 
some cases such as the US a barrier to sign a double taxation treaty with Kuwait.  
 
b. Unclear provisions and ambiguous definitions: 
 
Foreign businesses in Kuwait have criticised the Tax Law as being vague and ambiguous, 
almost all of the companies interviewed754 provided that apart from the reduced tax rate 
which the new amendments brought no actual improvement has been made to the law in 
terms of clarifying the following debated issues: 
- The definitions of agent and tax payer 
- Tax inspector authorities 
- Penalties in the event of failure to pay tax, or failure to pay on time 
- Allowances and disallowances. 
 
Simplicity is one of the main requirements of a tax policy. A tax law should be 
understood by the tax payer. If tax payers do not understand the working of a tax they 
may respond to it in an irrational way. The terms of a tax should be expressed clearly and 
precisely, the language as well as the content should be as straight forward as possible755 .   
 
c. Recommended additions: 
 
- The first and most important recommendation is regarding the national agent rule 
which most foreign companies suffer from in terms of restricting their ownership 
of their own business and sharing the right to decision making756, but worst of all 
demanding a higher agency commission than that specified in an agreement 
                                                 
753 See pp. 110-111 and pp. 112-113. 
754 See pp. 241-246. 
755
 Sanford, C.T. (1971), Realistic Tax Reform, Catto &Windus Ltd. London, p.9. 
756 See pp. 298-300. 
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between foreign business and national agent. Thus eliminating the agency rule 
helps make Kuwait a more attractive market. 
- Most companies argued that the progressive rate the previous Tax Decree 3/1955 
imposed provided more justice than the new 15% flat rate757, especially for the 
smaller size companies that fell under the previous 5% and 10% rate.  
- The authorities of the tax inspector should be regulated (according to the current 
practice there are no restrictions on tax inspector’s authorities)758. 
- Most companies would like to see an increase in the recently decreased head 
office expenses and agent commissions759. 
- A separate and an independent panel from the tax department to look into tax 
objections and appeals760. 
- Tax holiday for the first few years (preferably 5 years) of the foreign business 
investment life in Kuwait761. 
 
2. The Kuwaiti Commercial Law No. 68/1980: 
 
The Kuwaiti commercial law provides in Article 23 that no person other than a 
Kuwait can carry out business in Kuwait, unless they have one (or more) Kuwaiti 
partners, provided that the capital investment by the Kuwaiti is no less than 51% 
of the total capital of the treading firm.  Article 24 of the same law states: “No 
foreign company may establish a branch or carry on trading activities in Kuwait 
except through a Kuwaiti agent”. 
 
a. Recommendations: 
                                                 
757 See pp. 247-251. 
758 See pp. 271-274. 
759 See p. 292. 
760 See pp. 286 and 292. 
761 See p. 292. 
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- The elimination of the Kuwaiti National Sponsor rule, and the rule of foreign 
business being restricted to owning only 49% of their business while a Kuwaiti 
National has to own the other 51%. This recommendation has been on the top of 
the list with all of the foreign businesses interviewed762. 
- Easier requirements for starting up a business in the Kuwait commercial law763. 
 
3. The Kuwaiti Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 8/2001 
 
The law and the foreign investment bureau has been discussed briefly in chapter 
4764 and mentioned again in Chapter 7765. It should be noted here that this law was 
found to enhance Kuwait’s ability to attract FDI by allowing foreign enterprises 
working in Kuwait to own 100% of their businesses, and – under specific 
circumstances – providing foreign enterprises with a 3 – 10 year tax exemption. 
However, the law proved to be more successful in theory than in practice with 
endless bureaucratic requirements for foreign enterprises to fulfil in order to reap 
the benefits which the law offers. 
 
a. Recommendations: 
    
- To make the law accessible to more companies: the law aims to provide tax 
incentives for foreign investment in Kuwait, however with the law’s current very 
challenging requirements, foreign enterprises have not been able to benefit from 
                                                 
762 See p. 261 and pp. 298-300. 
763 See p. 259 and p. 294. 
764 See pp. 106-108. 
765 See pp. 295-296. 
 328 
 
the incentives this law provides since it came into force in 2001, only 7 
companies have been considered eligible. 
- Better promotion of the law: a significant number of foreign enterprises working 
in Kuwait have provided that they are not familiar with the law or the benefits it 
aims to provide for foreign investors carrying on trade and business in Kuwait766, 
thus most probably, potential foreign investors outside Kuwait are also unfamiliar 
with this law, which defeats its objective of attracting more foreign investment to 
the state. 
 
Other countries have laws such as the Republic of Korea’s enacted Promotion Act (FIPA) 
in 1998, an attempt to create a more liberalized and favourable business environment for 
foreign businesses and providing tax incentives to certain types of FDI. Under the FIPA, 
foreign businesses and investors who make advanced technology FDI in Korea are 
eligible for exemptions from individual and corporate income taxes for the first 7 years 
and 50% reductions for the next three years. In addition, foreign businesses and investors 
have been granted exemptions from a number of local taxes (i.e. acquisition tax, property 
tax, aggregate land tax, and registration tax) for a minimum of 5 years and 50% 
reductions for the next 3 years. Imported capital goods have also been made eligible for 
full or partial exemptions from custom duties, the special excise tax, and VAT767. 
However, the exemptions and special treatments given to promote specific economic 
objectives should not be so widely extended without the broadening of the tax base first. 
The already narrow tax base in most developing countries is eroded further by the 
provision of fiscal incentives in the form of tax preference and exemptions768.To 
maximize the likelihood of beneficial results from tax concessions and to reduce the 
                                                 
766 See p. 296. 
767 See Sanford, (note 755 supra). 
768 World Bank, (1991), Lessons of Tax Reform, World Bank, p.2. 
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damage that may be caused by poorly-designed and implemented incentives, countries 
should adhere to the following rules: 
1. Keep it simple: incentives should be few in number and simple in structure as 
possible. 
2. Keep records on who receives what concessions and at what cost is revenue 
forgone and also if the incentive is intended to achieve some particular objective, 
on the measurable results; in the absence of such information the incentive is 
simply not efficient.  
3. Evaluate the numbers at regular intervals to determine whether the incentive is 
achieving results worth its estimated cost, and if it is not, eliminate it769. 
 
 
4.2  Reforming The Kuwaiti Tax Department 
 
a. Recommendations: 
 
- To have a judicial system (for tax objections and appeals) independent from the 
tax department (this is not the case at the moment, as the person who looks into 
tax assessment objections and appeals is the tax inspector who carried out the 
assessment and his supervisor) this recommendation was on the top of the list for 
all the foreign companies interviewed770. 
- The elimination of arbitration: all foreign enterprises interviewed have 
complained about how arbitrary tax inspectors are in terms of deductions, 
allowances and disallowances, and in inspection procedures771; both foreign 
                                                 
769
 Bird, R.M. (2008), The BBLR Approach to the Tax Reform in Emerging Countries, National 
Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, pp. 7-8. 
770 See p. 261, 268, 278 and 287. 
771 See p. 281 and 290. 
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enterprises and Tax Auditors believe that tax inspectors and tax employees 
should have clear authorities, restricted and regulated by law, this helps eliminate 
uncertainty which is caused by the arbitrary decisions tax employees/inspectors 
make.   
- Efficiency: although the majority of enterprises interviewed described the 
Kuwaiti Tax Department as efficient, they did criticise it’s level of efficiency; in 
terms of inspectors not being available for inspection, or failing to inspect on the 
day of inspection set by them, not taking any of the company’s comments on 
board, and finally not submitting the assessment to the subject enterprise on 
time772. 
1) Poor communication between foreign enterprises and inspectors, and the tax 
department in general due to language barriers. 
2) The unfamiliarity of tax inspectors with international accounting standards can 
cause inspectors to fail to assess the foreign enterprises fairly. 
3) The ‘deemed profit’ problem, most enterprises interviewed have on some 
occasion experienced the unfair ‘deemed profit’ treatment. The Tax Department 
has the authority under Circular 43/2002 to tax a foreign enterprise with a 15% 
tax  even when the enterprise has shown losses if the enterprise did not submit a 
certain document, or did not show profits that financial year. 
 
Reforming an existing tax system is not a straightforward process, adopting a 
fiscal regime proven successful in another jurisdiction will not always result in the 
same success if consideration was not given to the differences between the two 
jurisdictions, effectively, developed and developing states need their fiscal 
                                                 
772 See pp. 270-275. 
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systems to operate in different ways and therefore will mould their reform in ways 
that will fit their fiscal needs most. 
 
Developed and developing countries differ in their taxing strategies, the difference 
between industrial and developing countries is that the latter rely more heavily on 
corporate tax than on personal income tax. Personal income taxes are hard to 
collect in predominately rural economies or economies with large informal 
sectors, also personal income tax requires sophisticated tax administrations which 
developing countries lack773. In 1998 Korea’s tax revenue had decreased 
significantly due to the recession, on the other hand a sharp increase in 
government spending was necessary, particularly to meet part of the cost of 
restructuring, unemployment benefits, and social safety nets. These naturally led 
to a huge fiscal deficit. To prevent an excessive deficit, the government raised tax 
rates on items that were believed to have been least affected by the economic 
crisis774. Thus among others, taxes on gasoline and diesel were raised, and the 
progressive taxation on interest income was switched to a proportional 
withholding tax. In addition to these, cigarettes became subject to VAT on top of 
the existing local tax. The government also curtailed tax exemptions and 
reductions. One notable example is the abolition of the VAT exemption on 
services supplied by professional service providers’ e.g. lawyers, and 
accountants775. Broadening the base of the tax system should be a high priority 
when reforming the tax policy. In developing countries the tax base is often 
                                                 
773 World Bank (note 768 supra). 
774 Yoo, I. (2000), Experience with Tax Reform in the Republic of Korea, Asia Pacific 
Development Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 82. 
775 Id. 
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narrow so governments must rely on relatively high tax rates to generate revenue 
(this used to be the case in Kuwait for foreign investments which used to pay 
taxes up to 55% on their income) the higher the rate, the greater the distortion in 
private economic activity and the greater the associated efficiency costs of 
taxation.  In recent years the VAT has come into favour as an instrument for 
broadening the goods and services tax base in developing countries, as a desirable 
broadly based tax instrument, the VAT – particularly simplified versions of it – is 
suggested for most countries that do not already have one. The basic argument in 
favour of VAT is that, in light of its built-in-self enforcing mechanisms; it is a 
reliable generator of revenue and incurs relatively small efficiency losses. 
However since lower-income taxpayers tend to consume a higher proportion of 
their income than do middle and upper income taxpayers the VAT can be 
regressive. In an attempt to correct this the VAT is generally implemented with 
selected exemptions for commodity groups, such as unprocessed food, that are 
important items in the expenditure of the poor, and it is often supplemented by a 
set of luxury taxes on income-elastic consumption goods776.  
In addition to broadening the current tax base considering the possibility of future 
individual tax or VAT, Kuwait must understand the behaviour of foreign 
investment in order to have the means to attract more FDI. 
Most Countries in Transition (CITs) governments have adopted a western-style 
tax structure with relative ease, yet have struggled with low rates of revenue 
mobilization and increasing rates of tax evasion777. It has slowly become clear that 
                                                 
776 World Bank (note 768 supra). 
777 Go, D. S., (1994), External Shocks, Adjustment Policies and Investment in a Developing 
Economy: Illustrations from a Forward.Looking CGE Model of the Philippines, Journal of 
Development Economics 44(2): 229-61. 
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whether or not the tax reform effort ultimately succeeds in CITs will depend upon 
the upgrading of the tax administration system. Poor tax administration can be 
partly blamed for the poor revenue performance by CITs. Tax revenues in CITs 
plunged in years immediately following early reforms778. Tax systems are as good 
as their enforcement. Effective tax reform cannot be accomplished in isolation 
from the current capabilities of the tax administration system and taxpayers 
culture. The most serious mistake CITs collectively made was to focus primarily 
on modernizing tax policies and relegating tax administration and taxpayer issues 
to remote second place. Because the time required for these efforts to take effect 
was measured in years, the focus shifted to tax policy reform without considering 
the limited capacity of the tax administration. The results have been in many cases 
lagging collections and increased evasion779. 
 
Are all Tax Concessions Welcome? 
  
Kuwait needs to simplify procedures, open the door to foreign investors in terms 
of infrastructure, and provide business opportunities and ensure political stability 
since those three requirements (business opportunities, infrastructure and political 
stability) were the most desirable conditions foreign enterprises look for in a host 
country. Foreign investors confirmed that those three conditions are more 
important than tax exemptions, tax holidays or increased allowances780.  Although 
tax concessions and subsidies continue to play a role in the case of market failure, 
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and Lessons, Georgia State University, International Studies, pp. 5-6. 
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in recent years fiscal experts have become more sceptical about using fiscal 
incentives in the form of tax expenditures to promote activities for the following 
reasons: 
- Tax concessions erode the revenue base, the more tax concessions are 
granted, the higher the rates have be on the remaining tax bases to raise the 
requisite revenue781. 
- Many incentive schemes are a response to pressure groups rather than to 
needs that can be analytically justified. The resulting biases in favour of 
some sectors and projects can lead to inefficiency by altering the relative 
profitability of projects in the eyes of investors.  
- Some incentive measures are ineffective, either because they are 
insufficient to override underlying economic forces, as with the incentives 
for decentralizing the locations of industries, or because they are offset by 
other domestic or foreign tax provisions. 
- If tax incentives become a source of inequity, they make the tax burden 
uneven across taxpayers. 
- Incentives schemes facilitate rent-seeking and arbitrage activities (legal 
ways of manipulating income so that it accrues to a low-tax entity) thereby 
making it difficult to administer taxes. 
 
Mexico is one of the many countries that in recent years has responded to limiting 
the use of fiscal incentives. In the early 1980s, a fiscal incentive scheme was 
implemented by the Mexican government to promote investment. The programme 
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had several objectives: increase employment, promote high-priority sectors of the 
economy, develop small industries, and to promote balanced regional growth. The 
incentives were given in the form of a tax credit based on a special certificate 
(CEPROFIS) that was used to pay the beneficiary’s tax liabilities. During the 
three year period when CEPROFIS was implemented and promoted as the most 
important incentive, it was proven highly ineffective because the multiplicity of 
objectives weakened the signals that the government intended to send through the 
tax incentives. Thus due to its revenue costs and ineffectiveness the scheme was 
among the measures pruned to reduce the public sector deficit.782  
 
How Concessions can Affect International Investment 
 
The impact of tax policy on international competitiveness has not received much 
attention in tax reform analysis. It appears that developing countries are often 
engaged in wasteful tax competition by offering an increasing array of incentives 
to foreign investors, while not paying adequate attention to the tax regime that a 
potential investor faces in his home country. An investor from a country with a 
worldwide system of taxation can be taxed by the host country at the home 
country tax rate. Further, the host country must ensure that income is not shifted 
to low tax countries or tax havens through transfer pricing783. The theory of public 
finance and past experience from developed and developing countries show that 
the choices of tax structure and tax reform strategy can have significant effects on 
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the overall economic performance of a country. The correlation coefficients 
between tax reform and measurements such as: 
            -  The Timing of Tax Reform, 
            -  The Preparation for Tax Reform,  
(The average period of time allotted for preparation of legislation and 
preparation for implementation), 
- Stability (stability in reforming tax legislation, not constant, rapid 
changes),   
- The Tax Rates, 
- Prevalence of Tax Holiday, 
- and Complexity of the tax laws 
are very important in determining success of the tax reform. States that have 
adopted effective tax reform strategies have not done that in isolation of other 
important pieces of economic reform. Also effective tax reform needs to be 
accompanied by overall liberalization, privatization, more competition and 
effectiveness of legislation fostering investment784. As additional measures to 
attract FDI in the Republic of Korea, the long protected real estate market in the 
country was completely opened to foreign investors in 1998 in an effort to attract 
large-scale foreign investment. The government also introduced a Foreign 
Investment Zone (FIZ) system. Foreign investment companies that receive the 
FIZ designation are eligible for government support and tax benefits. As for 
incentives provided to small and medium sized enterprises to stimulate 
employment and technology investment, they include tax exemptions on stock 
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 Martinez-Vasquez (note 779 supra). 
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options, tax credits, and exemptions on R&D, reduction of special excise tax on 
consumer electronic goods and automobiles, reduction of automobile tax, and 
reduction of capital gains tax785. In practice, the application of conventional fiscal 
analysis to developing countries is heavily constrained by the inadequacy of the 
data and information base, by administrative weaknesses and by insufficient 
political will786. Indeed the basic ingredients for an effective tax administration 
are: the political will to administer the tax system effectively, a clear strategy for 
achieving this goal and adequate resources for the task. The tax administration 
should be given an appropriate institutional form, adequately staffed with trained 
officials, with an organizational structure based on function or client groups. 
Computerization and appropriate use of modern information technology are 
important787. Experience from tax administration improvement suggests that the 
best approach to improving tax administration begins by assuming that the tax 
payer is a client not a thief to be caught. Studies on tax payer behaviour have 
shown that services to tax payers that facilitate reporting, filing, and paying taxes, 
or that impart education or information among citizens about their obligations 
under the tax laws, are often as or more cost-effective in securing compliance than 
measures (auditing, penalties) more directly designed to counter non-compliance. 
Simplifying procedures is also one of the main incentives for tax compliance; 
eliminating demands for superfluous information in tax returns and consolidating 
return and payment forms. Once procedures are simplified, the tax administration 
can then concentrate on its main tasks: facilitating compliance, monitoring and 
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enforcing compliance, and controlling corruption788. Another major task is to 
control corruption amongst tax collectors. Corruption undermines confidence in 
the tax system, affects willingness to pay taxes, and reduces a country’s capacity 
to finance government expenditures789, no government can expect taxpayers to 
comply willingly if tax payers believe the tax structure is unfair or the revenue 
collected is not effectively used. Ideally tax collectors/inspectors should be 
professionally trained, promoted on the basis of merit, and judged by their 
adherence to the strictest standards of legality and morality. Temptation should be 
reduced by reducing direct contact between officials and tax payer, and increasing 
supervision when they do have such contact 790. 
 
 
More revealing of this thesis is its direct contact with foreign enterprises doing 
business in Kuwait. Throughout Chapter 7 an empirical survey is carried out on 
foreign enterprises in Kuwait and various interviews and questionnaires 
undertaken with Tax Auditors, employees working in the Tax Department in 
addition to foreign enterprises carrying on work or business in Kuwait. The 
general attitude of the survey samples was that the 2008 Amendments did not add 
much improvement to Income Tax Decree 3/1955 other than the significant 
reduction in the tax rate791. Foreign enterprises have also stated their opinions on 
how Kuwait can improve its chances of becoming more attractive for FDI, where 
the majority wanted to see agency and 49% shareholding rules eliminated, such 
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rules prohibit foreign enterprises from carrying on business in Kuwait unless they 
(a) had a national agent, or (b) held no more than 49% of a company’s shares 
while a national holds 51% of the company’s shares. This recommendation topped 
the list of foreign enterprises in Kuwait as the above rules create a significant 
hindrance to FDI. 
Clarifying the ambiguity in the Tax Law Amendments was also one of the main 
recommendations foreign enterprises had. Many foreign enterprises called for a 
panel which is separate from the Kuwaiti Tax Department to look into objections 
and appeals relating to tax assessments.  
Most Taxpayers (foreign enterprises) who agreed that Kuwait is actually an 
attractive jurisdiction for foreign investment based their opinion on the reduction 
in the tax rate. However, disturbingly, perhaps, almost 70% of taxpayers in the 
survey samples used in Chapter 7 felt that Kuwait is not an attractive environment 
for investment. Some of the reasons cited were as follows:  
- Kuwait’s business regulations are very restricting (agency and sponsorship 
rules), while other GCC countries are opening up for investment and 
abolishing barriers. 
- It is supposed to be attractive but it is not due to the endless disputes between 
the government and Parliament. All development projects are shelved, and 
the continuous re-shuffling of the government is a hindrance to decision 
making. 
- There are business opportunities but the requirement that a national must 
own 51% of the project makes these opportunities unattractive. 
- The bureaucracy is huge, too many rules, and requirements and very long 
procedures. 
- It is only attractive for oil companies792.  
 
 
 
Tax payers (foreign enterprises) had the following specific recommendations to 
improve the 2008 Amendments: 
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- The law is ambiguous, more clarity is crucial. 
- There needs to be periodical reviews on the law and its clauses and 
amendments in order to improve the law and the system as a whole. 
- Increase allowances for agent commission and head office expenses. 
- A progressive tax rate is fairer than a flat rate tax. 
- An independent panel to rule in tax objections and appeals, rather than the 
tax inspector in the Tax Department. 
Giving start-up companies a tax holiday e.g. first five years of their business as 
an encouragement.  
Also, in terms of improving the Tax Department’s services each survey sample 
had the following recommendations: 
 
 Taxpayers’ (foreign enterprises) recommendations on improving the tax 
department: 
- We want the Department to interact more closely with companies. We want 
to talk to them and communicate with them. 
- Better deadline definition (they give us deadlines for tax assessments but 
they never comply). 
- The arbitration panel must be independent from the Department. 
- When they have doubts on our accounts there should be a chance to talk and 
discuss instead of taxing us according to deemed profits. 
- There is a language barrier. They don’t speak English, and we don’t speak 
Arabic. 
- Easier, faster inspection procedures.   
- Fairer treatment for taxpayers without discriminating against smaller 
companies by treating larger ones more favourably. 
 
Tax Auditors recommendations on how to improve the tax department; 
- Tax law should cover all areas and not leave any room for  arbitration, or self 
interpretation. 
- Better qualified inspectors, by introducing them to international accountancy 
standards, and also exposing them to more advanced tax systems.  
- The inspectors need to be more responsible; accountability is important. 
- Simpler and easier compliance procedures, tax assessments and inspection 
procedures. 
- An independent panel for tax objections and appeals. 
 
 
Tax Department’s recommendations on how to improve the tax department: 
 
- Developing the staff by offering courses and better training. 
- Increasing tax awareness in the country. 
- A more comprehensive tax law. 
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- Independence of the Tax Department from the Ministry of Finance and less 
bureaucracy. 
- Better communication and correspondence with taxpayers and tax auditors 
by listening to their concerns and recommendations. 
- A tax magazine for the employees which provides the latest news on 
amendments, and changes on tax locally and internationally to improve their 
tax awareness.  
 
 
 
Each chapter in this thesis has given rise to a crucial question in relation to the 
feasibility of tax reform in Kuwait and finally recommendations of how such tax 
reform can be carried out. There is much scope for taxing individual income in 
Kuwait and national companies especially when conforming to the WTO 
principles of MFN and NT, as has been mentioned in chapter 4 there is a capacity 
in the current tax system to tax national enterprises, however, in terms of taxing 
both individuals and national enterprises the Kuwaiti governments needs to 
provide fiscal awareness for the people and the domestic enterprises. As 
mentioned in chapter 2 it would not be realistic to argue that Zakat alone can 
serve as a sufficient system of redistribution of wealth in its current form, i.e. 
Zakat is currently voluntary in Kuwait allowing a significant chance of avoidance, 
and in its current inflexible form where all Zakat revenue is allocated to eight 
exclusive groups of poor and needy people mentioned in the Qur’an and not 
permitted towards the provision of public goods and services. The community 
based fiscal system which Kuwait is in crucial need for is one that focuses on 
convincing the Kuwaiti people that through tax extraction they can finance the 
provision of public goods and services and be able to hold their government liable 
to the level of such provisions of goods and services. It would be useful to merge 
Sen’s capability approach with a system similar to Zakat, only one which allows 
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revenues to be spent on public goods, rather on just the worse off. With the 
capability approach which Sen endorses, resources will not only be extracted from 
the better off into the state and distributed between the worse off but there will 
also exist a significant measure of how to turn these resources into functionings 
that can benefit society as a whole. However, both this ambition of taxing the 
Kuwaiti people and national enterprises is outside the scope of this thesis but 
provide an interesting and relevant subject for future research.  
What can be achieved in the short term in regards to the reformation of the 
Kuwaiti fiscal system is the cooperation between the Kuwaiti government and the 
Tax Department to take Taxpayers’ recommendations mentioned above on board. 
Certainly relaxing the requirements and reducing the barriers for starting a 
business in Kuwait and allowing foreign investors more freedom to run their own 
enterprise without agency rules or the 49% rule can enhance Kuwait’s ability to 
attract investment. Business opportunities and political stability also go a long 
way and in terms of the Tax Department; eliminating the concept of deemed 
profits, providing an arbitration panel which is separate from the Tax Department 
to look into the objections and appeals of tax assessments carried out by tax 
inspectors, and restricting the powers of tax inspectors to avoid arbitrary 
decisions, all contribute towards a fairer and more efficient Tax Department, as 
foreign enterprises prefer to be certain about their tax liability when investing in a 
foreign jurisdictions, this provides the feeling of commercial stability which 
foreign investment needs.   
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Poor tax administration as pointed out by Martinez793 can be partly blamed for the 
poor revenue performance. Tax systems, he provides, are as good as their 
enforcement. Effective tax reform cannot be accomplished in isolation from the 
current capabilities of the tax administration system and taxpayers culture. The 
most serious mistake a country reforming its tax system can do is focus primarily 
on modernizing its tax policies and relegating tax administration and taxpayer 
issues to remote second place. 
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Verse from the Qu’ran  
Surat Al Ahzab 33:33. 
Surat Al An’am 6:141. 
Surat Al Baqara 2:267. 
Surat Al Maida 5:12. 
Surat Al isa 4:5. 
Surat Al Tawbah 9:34. 
Surat Al Tawbah 9:60. 
Surat Al Tawbah 9:103. 
Surat Al Zariyat 51:19. 
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Personal Interviews  
A personal interview with the director of Kuwait Tax Department, Mr. Fayez Al 
Jassar, March 12th 2009. 
 
 
 
 
